|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1801 To 2400|
|Locale Reference||airport : mia|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 0
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng|
|Flight Phase||ground : preflight|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : second officer|
|Qualification||pilot : flight engineer|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 450|
flight time total : 5500
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 150|
flight time total : 15000
flight time type : 5000
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : less severe|
non adherence : far
other anomaly other
|Independent Detector||other other : unspecified|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : detected after the fact|
|Air Traffic Incident||other|
This aircraft was scheduled to be an large transport a but was switched several times to an large transport B. This aircraft arrived several hours late with an MEL item concerning an intermittent problem with the cruise trim. The aircraft was operated several legs previous by other crew members with this same condition. When maintenance issued a corrective item number to allow the aircraft O continue operation in this state (open MEL). The number was referenced to an large transport a. The large transport a has no flight restrictions with this problem. The large transport B (of which ours belongs) does have flight restrictions involved when the cruise trim is inoperative. Since this was referenced to an large transport a, there was no note of the flight restrictions on the computer generated dispatch release. The flight crew had no knowledge of these flight restrictions and operated the aircraft under the normal operations specifications of the flight manual. Had the item been referenced properly by having it listed under an large transport B, it is my belief the flight crew would have had proper notification and operated the aircraft accordingly. Supplemental information from acn 86422: three crews prior to my flight had flown this aircraft and not detected any irregularity with the ci. Had I been the captain of the first flight after the assigning of this or any ci, my personal policy would have been to research the MEL completely prior to flight. Some possible contributions to not questioning the ci may have been the day's activity. We (the crew) had been subjected to irregular operations, rescheduling and rerouting and extensive ground waits, awaiting inbound aircraft for our flight. This was the last flight of the day and we were to be exceeding maximum on duty crew time. There was no significant WX to contribute to another abnormal crew fatigue. Subsequent to my flight the error was discovered. The aircraft was taken out of service, repaired and returned to service in minimum time (3 hours). With so much information being computer generated how is it possible for flight crews to practically check every piece of paper we receive for complete validity? Particularly when so much information is not readily available to flight crews.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLT DISPATCHED IN AN UNAIRWORTHY ACFT THAT WAS DECLARED AIRWORTHY BY MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT.
Narrative: THIS ACFT WAS SCHEDULED TO BE AN LGT A BUT WAS SWITCHED SEVERAL TIMES TO AN LGT B. THIS ACFT ARRIVED SEVERAL HRS LATE WITH AN MEL ITEM CONCERNING AN INTERMITTENT PROB WITH THE CRUISE TRIM. THE ACFT WAS OPERATED SEVERAL LEGS PREVIOUS BY OTHER CREW MEMBERS WITH THIS SAME CONDITION. WHEN MAINT ISSUED A CORRECTIVE ITEM NUMBER TO ALLOW THE ACFT O CONTINUE OPERATION IN THIS STATE (OPEN MEL). THE NUMBER WAS REFERENCED TO AN LGT A. THE LGT A HAS NO FLT RESTRICTIONS WITH THIS PROB. THE LGT B (OF WHICH OURS BELONGS) DOES HAVE FLT RESTRICTIONS INVOLVED WHEN THE CRUISE TRIM IS INOP. SINCE THIS WAS REFERENCED TO AN LGT A, THERE WAS NO NOTE OF THE FLT RESTRICTIONS ON THE COMPUTER GENERATED DISPATCH RELEASE. THE FLT CREW HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THESE FLT RESTRICTIONS AND OPERATED THE ACFT UNDER THE NORMAL OPS SPECS OF THE FLT MANUAL. HAD THE ITEM BEEN REFERENCED PROPERLY BY HAVING IT LISTED UNDER AN LGT B, IT IS MY BELIEF THE FLT CREW WOULD HAVE HAD PROPER NOTIFICATION AND OPERATED THE ACFT ACCORDINGLY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 86422: THREE CREWS PRIOR TO MY FLT HAD FLOWN THIS ACFT AND NOT DETECTED ANY IRREGULARITY WITH THE CI. HAD I BEEN THE CAPT OF THE FIRST FLT AFTER THE ASSIGNING OF THIS OR ANY CI, MY PERSONAL POLICY WOULD HAVE BEEN TO RESEARCH THE MEL COMPLETELY PRIOR TO FLT. SOME POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO NOT QUESTIONING THE CI MAY HAVE BEEN THE DAY'S ACTIVITY. WE (THE CREW) HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO IRREGULAR OPS, RESCHEDULING AND REROUTING AND EXTENSIVE GND WAITS, AWAITING INBND ACFT FOR OUR FLT. THIS WAS THE LAST FLT OF THE DAY AND WE WERE TO BE EXCEEDING MAX ON DUTY CREW TIME. THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT WX TO CONTRIBUTE TO ANOTHER ABNORMAL CREW FATIGUE. SUBSEQUENT TO MY FLT THE ERROR WAS DISCOVERED. THE ACFT WAS TAKEN OUT OF SVC, REPAIRED AND RETURNED TO SVC IN MINIMUM TIME (3 HRS). WITH SO MUCH INFO BEING COMPUTER GENERATED HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR FLT CREWS TO PRACTICALLY CHK EVERY PIECE OF PAPER WE RECEIVE FOR COMPLETE VALIDITY? PARTICULARLY WHEN SO MUCH INFO IS NOT READILY AVAILABLE TO FLT CREWS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.