Narrative:

I was in the cockpit jumpseat; wearing headset during pushback. All required communications and phraseology from the flight crew was accomplished in accordance with standard operating procedures (sops). After the captain asked the pushback crew to disconnect external air after starting engine #2 only. Pushback crew confirmed this. The captain then asked the pushback crew if all ground equipment was clear; and if they were ready for pushback. Pushback crew confirmed clear and ready for pushback; captain then told the pushback crew that the parking brake was released; and that they were clear for pushback. As we started our push I felt and heard a 'grinding' vibration and noise in the aircraft. The pushback was stopped by the pushback crew and the captain immediately asked the pushback crew what happened? There was no response from the pushback crew. After numerous attempts by the captain to establish communications; I noticed the pushback tug operator just walking away from his post (with the #2 engine still running). Every ramp person at this time ignored the hand signals of both pilots to establish headset communications for a period of approximately 7 - 10 minutes. The first officer effectively assisted the captain in advising the company; and the ramp control. Then the airstart operator answered to the captain's hand signal to get on the headset. He got on the headset and told the captain it was not his fault. The captain was very assertive to request the airstart operator to 'remain' on the headset to continue communications since we still had #2 engine running. Airstart operator said he was not responsible for this and told the captain goodbye. Cockpit to ground communications were established approximately 20 minute after this incident.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier cockpit jumpseat rider reported aircraft damage during pushback; allegedly due to ramp equipment not being clear of the aircraft.

Narrative: I was in the cockpit jumpseat; wearing headset during pushback. All required communications and phraseology from the flight crew was accomplished in accordance with Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). After the Captain asked the pushback crew to disconnect external air after starting engine #2 only. Pushback crew confirmed this. The Captain then asked the pushback crew if all ground equipment was clear; and if they were ready for pushback. Pushback crew confirmed clear and ready for pushback; Captain then told the pushback crew that the parking brake was released; and that they were clear for pushback. As we started our push I felt and heard a 'grinding' vibration and noise in the aircraft. The pushback was stopped by the pushback crew and the Captain immediately asked the pushback crew what happened? There was no response from the pushback crew. After numerous attempts by the Captain to establish communications; I noticed the pushback tug operator just walking away from his post (with the #2 engine still running). Every ramp person at this time ignored the hand signals of both pilots to establish headset communications for a period of approximately 7 - 10 minutes. The First Officer effectively assisted the Captain in advising the Company; and the Ramp Control. Then the Airstart Operator answered to the Captain's hand signal to get on the headset. He got on the headset and told the Captain it was not his fault. The Captain was very assertive to request the Airstart Operator to 'remain' on the headset to continue communications since we still had #2 engine running. Airstart Operator said he was not responsible for this and told the Captain goodbye. Cockpit to Ground communications were established approximately 20 minute after this incident.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.