Narrative:

At approximately XA00L; I departed as a student pilot on a solo-country; operating under sport pilot rules and regulations. The flight departed with a full stop landing at ZZZ; about 30 NM distance; to return to home base. During the preflight; I observed fuel was unbalanced. I spoke with the flight school's manager and notified her of the issue. The manager stated that this was a normal issue and that I should turn off the lesser fuel valve after I am no longer in a critical stage of flight. During the enroute portion of the flight; I shut off the left fuel valve to allow the fuel to equalize as instructed. The flight was uneventful. When I was getting ready to descend to pattern altitude; I intended to turn the left fuel valve back to the 'on' position; remembering to make these adjustments while I was still at a higher altitude. However; I inadvertently shut 'off' the valve which was in the 'on' position. Again my intention was to turn both valves to the 'on' position; but made the mistake in turning both of the fuel valves 'off.' I made my approach radio call and descended to pattern altitude. The aircraft continued to run as normal. Then; shortly after entering the 45 degree to downwind runway 34; the engine died due to fuel starvation. I performed the engine restart procedures. I checked to assure that both fuel valves were in the same direction; mistakenly not realizing that both fuel valves were in the wrong position. The engine failed to restart. I had the runway made; had been making my radio calls; knew there was no one else in the traffic pattern; and had just seen another airplane safely takeoff. I decided to land the airplane safely. I made my radio calls to announce that I was 'engine-out' and 'landing runway 34.' I also made a 'mayday' call on AWOS. I continued to make the radio calls as necessary. I made a safe landing at approximately XA35. After securing the aircraft; I troubleshot the cause of the engine failure. I quickly determined that I had mistakenly moved both fuel valves to 'off' rather than 'on' as intended. After determining this as the cause of the failure; I departed to return home; with another aircraft (also based at my home base) to follow my flight. ETD was XA50. I determined that the ete should be approximately fifteen minutes to arrive just before the end of civil twilight (XB19). The sun set whilst enroute. I made a normal pattern landing at night; arriving at approximately XB25. I landed safely and secured the aircraft. I made the mistake to continue home being that I would be close to arriving after legal day VFR. Some factors which contributed to these errors this day were: 1) failure to assure both fuel valves in on position. 2) continuing home after inadvertent engine failure. 3) misjudging my ete and ETA at home; based on recent time change. 4) overall judgment deterioration resulting from mistakes leading to a dead-stick landing. I have learned very much from this flight. I will always be sure to perform a more thorough pre-landing checklist. Further; better planning will go into my day/night VFR observations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LSA student pilot inadvertently turns off both fuel selectors entering the VFR pattern and lands safely; dead stick. The error is discovered and corrected on the ground and the decision is made to return to base; landing after civil twilight.

Narrative: At approximately XA00L; I departed as a student pilot on a solo-country; operating under sport pilot rules and regulations. The flight departed with a full stop landing at ZZZ; about 30 NM distance; to return to home base. During the preflight; I observed fuel was unbalanced. I spoke with the Flight School's Manager and notified her of the issue. The Manager stated that this was a normal issue and that I should turn off the lesser fuel valve after I am no longer in a critical stage of flight. During the enroute portion of the flight; I shut off the left fuel valve to allow the fuel to equalize as instructed. The flight was uneventful. When I was getting ready to descend to pattern altitude; I intended to turn the left fuel valve back to the 'on' position; remembering to make these adjustments while I was still at a higher altitude. However; I inadvertently shut 'off' the valve which was in the 'on' position. Again my intention was to turn both valves to the 'on' position; but made the mistake in turning both of the fuel valves 'off.' I made my approach radio call and descended to pattern altitude. The aircraft continued to run as normal. Then; shortly after entering the 45 degree to downwind Runway 34; the engine died due to fuel starvation. I performed the engine restart procedures. I checked to assure that both fuel valves were in the same direction; mistakenly not realizing that both fuel valves were in the wrong position. The engine failed to restart. I had the runway made; had been making my radio calls; knew there was no one else in the traffic pattern; and had just seen another airplane safely takeoff. I decided to land the airplane safely. I made my radio calls to announce that I was 'engine-out' and 'landing Runway 34.' I also made a 'mayday' call on AWOS. I continued to make the radio calls as necessary. I made a safe landing at approximately XA35. After securing the aircraft; I troubleshot the cause of the engine failure. I quickly determined that I had mistakenly moved both fuel valves to 'off' rather than 'on' as intended. After determining this as the cause of the failure; I departed to return home; with another aircraft (also based at my home base) to follow my flight. ETD was XA50. I determined that the ETE should be approximately fifteen minutes to arrive just before the end of civil twilight (XB19). The sun set whilst enroute. I made a normal pattern landing at night; arriving at approximately XB25. I landed safely and secured the aircraft. I made the mistake to continue home being that I would be close to arriving after legal day VFR. Some factors which contributed to these errors this day were: 1) Failure to assure both fuel valves in ON position. 2) Continuing home after inadvertent engine failure. 3) Misjudging my ETE and ETA at home; based on recent time change. 4) Overall judgment deterioration resulting from mistakes leading to a dead-stick landing. I have learned very much from this flight. I will always be sure to perform a more thorough pre-landing checklist. Further; better planning will go into my day/night VFR observations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.