Narrative:

We were on a visual approach to runway 21R kdtw, 4 mi, behind an mdt. Landing clearance was received. Then asked to 'reduce to final approach speed,' (we were already at vap 147 KIAS). An large transport will depart prior to your arrival. We were approximately 3 mi from T/D, 900' AGL, when the large transport was cleared into position. The mdt had just T/ded. Since the first officer was flying, I advised him to 'be prepared to go around,' and briefed the missed approach procedure. I then transmitted to the tower, 'this isn't going to work,' hoping that the local controller would stop the large transport from moving into position. The controller responded with 'it'll work!' at 600' AGL, approximately 2 mi from T/D, the large transport was in position and the mdt was just beginning to clear. At 500' AGL, the large transport began to roll. At approximately 300' AGL, I ordered a go around. After we initiated the go around, the tower said 'go around!' I began a right turn, as I was concerned that the large transport would climb up under us, even though the missed approach procedure is 'climb to 3000', 210 degree heading, then direct svm VOR to hold.' while I would not characterize this to be a dangerous situation, it certainly was upsetting to our passenger, wasteful and definitely unnecessary. There was more than ample opportunity for the local controller to cancel the clearance given to the large transport. It was obvious to me that the controller would not take the warning or suggestion of a pilot, even though the situation was obviously rapidly degrading.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB INITIATED A GO AROUND BECAUSE THE PIC THOUGHT HE WAS LNDG TOO CLOSE BEHIND AN LGT ON TKOF.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 21R KDTW, 4 MI, BEHIND AN MDT. LNDG CLRNC WAS RECEIVED. THEN ASKED TO 'REDUCE TO FINAL APCH SPD,' (WE WERE ALREADY AT VAP 147 KIAS). AN LGT WILL DEPART PRIOR TO YOUR ARR. WE WERE APPROX 3 MI FROM T/D, 900' AGL, WHEN THE LGT WAS CLRED INTO POS. THE MDT HAD JUST T/DED. SINCE THE F/O WAS FLYING, I ADVISED HIM TO 'BE PREPARED TO GO AROUND,' AND BRIEFED THE MISSED APCH PROC. I THEN XMITTED TO THE TWR, 'THIS ISN'T GOING TO WORK,' HOPING THAT THE LCL CTLR WOULD STOP THE LGT FROM MOVING INTO POS. THE CTLR RESPONDED WITH 'IT'LL WORK!' AT 600' AGL, APPROX 2 MI FROM T/D, THE LGT WAS IN POS AND THE MDT WAS JUST BEGINNING TO CLR. AT 500' AGL, THE LGT BEGAN TO ROLL. AT APPROX 300' AGL, I ORDERED A GO AROUND. AFTER WE INITIATED THE GO AROUND, THE TWR SAID 'GO AROUND!' I BEGAN A RIGHT TURN, AS I WAS CONCERNED THAT THE LGT WOULD CLB UP UNDER US, EVEN THOUGH THE MISSED APCH PROC IS 'CLB TO 3000', 210 DEG HDG, THEN DIRECT SVM VOR TO HOLD.' WHILE I WOULD NOT CHARACTERIZE THIS TO BE A DANGEROUS SITUATION, IT CERTAINLY WAS UPSETTING TO OUR PAX, WASTEFUL AND DEFINITELY UNNECESSARY. THERE WAS MORE THAN AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE LCL CTLR TO CANCEL THE CLRNC GIVEN TO THE LGT. IT WAS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT THE CTLR WOULD NOT TAKE THE WARNING OR SUGGESTION OF A PLT, EVEN THOUGH THE SITUATION WAS OBVIOUSLY RAPIDLY DEGRADING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.