Narrative:

The bur weather was clear and 10 miles vis; with wind out of 160/11 and negative turbulence. We had been vectored for the four stacks visual approach into bur for runway 15. As the flying pilot I had decided to use runway 15 due to the runway length and wind direction. Runway 15 provides a safer and more comfortable margin for passengers when landing in bur because it is longer and requires much less aggressive braking than shorter runway 8. ATC vectored us from just south of pirue intersection to the four stacks visual. The vector took us on a path from the northwest to the southwest through the saddle between oat mountain and the san gabriel mountains. I have done this approach many times and am familiar with the terrain. We were 8-10 miles from the airport and had been cleared the visual to runway 15 to turn final at or above 3000 feet. You can get caught high on the approach and find it difficult to get stabilized for the fairly short runway at bur. I wanted to get down to 3000 as I turned final so as not to get caught high on the approach. As you descend along the south flank of the san gabriel's the hills rapidly fall away after you fly through the saddle back. Unfortunately during the descent; (the aircraft was clean and not configured with gear down) we received ground proximity warning and cautions due the close proximity of terrain while descending parallel the terrain as it sloped away toward the airport. The approach would have been unremarkable if not for the ground proximity warning. As I was still high on the VNAV path and well above the terrain; I chose to slow my descent rate and level off momentarily; knowing that the elevation causing the ground proximity warning would correct itself quickly as the terrain dropped away. The first officer looked at me and said we didn't have a choice; he wanted me to perform the escape maneuver for a ground proximity warning. I quickly reassessed the situation to make sure that I wasn't missing something. I was sure we operating safely and told the first officer that I was going to use a little common sense instead. The warnings ceased and we continued our descent to a normal landing at bur. Certainly in this phase of the approach making a violent maneuver would have scared passengers. After parking the aircraft; the first officer presumed to give me a lesson about the ground proximity warning escape procedures. The first officer and I have occasionally butted heads and it didn't take much to set me off; and I pretty much unloaded on him. After reaching the hotel; I had time to reflect. I still believe I acted reasonably and safely; but to the letter our flight safety manual says differently; and I failed to communicate effectively with the first officer in a timely matter about the situation; both during and after the event. The next morning I made it a point to apologize to the first officer for treating him so brusquely; and told him I realized that he was just trying to follow SOP in the flight safety manual; and he was correct. I did not allow myself enough room (altitude); to maneuver down the back side of the mountains without setting off the ground prox warning. As I described in the report above; I considered the approach completely normal; except for the ground prox warning. I didn't effectively communicate with the first officer during the event; and was most unkind in my actions after the landing. In retrospect he was completely correct. Standardization is what keeps us safe; and I will make better decisions and renew my effort in being as standard as possible going forward.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-700 Captain reports disregarding a First Officer's suggestion that he execute the GPWS Escape Maneuver while on approach to BUR Runway 15. The Captain realized his inappropriate response to the First Officer's safety suggestion and apologized.

Narrative: The BUR weather was clear and 10 miles vis; with wind out of 160/11 and negative turbulence. We had been vectored for the Four Stacks visual approach into BUR for Runway 15. As the Flying Pilot I had decided to use Runway 15 due to the runway length and wind direction. Runway 15 provides a safer and more comfortable margin for passengers when landing in BUR because it is longer and requires much less aggressive braking than shorter Runway 8. ATC vectored us from just south of Pirue intersection to the Four Stacks visual. The vector took us on a path from the northwest to the southwest through the saddle between Oat Mountain and The San Gabriel Mountains. I have done this approach many times and am familiar with the terrain. We were 8-10 miles from the airport and had been cleared the visual to Runway 15 to turn final at or above 3000 feet. You can get caught high on the approach and find it difficult to get stabilized for the fairly short runway at BUR. I wanted to get down to 3000 as I turned final so as not to get caught high on the approach. As you descend along the south flank of the San Gabriel's the hills rapidly fall away after you fly through the saddle back. Unfortunately during the descent; (the aircraft was clean and not configured with gear down) we received ground proximity warning and cautions due the close proximity of terrain while descending parallel the terrain as it sloped away toward the airport. The approach would have been unremarkable if not for the ground proximity warning. As I was still high on the VNAV path and well above the terrain; I chose to slow my descent rate and level off momentarily; knowing that the elevation causing the ground proximity warning would correct itself quickly as the terrain dropped away. The First Officer looked at me and said we didn't have a choice; he wanted me to perform the escape maneuver for a ground proximity warning. I quickly reassessed the situation to make sure that I wasn't missing something. I was sure we operating safely and told the First Officer that I was going to use a little common sense instead. The warnings ceased and we continued our descent to a normal landing at BUR. Certainly in this phase of the approach making a violent maneuver would have scared passengers. After parking the aircraft; the First Officer presumed to give me a lesson about the Ground Proximity Warning escape procedures. The First Officer and I have occasionally butted heads and it didn't take much to set me off; and I pretty much unloaded on him. After reaching the hotel; I had time to reflect. I still believe I acted reasonably and safely; but to the letter our Flight Safety Manual says differently; and I failed to communicate effectively with the First Officer in a timely matter about the situation; both during and after the event. The next morning I made it a point to apologize to the First Officer for treating him so brusquely; and told him I realized that he was just trying to follow SOP in the Flight Safety Manual; and he was correct. I did not allow myself enough room (altitude); to maneuver down the back side of the mountains without setting off the ground prox warning. As I described in the report above; I considered the approach completely normal; except for the ground prox warning. I didn't effectively communicate with the First Officer during the event; and was most unkind in my actions after the landing. In retrospect he was completely correct. Standardization is what keeps us safe; and I will make better decisions and renew my effort in being as standard as possible going forward.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.