Narrative:

While acting as a safety pilot I was to ride along with mr. X and be there for safety since he felt that he had not been doing much night flying lately. After pre-flight a plan was made to depart his home base and proceed to two other airports with longer and wider runways so he could practice night landings more safely. It was agreed that mr. X was to be PIC and fly the airplane but that I could help out by talking on the radios for him. He also stated after I asked that I should 'speak up' if I saw anything I was concerned with. I also wanted to be sure he was okay if I felt I needed to take the controls. He said that would be fine if I felt I needed to. The flight proceeded as planned and I observed that mr. X did well with night navigation; use of airport weather data; pattern entry and use of pilot controlled lighting; and night landings and takeoffs. After completing 3 full stop landings I asked mr. X if he felt he needed to do any more and he said no that he felt good and that we should return to our departure airport. Enroute back mr. X identified where the airport should be and we clicked the mic 5 times on CTAF; which resulted in no lights coming on. Mr. X proceeded to where he thought the airport was and confirmed that he had the runway; centerline; and runway identification numbers in sight and I looked out and confirmed. We tried to activate the lights again while over the airport at 1500' MSL with no results. Mr. X then placed the aircraft in a left hand orbit over the airport while I consulted the sectional and AFD to confirm the frequency and printed procedure for activation of the lights. I communicated to mr. X that we were doing everything correctly and based on our success at the other airports that there had to be a problem with the system on the ground. Mr. X asked me to try again which I did with no positive results and then he asked me to try 7 and then 9 clicks; with no positive outcome. Mr. X then announced that he would have to land the plane by moonlight. I objected and pointed out that we took off with full tanks and had plenty of fuel to divert back to the previous airfield and call for a ride home; or divert to another airfield where I had access to a crew car I could use to drive us home. Mr. X listened to my objection and suggestions; but decided that he wanted to proceed with the attempt to land by moonlight and then go around if it did not work. Mr. X proceeded with his plan and ended up going around on his first attempt because he over shot his base to final turn. He then again made the decision to not divert and try one more time; which resulted in a turn to final that was lined up correctly. However I objected that he was too fast and mr. X then reduced power. On short final I again objected that he was too fast and he reduced power. Upon crossing over the thresh hold the plane entered a ground effect induced float and I called out two times in a row to 'go around' and mr. X did not comply. The plane then touched down a little past the first third of the runway. I felt that we would not be able to get stopped and started to call out non-stop 'you are not going to make it'. I also started at this point to reach for the throttle to force a go around but before I could gain control the plane yawed to the right and skidded down the runway and drifting towards the right edge of the paved surface. I abandoned my attempt to grab the throttle and applied left rudder to help keep the plane on the runway. As the plane decelerated in the skid down the runway it was evident that the plane was not going to stop before the end. I relaxed left rudder after I felt the plane had slowed to a safe speed and the plane drifted off the runway and impacted a small rise in the ground. The nose wheel failed and the plane came to a stop. After departing the aircraft mr. X told me that he had tried to 'ground loop' the aircraft after touch down and asked if I was fighting him on the rudder controls. I confirmed that I had and that I felt we were going too fast and that the best thing to do was stay on the runway as long as possible. My lack of familiarity with the controls slowed my ability to take corrective action. Mr. X's decision not to divert and attempt the landing without runway lights. Me not insisting on mr. X giving me PIC authority when I felt it would safer to divert. And to a lesser extent that the pilot controlled lighting lights were not working; I feel that this caused mr. X who had been making good decisions up until this point to become stressed and distracted which contributed to his abandonment of good judgment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Pilot and safety pilot aboard Beechcraft 36 struggle for control during a night landing rollout. Landing was long and fast on an unlit 1900 foot runway.

Narrative: While acting as a safety pilot I was to ride along with Mr. X and be there for safety since he felt that he had not been doing much night flying lately. After pre-flight a plan was made to depart his home base and proceed to two other airports with longer and wider runways so he could practice night landings more safely. It was agreed that Mr. X was to be PIC and fly the airplane but that I could help out by talking on the radios for him. He also stated after I asked that I should 'speak up' if I saw anything I was concerned with. I also wanted to be sure he was okay if I felt I needed to take the controls. He said that would be fine if I felt I needed to. The flight proceeded as planned and I observed that Mr. X did well with night navigation; use of airport weather data; pattern entry and use of pilot controlled lighting; and night landings and takeoffs. After completing 3 full stop landings I asked Mr. X if he felt he needed to do any more and he said no that he felt good and that we should return to our departure airport. Enroute back Mr. X identified where the airport should be and we clicked the mic 5 times on CTAF; which resulted in no lights coming on. Mr. X proceeded to where he thought the airport was and confirmed that he had the runway; centerline; and runway identification numbers in sight and I looked out and confirmed. We tried to activate the lights again while over the airport at 1500' MSL with no results. Mr. X then placed the aircraft in a left hand orbit over the airport while I consulted the sectional and AFD to confirm the frequency and printed procedure for activation of the lights. I communicated to Mr. X that we were doing everything correctly and based on our success at the other airports that there had to be a problem with the system on the ground. Mr. X asked me to try again which I did with no positive results and then he asked me to try 7 and then 9 clicks; with no positive outcome. Mr. X then announced that he would have to land the plane by moonlight. I objected and pointed out that we took off with full tanks and had plenty of fuel to divert back to the previous airfield and call for a ride home; or divert to another airfield where I had access to a crew car I could use to drive us home. Mr. X listened to my objection and suggestions; but decided that he wanted to proceed with the attempt to land by moonlight and then go around if it did not work. Mr. X proceeded with his plan and ended up going around on his first attempt because he over shot his base to final turn. He then again made the decision to not divert and try one more time; which resulted in a turn to final that was lined up correctly. However I objected that he was too fast and Mr. X then reduced power. On short final I again objected that he was too fast and he reduced power. Upon crossing over the thresh hold the plane entered a ground effect induced float and I called out two times in a row to 'go around' and Mr. X did not comply. The plane then touched down a little past the first third of the runway. I felt that we would not be able to get stopped and started to call out non-stop 'you are not going to make it'. I also started at this point to reach for the throttle to force a go around but before I could gain control the plane yawed to the right and skidded down the runway and drifting towards the right edge of the paved surface. I abandoned my attempt to grab the throttle and applied left rudder to help keep the plane on the runway. As the plane decelerated in the skid down the runway it was evident that the plane was not going to stop before the end. I relaxed left rudder after I felt the plane had slowed to a safe speed and the plane drifted off the runway and impacted a small rise in the ground. The nose wheel failed and the plane came to a stop. After departing the aircraft Mr. X told me that he had tried to 'ground loop' the aircraft after touch down and asked if I was fighting him on the rudder controls. I confirmed that I had and that I felt we were going too fast and that the best thing to do was stay on the runway as long as possible. My lack of familiarity with the controls slowed my ability to take corrective action. Mr. X's decision not to divert and attempt the landing without runway lights. Me not insisting on Mr. X giving me PIC authority when I felt it would safer to divert. And to a lesser extent that the PCL lights were not working; I feel that this caused Mr. X who had been making good decisions up until this point to become stressed and distracted which contributed to his abandonment of good judgment.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.