Narrative:

We had a gate hold due to weather at ZZZ for approximately 3 hours. During this time I got lfpg ATIS and loaded the entire flight plan with the dpe 4W arrival and the ILS runway 27L. After departure gave vectors till handed off to paris who gave us dpe 4W arrival. Then merue; merue arrival. After merue we got vectors for the approach runway 29R. No bells had yet gone off and I (pilot flying) started configuration and asked for the approach checklist. The last item on the checklist is NAVAID's; checked when given a last heading and cleared for the approach. I saw no localizer. I told the first officer to manually tune the ILS. By now we had flown through the runway 27R localizer and past runway 27L. I disconnected the autopilot; autothrottles and manually turned the plane back to the right. Lfpg called and said air carrier X you are going to runway 27R. This further confused me and the first officer said that's in the south complex. Now lfpg called and gave us a heading 360 degree and 4000 ft. I turned right to 360 degrees and reconnected the autopilot. The first officer now pointed at the glare shield altitude selector and said 4000 ft. I looked and it was set to 4000 ft. He now pointed to the glare shield and again said 4000 ft. This time I looked at my flight instruments and saw we were actually holding 3650 ft. I pulled altitude selector and we climbed back to 4000 ft. Approach gave us vectors back for another approach runway 27R; next approach was uneventful. Extenuating factors included: fatigue; I was able to sleep 4.5 hours each of the previous 2 nights. Complacency: I had a 3 hour old ATIS and been to lfpg many times. I also put too much reliance in my first officer; he was actually fairly new on the plane. He later told me he was overwhelmed and did not finish the approach checklist. I've learned many lessons from this and have made adjustments in my operating technique to make sure nothing like this happens again. In the end; I am the captain; the boss; and this is my responsibility. Rest assured; I take this very seriously.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier on approach to Runway 27R at LFPG flew through the localizer; failed to maintain assigned altitude and was given additional vectors by ATC for another approach; reporter claiming fatigue and too much reliance on the First Officer as causal factors.

Narrative: We had a gate hold due to weather at ZZZ for approximately 3 hours. During this time I got LFPG ATIS and loaded the entire flight plan with the DPE 4W arrival and the ILS Runway 27L. After departure gave vectors till handed off to Paris who gave us DPE 4W arrival. Then MERUE; MERUE arrival. After MERUE we got vectors for the approach Runway 29R. No bells had yet gone off and I (pilot flying) started configuration and asked for the approach checklist. The last item on the checklist is NAVAID's; checked when given a last heading and cleared for the approach. I saw no localizer. I told the First Officer to manually tune the ILS. By now we had flown through the Runway 27R localizer and past Runway 27L. I disconnected the autopilot; autothrottles and manually turned the plane back to the right. LFPG called and said air carrier X you are going to Runway 27R. This further confused me and the First Officer said that's in the South complex. Now LFPG called and gave us a heading 360 degree and 4000 FT. I turned right to 360 degrees and reconnected the autopilot. The First Officer now pointed at the glare shield altitude selector and said 4000 Ft. I looked and it was set to 4000 FT. He now pointed to the glare shield and again said 4000 FT. This time I looked at my flight instruments and saw we were actually holding 3650 FT. I pulled altitude selector and we climbed back to 4000 FT. Approach gave us vectors back for another approach Runway 27R; next approach was uneventful. Extenuating factors included: fatigue; I was able to sleep 4.5 hours each of the previous 2 nights. Complacency: I had a 3 hour old ATIS and been to LFPG many times. I also put too much reliance in my First Officer; he was actually fairly new on the plane. He later told me he was overwhelmed and did not finish the approach checklist. I've learned many lessons from this and have made adjustments in my operating technique to make sure nothing like this happens again. In the end; I am the Captain; the Boss; and this is my responsibility. Rest assured; I take this very seriously.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.