|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0601 To 1200|
|Locale Reference||airport : pvd|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 0
|Controlling Facilities||tower : mem|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng|
|Flight Phase||climbout : takeoff|
descent : approach
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : flight engineer|
pilot : atp
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 200|
flight time total : 8500
flight time type : 3000
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Anomaly||non adherence : far|
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : anomaly accepted|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||Pilot Deviation|
*Reporter had been bumped back to first officer and very junior as the result of a merger. He is making every attempt to accept the demotion and be the best first officer possible. Was flying with a former company captain who was senior and was continuing to fly the left seat. Three incidents of command authority and questionable judgement came to light on this segment of trips. Gross weight information was not in the second officer flight manual and an attempt was made to get a copy from dispatch. Company ground personnel were not familiar with the required information and it could not be located. The captain called to return to the aircraft as they had the problem solved. During the taxiout the captain advised he was using weight information from a similar airport and elevation. Second incident involved landing minimums with the type of flight director on the aircraft. At the time of the merger the FAA mandated that if the flight crew had not received training on the flight director in use, the minimums would have to be 4000 and 3/4. First officer had been checked on different type flight director and felt he was not qualified. Captain elected to make the approach anyway. Third incident involved proceeding to an airport below minimums at time of departure and forecasted to remain. Captain advised if they delayed until the new forecast came out, which called for above minimum conditions, they would be legal to go. Elected to depart and at best completed the approach below minimums. Reporter finds it very difficult to be a good first officer under these conditions even thought he felt nothing was life threatening. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: gave information as to type aircraft involved. Feels the ground personnel are very limited in training and in general very lax. Finds it very difficult to operate under the conditions he now finds himself. At no time did the captain explain his decisions or apologize for his actions. The final approach ended up being made west/O the required callouts on final and the aircraft descended 100' below minimums with no comment from the captain.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: COMMAND AUTHORITY USED IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL AVIATION REG.
Narrative: *RPTR HAD BEEN BUMPED BACK TO F/O AND VERY JUNIOR AS THE RESULT OF A MERGER. HE IS MAKING EVERY ATTEMPT TO ACCEPT THE DEMOTION AND BE THE BEST F/O POSSIBLE. WAS FLYING WITH A FORMER COMPANY CAPT WHO WAS SENIOR AND WAS CONTINUING TO FLY THE LEFT SEAT. THREE INCIDENTS OF COMMAND AUTHORITY AND QUESTIONABLE JUDGEMENT CAME TO LIGHT ON THIS SEGMENT OF TRIPS. GROSS WT INFO WAS NOT IN THE S/O FLT MANUAL AND AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO GET A COPY FROM DISPATCH. CGP WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE REQUIRED INFO AND IT COULD NOT BE LOCATED. THE CAPT CALLED TO RETURN TO THE ACFT AS THEY HAD THE PROB SOLVED. DURING THE TAXIOUT THE CAPT ADVISED HE WAS USING WT INFO FROM A SIMILAR ARPT AND ELEVATION. SECOND INCIDENT INVOLVED LNDG MINIMUMS WITH THE TYPE OF FLT DIRECTOR ON THE ACFT. AT THE TIME OF THE MERGER THE FAA MANDATED THAT IF THE FLT CREW HAD NOT RECEIVED TRNING ON THE FLT DIRECTOR IN USE, THE MINIMUMS WOULD HAVE TO BE 4000 AND 3/4. F/O HAD BEEN CHKED ON DIFFERENT TYPE FLT DIRECTOR AND FELT HE WAS NOT QUALIFIED. CAPT ELECTED TO MAKE THE APCH ANYWAY. THIRD INCIDENT INVOLVED PROCEEDING TO AN ARPT BELOW MINIMUMS AT TIME OF DEP AND FORECASTED TO REMAIN. CAPT ADVISED IF THEY DELAYED UNTIL THE NEW FORECAST CAME OUT, WHICH CALLED FOR ABOVE MINIMUM CONDITIONS, THEY WOULD BE LEGAL TO GO. ELECTED TO DEPART AND AT BEST COMPLETED THE APCH BELOW MINIMUMS. RPTR FINDS IT VERY DIFFICULT TO BE A GOOD F/O UNDER THESE CONDITIONS EVEN THOUGHT HE FELT NOTHING WAS LIFE THREATENING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: GAVE INFO AS TO TYPE ACFT INVOLVED. FEELS THE GND PERSONNEL ARE VERY LIMITED IN TRNING AND IN GENERAL VERY LAX. FINDS IT VERY DIFFICULT TO OPERATE UNDER THE CONDITIONS HE NOW FINDS HIMSELF. AT NO TIME DID THE CAPT EXPLAIN HIS DECISIONS OR APOLOGIZE FOR HIS ACTIONS. THE FINAL APCH ENDED UP BEING MADE W/O THE REQUIRED CALLOUTS ON FINAL AND THE ACFT DSNDED 100' BELOW MINIMUMS WITH NO COMMENT FROM THE CAPT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.