Narrative:

The flight down was uneventful. 80 mile deviation for thunderstorms enroute; and the standard on-and-off turbulence. We were assigned an arrival and descent. Weather was 600 broken; 2500 meters visibility at the airport. We programmed the lower of the altitudes on the arrival as hard altitudes in order to drive the VNAV calculations towards being lower rather than higher; and hit the altitudes as planned. We were cleared to 5500 ft MSL. First officer 2 had been checking the ATIS and questioned our acceptance of the clearance below FL070 at that point. We queried the controller and he verified that we were absolutely ok for descent to the 5500 ft MSL. We were also in VMC above a cloud layer and could see the relevant terrain. (I checked the minimum vectoring altitude chart after the flight and we were well within the areas that is listed as 5500 ft.)we were then cleared to 4700 ft MSL and arrived approximately at the IAF without instruction to call established or clearance for the approach. There was a lot of radio transmissions between ATC and other planes; so the frequency was very congested. First officer 2 asked us to verify that we were cleared for the approach. ATC gave a burst clearance for the approach; for descent on the glide path and to call tower; I sense we were forgotten about and things didn't quite unfold the way they usually do. Anyway; this put us slightly high and fast but we have a few miles before the outer marker. We see the runway between clouds at abut 700-800 ft AGL on the PAPI's and in great shape for landing. We are below the clouds by 600 ft AGL. Speed; sink and power seem fairly normal. I know we never exceed 1000 FPM sink. Again it seems like any of the other approaches I had ridden through into this airport. Slightly high; hot and rushed. We were late getting fully configured because of airspeed and flap speed limits; but while I thought whether we needed to go around; we always seemed to be in good enough shape; progressing towards normal and once we saw the runway I was very confident of a successful and normal landing. Like I said before first officer 1 was doing a great job of bringing things together for a successful approach and all seemed to work out fine until after touchdown. Vref was 139. The final part of the approach and touchdown seemed great; in fact a quite smooth landing in what I remember as a fairly normal attitude. The spoilers came up and I checked on reverser deployment. While I was checking those I did not have my eyes on the ADI on the horizon. I say that because I truly wish I could report our touchdown attitude and airspeed; and exactly how things happened afterwards; but I cannot. I sensed out of the corner of my eye and the nose was getting high; I looked forward said 'keep it coming down' gave a small nudge on the column and felt a vibration in my seat and heard a slight rumble. I thought to myself; 'this is what the tail of the airplane dragging feels like.' we taxied in; I said to the first officers that I thought we had a trail strike. We talked to local maintenance. Once they looked at it; they felt that it was a minor event with probably only the need to repaint and pump up the cartridge. I called dispatch who got maintenance control on the line and reported what I knew. Appropriate logbook write-ups were made. The duty pilot was busy; so we left that conversation for the hotel. We did not request a load audit; which we should have done. We arrived at the hotel 1.5 hours later; at which time I talked to the duty pilot and chief pilot. The duty pilot was able to verify that the initial maintenance assessment was correct and the tail skid only needed paint and to be pumped up. First; I think that there needs to be reference in the airport rescue and fire fighting about post tail-strike actions; and the first bullet needs to be 'consider the audit.' I checked the flight operating manual index and there is nothing. The reason these things need to be in the flight operating manual is because in my mind it is an administrative exercise that we are now going to go through. Who to call; what to write; etc; etc. Maintenance and flight operating manual are for on the ground after the events are all over. There needs to be an index entry in the flight operating manual for tail strike. Even if all the other actions are in other books; the flight operating manual index should get you headed to those. Sort of a master way to find things. I do see that I could have looked at the irregularity considerations checklist; but no mention of load audit there. I will definitely be the pilot flying on any future trips into this station and will definitely de-emphasize the verification of spoiler and thrust reverser deployment in my cross check during future landings anywhere by the first officers and increase emphasis on pitch attitude and touchdown airspeed; if for no other reason than to be able to report something other than it 'looked right.' however; I am not sure what I could have done anything to prevent the nose up about touchdown; other than actually being on the controls. I have had at least two first officers not use the thrust reverser early on in middle of the roll out; hence and extra emphasis by me. I think in their case they were afraid of the nose slamming down. After touchdown I had fully expect the nose to keep coming down. My habit pattern on landing is to place my hand onto the speed brake lever while verifying that the lever is in the up position. A similar motion to placing my hand on the flap lever while verifying its position during the landing check. When looking at the speed brake lever on this landing I remember seeing it in the 1/3 to 1/2 deployed position and moving slowly aft. I remember placing my hand around it with the intent to follow it through to the full position. What is the possibility that I inadvertently changed its mode from auto to manual during this and that caused the pitch up? It was definitely not my intent to transfer to manual extension; but it is possible that I caused it. If this is somehow found to be true; there should be some additional caution about touching the handle during it motion; and thus causing a mode change. I am aware of the caution about deploying the speed brakes manually with the nose up. I rechecked and found it in the training manual; perhaps it should be moved or reiterated elsewhere. I checked the operating manual volume 1 in the landing roll procedure and found some verbiage for the pilot monitoring that could be cleared up. After the 'speed brakes not up' call we all would presume to raise the lever if the speed brakes are operable; but the box doesn't say if the pilot monitoring or the pilot flying would be responsible and if any verbiage is inserted it should have the caution about manual deployment with the nose up. Plus there is no call by the pilot monitoring for the reverser state on this page; was this an intentional change? If my action with the speed brake lever is determined to be a factor I hope it helps the view taken of the first officer's actions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 Captain with First Officer flying reports unstabilized approach followed by normal landing. Shortly after touch down a tail strike occurs.

Narrative: The flight down was uneventful. 80 mile deviation for thunderstorms enroute; and the standard on-and-off turbulence. We were assigned an arrival and descent. Weather was 600 broken; 2500 meters visibility at the airport. We programmed the lower of the altitudes on the arrival as hard altitudes in order to drive the VNAV calculations towards being lower rather than higher; and hit the altitudes as planned. We were cleared to 5500 FT MSL. First Officer 2 had been checking the ATIS and questioned our acceptance of the clearance below FL070 at that point. We queried the Controller and he verified that we were absolutely OK for descent to the 5500 FT MSL. We were also in VMC above a cloud layer and could see the relevant terrain. (I checked the Minimum Vectoring Altitude chart after the flight and we were well within the areas that is listed as 5500 FT.)We were then cleared to 4700 FT MSL and arrived approximately at the IAF without instruction to call established or clearance for the approach. There was a lot of radio transmissions between ATC and other planes; so the frequency was very congested. First Officer 2 asked us to verify that we were cleared for the approach. ATC gave a burst clearance for the approach; for descent on the glide path and to call Tower; I sense we were forgotten about and things didn't quite unfold the way they usually do. Anyway; this put us slightly high and fast but we have a few miles before the Outer Marker. We see the runway between clouds at abut 700-800 FT AGL on the PAPI's and in great shape for landing. We are below the clouds by 600 FT AGL. Speed; sink and power seem fairly normal. I know we never exceed 1000 FPM sink. Again it seems like any of the other approaches I had ridden through into this airport. Slightly high; hot and rushed. We were late getting fully configured because of airspeed and flap speed limits; but while I thought whether we needed to go around; we always seemed to be in good enough shape; progressing towards normal and once we saw the runway I was very confident of a successful and normal landing. Like I said before First Officer 1 was doing a great job of bringing things together for a successful approach and all seemed to work out fine until after touchdown. Vref was 139. The final part of the approach and touchdown seemed great; in fact a quite smooth landing in what I remember as a fairly normal attitude. The spoilers came up and I checked on reverser deployment. While I was checking those I did not have my eyes on the ADI on the horizon. I say that because I truly wish I could report our touchdown attitude and airspeed; and exactly how things happened afterwards; but I cannot. I sensed out of the corner of my eye and the nose was getting high; I looked forward said 'keep it coming down' gave a small nudge on the column and felt a vibration in my seat and heard a slight rumble. I thought to myself; 'this is what the tail of the airplane dragging feels like.' We taxied in; I said to the First Officers that I thought we had a trail strike. We talked to local maintenance. Once they looked at it; they felt that it was a minor event with probably only the need to repaint and pump up the cartridge. I called Dispatch who got Maintenance Control on the line and reported what I knew. Appropriate logbook write-ups were made. The duty pilot was busy; so we left that conversation for the hotel. We did not request a load audit; which we should have done. We arrived at the hotel 1.5 hours later; at which time I talked to the duty pilot and Chief Pilot. The duty pilot was able to verify that the initial maintenance assessment was correct and the tail skid only needed paint and to be pumped up. First; I think that there needs to be reference in the airport rescue and fire fighting about Post Tail-strike actions; and the first bullet needs to be 'consider the audit.' I checked the Flight Operating Manual index and there is nothing. The reason these things need to be in the Flight Operating Manual is because in my mind it is an administrative exercise that we are now going to go through. Who to call; what to write; etc; etc. Maintenance and Flight Operating Manual are for on the ground after the events are all over. There needs to be an index entry in the Flight Operating Manual for tail strike. Even if all the other actions are in other books; the Flight Operating Manual index should get you headed to those. Sort of a master way to find things. I do see that I could have looked at the irregularity considerations checklist; but no mention of load audit there. I will definitely be the pilot flying on any future trips into this station and will definitely de-emphasize the verification of spoiler and thrust reverser deployment in my cross check during future landings anywhere by the First Officers and increase emphasis on pitch attitude and touchdown airspeed; if for no other reason than to be able to report something other than it 'looked right.' However; I am not sure what I could have done anything to prevent the nose up about touchdown; other than actually being on the controls. I have had at least two First Officers not use the thrust reverser early on in middle of the roll out; hence and extra emphasis by me. I think in their case they were afraid of the nose slamming down. After touchdown I had fully expect the nose to keep coming down. My habit pattern on landing is to place my hand onto the speed brake lever while verifying that the lever is in the up position. A similar motion to placing my hand on the flap lever while verifying its position during the landing check. When looking at the speed brake lever on this landing I remember seeing it in the 1/3 to 1/2 deployed position and moving slowly aft. I remember placing my hand around it with the intent to follow it through to the full position. What is the possibility that I inadvertently changed its mode from auto to manual during this and that caused the pitch up? It was definitely not my intent to transfer to manual extension; but it is possible that I caused it. If this is somehow found to be true; there should be some additional caution about touching the handle during it motion; and thus causing a mode change. I am aware of the caution about deploying the speed brakes manually with the nose up. I rechecked and found it in the training manual; perhaps it should be moved or reiterated elsewhere. I checked the Operating Manual Volume 1 in the Landing Roll procedure and found some verbiage for the pilot monitoring that could be cleared up. After the 'speed brakes not up' call we all would presume to raise the lever if the speed brakes are operable; but the box doesn't say if the pilot monitoring or the pilot flying would be responsible and if any verbiage is inserted it should have the caution about manual deployment with the nose up. Plus there is no call by the pilot monitoring for the reverser state on this page; was this an intentional change? If my action with the speed brake lever is determined to be a factor I hope it helps the view taken of the First Officer's actions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.