Narrative:

Approaching airport field from the northwest. Field was in sight with showers southeast of airport. Lagoon visuals in effect; planning ILS runway 10; visual to runway 8. On base briefed full ILS runway 10 in the event showers reached the airport. Approaching condo; my 'RA' was intermittent; then faulted; which kicked off the autopilot before I expected to assume control. Approach was normal; no unusual radio transmissions by other aircraft or ATC noted. Below 500 ft (400 ft) 'go around; windshear ahead' warning triggered with red 'do not fly' band ahead. Initiated go around; tower said to fly runway heading. (I believe I hit the non-existent go around buttons where the 757's had them. 87 hrs on 737; first go around vs. 9000 hrs on 757/767 lead to negative transfer). Based on windshear alert; and previous visual and radar depiction I thought this was unsafe. Advised first officer to notify ATC of the necessity for a left turn (ie. In direction of usual missed approach procedure); and started turn. ATC came back with a turn to the right; opposite usual map; and towards the weather we were avoiding. Advised ATC that we were unable. We were climbing to 2000 ft per ATC instruction when first officer noticed TCAS traffic closing from the right. Glanced at inboard display unit and saw target a couple hundred feet above us. We were approximately 1500 ft IMC and climbed to 2000 ft. Target aircraft appeared to be in high teens or perhaps 2000 ft. First officer directed left turn. ATC was giving instructions but I decided that with traffic this close we would have to ensure our own separation. First officer directed further left and to descend. Glanced at lower display unit and traffic was +1. Over banked aircraft and increased descent to gain vertical separation and move target behind 3/9 line. Intermittent VFR as we were descending and gaining separation from weather. First officer stated she had target aircraft in sight and they were turning away. Approaching level off at approximately 1000 ft; and heading approximately 350 degrees we encountered cavok. With separation assured we continued with ATC instruction. ATC gave us instructions for another approach. During this time ATC advisde all aircraft 'sju tower visibility nil.' we diverted. Sju approach answered another aircraft's query with 'two guys behind him went around.' that's the first we knew anyone else had gone around. Kudos to the first officer and TCAS inventors. First officer did an outstanding job assuming directive control based on the situational awareness of evolving TCAS threat. No TCAS guidance due to altitude required manual interpretation of situational awareness. Flying aircraft; using HUD; having to change scan to lower screens; confirm TCAS; back to flying aircraft; left me in a slower 'processing' state of no notice; very short range; evolving TCAS threat. Hectic time; windshear go-around; ATC instruction into weather that conflicted with windshear guidance and prior visual/radar scan; and opposite normal map procedures; all while trying to clean up aircraft; transitioning into a short notice; no guidance TCAS event; at low altitude; was very hectic. On the ground I saw the aircraft which we had the near miss with; he had been 25 NM ahead of us into sju. I was surprised to see him at the diversion airport as we weren't aware of any prior go around's. On the ground spoke with sju supervisor at XC00. He stated he'd already heard the tapes; understood why we had to fly the track we did; but that it probably resulted in a loss of separation with an air carrier aircraft that had also gone around. I called dispatch and advised them of the event and reports to follow. Based on the reduction of visibility (unbeknownst to us at the time;) windshear directed go-around; subsequent report of 'nil' visibility; and after discussing with first officer and reviewed the event as we saw it; I still believe this was the safest course of action. First officer and TCAS; were key elements in the success. The next morning I spoke with the captain of a previous flight into sju. He said he had landed VFR. By the time he attempted to park at the gate the ramp was closed due to lightning and thunderstorm at the field. His landing time was XA38; so he probably was approaching his gate at about the time we were on the ILS; if not starting our go-around. His 'in' time was XB09. His description of the change in weather conditions (VFR to ramp closed in single digit minutes) reinforces my thinking that the GA; and subsequent weather avoidance; was critical.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier Crew responded to an EGPWS 'WINDSHEAR AHEAD' warning. Because the hazardous weather was in their go around path they turned opposite ATC's directions and had a near miss with an aircraft that had previously executed a go around.

Narrative: Approaching airport field from the Northwest. Field was in sight with showers Southeast of airport. Lagoon Visuals in effect; planning ILS Runway 10; visual to Runway 8. On base briefed full ILS Runway 10 in the event showers reached the airport. Approaching CONDO; my 'RA' was intermittent; then faulted; which kicked off the autopilot before I expected to assume control. Approach was normal; no unusual radio transmissions by other aircraft or ATC noted. Below 500 FT (400 FT) 'Go around; windshear ahead' warning triggered with red 'do not fly' band ahead. Initiated go around; Tower said to fly runway heading. (I believe I hit the non-existent go around buttons where the 757's had them. 87 hrs on 737; First go around vs. 9000 hrs on 757/767 lead to negative transfer). Based on windshear alert; and previous visual and radar depiction I thought this was unsafe. Advised First Officer to notify ATC of the necessity for a left turn (ie. in direction of usual missed approach procedure); and started turn. ATC came back with a turn to the right; opposite usual map; and towards the weather we were avoiding. Advised ATC that we were unable. We were climbing to 2000 FT per ATC instruction when First Officer noticed TCAS traffic closing from the right. Glanced at inboard display unit and saw target a couple hundred feet above us. We were approximately 1500 FT IMC and climbed to 2000 FT. Target aircraft appeared to be in high teens or perhaps 2000 FT. First Officer directed left turn. ATC was giving instructions but I decided that with traffic this close we would have to ensure our own separation. First Officer directed further left and to descend. Glanced at lower display unit and traffic was +1. Over banked aircraft and increased descent to gain vertical separation and move target behind 3/9 line. Intermittent VFR as we were descending and gaining separation from weather. First Officer stated she had target aircraft in sight and they were turning away. Approaching level off at approximately 1000 FT; and heading approximately 350 degrees we encountered CAVOK. With separation assured we continued with ATC instruction. ATC gave us instructions for another approach. During this time ATC advisde all aircraft 'SJU Tower visibility NIL.' We diverted. SJU approach answered another aircraft's query with 'two guys behind him went around.' That's the first we knew anyone else had gone around. Kudos to the First Officer and TCAS inventors. First Officer did an outstanding job assuming directive control based on the situational awareness of evolving TCAS threat. No TCAS guidance due to altitude required manual interpretation of situational awareness. Flying aircraft; using HUD; having to change scan to lower screens; confirm TCAS; back to flying aircraft; left me in a slower 'processing' state of no notice; very short range; evolving TCAS threat. Hectic time; windshear go-around; ATC instruction into weather that conflicted with windshear guidance and prior visual/radar scan; and opposite normal MAP procedures; all while trying to clean up aircraft; transitioning into a short notice; no guidance TCAS event; at low altitude; was very hectic. On the ground I saw the aircraft which we had the near miss with; he had been 25 NM ahead of us into SJU. I was surprised to see him at the diversion airport as we weren't aware of any prior go around's. On the ground spoke with SJU supervisor at XC00. He stated he'd already heard the tapes; understood why we had to fly the track we did; but that it probably resulted in a loss of separation with an air carrier aircraft that had also gone around. I called Dispatch and advised them of the event and reports to follow. Based on the reduction of visibility (unbeknownst to us at the time;) windshear directed go-around; subsequent report of 'nil' visibility; and after discussing with First Officer and reviewed the event as we saw it; I still believe this was the safest course of action. First Officer and TCAS; were key elements in the success. The next morning I spoke with the Captain of a previous flight into SJU. He said he had landed VFR. By the time he attempted to park at the gate the ramp was closed due to lightning and thunderstorm at the field. His landing time was XA38; so he probably was approaching his gate at about the time we were on the ILS; if not starting our go-around. His 'in' time was XB09. His description of the change in weather conditions (VFR to ramp closed in single digit minutes) reinforces my thinking that the GA; and subsequent weather avoidance; was critical.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.