An A319 first officer reported forgetting the predictive windshear switch on his after landing check...

Narrative:

After clearing the runway and contacting ground control; I performed my after landing flows. Upon arrival at the gate and accomplishing the parking checklist it was discovered that I had missed the pws (predictive windshear switch) and left it on. This was of course radiating the ground personnel until it was turned off; when accomplishing the parking checklist. I feel that the reason I missed this item on my after landing flow was due in part to the practice of pairing first officer's with first officer's during initial training. I was paired with another first officer and because of this; I was only afforded 1/2 of the time in my proper seat. The other 1/2 of the time I spent in the captain's seat; learning captain flows. This only allowed me to perform my required flows during 1/2 of my simulator training. And in some cases; due to the training that was occurring on that training day; it wasn't uncommon to not perform any flows from the first officer's seat during the training period. This is an unsafe training practice and needs to stop. It is certainly not a 'best practice' for an industry and an airline that touts safety is the number #1 priority.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 First Officer reported forgetting the Predictive Windshear Switch on his after landing check. Training paired with another First Officer during simulator training was cited as a contributory cause.

Narrative: After clearing the runway and contacting Ground Control; I performed my after landing flows. Upon arrival at the gate and accomplishing the parking checklist it was discovered that I had missed the PWS (Predictive Windshear Switch) and left it on. This was of course radiating the Ground Personnel until it was turned off; when accomplishing the parking checklist. I feel that the reason I missed this item on my after landing flow was due in part to the practice of pairing First Officer's with First Officer's during initial training. I was paired with another First Officer and because of this; I was only afforded 1/2 of the time in my proper seat. The other 1/2 of the time I spent in the Captain's seat; learning Captain flows. This only allowed me to perform my required flows during 1/2 of my simulator training. And in some cases; due to the training that was occurring on that training day; it wasn't uncommon to not perform any flows from the First Officer's seat during the training period. This is an unsafe training practice and needs to stop. It is certainly not a 'best practice' for an industry and an airline that touts safety is the number #1 priority.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	862986
Time
Date	200912
Local Time Of Day	1801-2400
Place
Locale Reference	ORD.Airport
State Reference	IL
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	A319
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Taxi
Flight Plan	IFR
Component
Aircraft Component	Weather Radar
Person 1
Function	First Officer Pilot Not Flying
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 82 Flight Crew Total 12500 Flight Crew Type 775
Events
Anomaly	Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

An A319 first officer reported forgetting the predictive windshear switch on his after landing check. Training paired with another first officer during simulator training was cited as a contributory cause.