Narrative:

During the initial climb out of ase the captain did not open the main air valves per the after take-off flow and did not set the flaps to 0 degrees at 600' AGL. We had an aircraft approaching from the opposite direction on the approach into ase and I pitched to about 15-17.5 degrees nose up to climb above the other aircraft. During this time we were receiving TCAS traffic advisories; but our take-off clearance made us aware of the incoming aircraft and had visual contact before take-off. During the climb the captain yelled 'what is your minimum climb speed'? I scanned my airspeed; which was 15-20 KIAS below vfto and lowered the nose to 12.5 degrees nose up. I was stunned that our airspeed had degraded so significantly and verified the power was set at maximum. Still climbing; because of the oncoming aircraft and local terrain; I verified that we were accelerating. The captain kept yelling 'what is your minimum climb speed'? I answered vfto and verified that we were still accelerating. Between the TCAS TA's; the captain yelling; aircraft control and wondering why our performance was so degraded; I reached an information overload point; and could not figure out what the problems were. Then; just before reaching 13;000'; the cabin altitude warning illuminated with an aural warning. I began to lower the nose to level off after visually checking that terrain was not an immediate threat to evaluate the problem by running the checklist and the captain yelled at me to continue climbing while he figured out what the problem was. I allowed myself to be pushed into climbing before the problem was resolved. Very shortly afterward the captain said that he had forgotten to open the main air valves and that the cabin was (now) descending. He completed the after take-off and climb checklists. We continued to climb very poorly and I still felt like I was overloaded with information and hostility. At around FL200 the captain discovered that he had forgotten to retract the flaps to 0 degrees and retracted them at FL220. I am not sure if the airplane was written up for inspection regarding the flap extension to FL220 or if it needs to be. I do not believe we oversped the flaps; but we might have. During the previous days I had felt berated; nitpicked; and bullied. When I had made a mistake; I felt that I was judged very harshly and when he made a mistake; we just swept it under the rug. The result is that CRM had deteriorated to an unsafe level. I was thinking that I did not want to make it worse; but I had actually been enabling it. During our first leg during cruise or while we were on the ground; I should have brought up the issues and sought resolution immediately. I also should not have climbed until the cabin pressure situation was properly resolved and if necessary declared an emergency. So many things went wrong that it is hard to believe that it happened to me. I have learned a lot and will be diligent to apply these lessons that were learned the hard way.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A First Officer chronicles a breakdown in CRM with a demanding Captain whose failures to comply with PNF duties contributed to events on a takeoff from a high altitude airport.

Narrative: During the initial climb out of ASE the Captain did not open the Main Air Valves per the after take-off flow and did not set the flaps to 0 degrees at 600' AGL. We had an aircraft approaching from the opposite direction on the approach into ASE and I pitched to about 15-17.5 degrees nose up to climb above the other Aircraft. During this time we were receiving TCAS traffic advisories; but our take-off clearance made us aware of the incoming aircraft and had visual contact before take-off. During the climb the Captain yelled 'what is your minimum climb speed'? I scanned my airspeed; which was 15-20 KIAS below VFTO and lowered the nose to 12.5 degrees nose up. I was stunned that our airspeed had degraded so significantly and verified the power was set at maximum. Still climbing; because of the oncoming aircraft and local terrain; I verified that we were accelerating. The Captain kept yelling 'what is your minimum climb speed'? I answered VFTO and verified that we were still accelerating. Between the TCAS TA'S; the Captain yelling; aircraft control and wondering why our performance was so degraded; I reached an information overload point; and could not figure out what the problems were. Then; just before reaching 13;000'; the cabin altitude warning illuminated with an aural warning. I began to lower the nose to level off after visually checking that terrain was not an immediate threat to evaluate the problem by running the checklist and the Captain yelled at me to continue climbing while he figured out what the problem was. I allowed myself to be pushed into climbing before the problem was resolved. Very shortly afterward the Captain said that he had forgotten to open the Main Air Valves and that the cabin was (now) descending. He completed the After Take-Off and Climb Checklists. We continued to climb very poorly and I still felt like I was overloaded with information and hostility. At around FL200 the Captain discovered that he had forgotten to retract the flaps to 0 degrees and retracted them at FL220. I am not sure if the airplane was written up for inspection regarding the flap extension to FL220 or if it needs to be. I do not believe we oversped the flaps; but we might have. During the previous days I had felt berated; nitpicked; and bullied. When I had made a mistake; I felt that I was judged very harshly and when he made a mistake; we just swept it under the rug. The result is that CRM had deteriorated to an unsafe level. I was thinking that I did not want to make it worse; but I had actually been enabling it. During our first leg during cruise or while we were on the ground; I should have brought up the issues and sought resolution immediately. I also should not have climbed until the Cabin Pressure situation was properly resolved and if necessary declared an emergency. So many things went wrong that it is hard to believe that it happened to me. I have learned a lot and will be diligent to apply these lessons that were learned the hard way.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.