Narrative:

Approaching orf flight was cleared to 5000' IFR (captain flying, first officer working the radios). At approximately 5 mi south of the field, VFR conditions, set up for a left base to a visual. Approach cleared us to 2000' and said that our traffic was on a 10 mi final straight in approach to runway 23. The traffic was named by type, of which I cannot recall, but I never heard it idented as an light transport. At 2000' VFR, and approximately 2 mi north of the field, we reported our traffic (or what we believed to be our traffic) and the field in sight (the traffic was 2-3 mi out). Approach at this point said, 'follow the traffic, cleared for a visual approach,' (or words to that effect). As we started our left base turn to final, following the traffic that we reported in sight, I called approach at least twice (maybe 3 times) to see if he wanted us on tower frequency. After the last call and no response, at the 90 degree position, I switched to tower. Now on tower, I heard tower say to an light transport aircraft on about a 5 mi instrument final, 'an medium large transport was turning on final and was not on the frequency,' (or words to that effect). I quickly came up and reported that we were on a visual. It became apparent at that time that we were on a converging path with an light transport aircraft on an instrument approach. The light transport broke off the approach, made an south turn and uneventfully landed behind us. Approach control at no point indicated that there was more than 1 aircraft on the approach to runway 23, nor did we ever hear advisories about an light transport until we switched to tower. After calling approach at least twice and getting no response, after being cleared for a visual behind the first aircraft, we switched to tower at the 90 degree position. Had we not switched, I don't think we would have been alerted to the situation since approach was not talking to us. I believe the situation occurred because approach did not inform us of the additional traffic. Had we originally been advised that we were #3 to follow an light transport on a 10 mi final, there would not have been any confusion. In addition, approach failed to switch us to tower and did not respond to at least 2 calls initiated by us during a very critical phase of flight. To summarize, I feel the situation occurred and was completely avoidable had the controller been more thorough in the information that he passed to us (that we were #3 to follow an light transport--not, 'your traffic is at 10 mi'). In addition, in a high density environment, when approach is called on the radio some sort of response from that controller is essential, even if it is just 'stand by.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR-MLG FOLLOWED WRONG ACFT ON TURN TO FINAL AND CAUSED CONFLICT WITH SECOND LTT ON STRAIGHT IN APCH HE WAS SUPPOSED TO FOLLOW.

Narrative: APCHING ORF FLT WAS CLRED TO 5000' IFR (CAPT FLYING, F/O WORKING THE RADIOS). AT APPROX 5 MI S OF THE FIELD, VFR CONDITIONS, SET UP FOR A LEFT BASE TO A VISUAL. APCH CLRED US TO 2000' AND SAID THAT OUR TFC WAS ON A 10 MI FINAL STRAIGHT IN APCH TO RWY 23. THE TFC WAS NAMED BY TYPE, OF WHICH I CANNOT RECALL, BUT I NEVER HEARD IT IDENTED AS AN LTT. AT 2000' VFR, AND APPROX 2 MI N OF THE FIELD, WE RPTED OUR TFC (OR WHAT WE BELIEVED TO BE OUR TFC) AND THE FIELD IN SIGHT (THE TFC WAS 2-3 MI OUT). APCH AT THIS POINT SAID, 'FOLLOW THE TFC, CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH,' (OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT). AS WE STARTED OUR LEFT BASE TURN TO FINAL, FOLLOWING THE TFC THAT WE RPTED IN SIGHT, I CALLED APCH AT LEAST TWICE (MAYBE 3 TIMES) TO SEE IF HE WANTED US ON TWR FREQ. AFTER THE LAST CALL AND NO RESPONSE, AT THE 90 DEG POS, I SWITCHED TO TWR. NOW ON TWR, I HEARD TWR SAY TO AN LTT ACFT ON ABOUT A 5 MI INSTRUMENT FINAL, 'AN MLG WAS TURNING ON FINAL AND WAS NOT ON THE FREQ,' (OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT). I QUICKLY CAME UP AND RPTED THAT WE WERE ON A VISUAL. IT BECAME APPARENT AT THAT TIME THAT WE WERE ON A CONVERGING PATH WITH AN LTT ACFT ON AN INSTRUMENT APCH. THE LTT BROKE OFF THE APCH, MADE AN S TURN AND UNEVENTFULLY LANDED BEHIND US. APCH CTL AT NO POINT INDICATED THAT THERE WAS MORE THAN 1 ACFT ON THE APCH TO RWY 23, NOR DID WE EVER HEAR ADVISORIES ABOUT AN LTT UNTIL WE SWITCHED TO TWR. AFTER CALLING APCH AT LEAST TWICE AND GETTING NO RESPONSE, AFTER BEING CLRED FOR A VISUAL BEHIND THE FIRST ACFT, WE SWITCHED TO TWR AT THE 90 DEG POS. HAD WE NOT SWITCHED, I DON'T THINK WE WOULD HAVE BEEN ALERTED TO THE SITUATION SINCE APCH WAS NOT TALKING TO US. I BELIEVE THE SITUATION OCCURRED BECAUSE APCH DID NOT INFORM US OF THE ADDITIONAL TFC. HAD WE ORIGINALLY BEEN ADVISED THAT WE WERE #3 TO FOLLOW AN LTT ON A 10 MI FINAL, THERE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ANY CONFUSION. IN ADDITION, APCH FAILED TO SWITCH US TO TWR AND DID NOT RESPOND TO AT LEAST 2 CALLS INITIATED BY US DURING A VERY CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. TO SUMMARIZE, I FEEL THE SITUATION OCCURRED AND WAS COMPLETELY AVOIDABLE HAD THE CTLR BEEN MORE THOROUGH IN THE INFO THAT HE PASSED TO US (THAT WE WERE #3 TO FOLLOW AN LTT--NOT, 'YOUR TFC IS AT 10 MI'). IN ADDITION, IN A HIGH DENSITY ENVIRONMENT, WHEN APCH IS CALLED ON THE RADIO SOME SORT OF RESPONSE FROM THAT CTLR IS ESSENTIAL, EVEN IF IT IS JUST 'STAND BY.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.