Narrative:

Flight was uneventful with the exception of hot brakes on landing which was normal considering the conditions at our destination; approximately 88F. After blocking in at xa:50L the first officer requested chocks and fans. After I returned to the cockpit the first officer informed me he had the fans placed on the mains and I noticed the inboard brakes on the right main (#3) were a higher temp than the outboard (#4); and made the comment 'its obvious where they put the fan!' inferring the reason why the #3 brake temp was higher. The wheels cooled down to acceptable temps before taxing. On the next flight we blocked out at xb:46L. It seemed to take an inordinate amount of thrust to break away on initial taxi and I made the comment 'we must be hot and heavy today' again inferring hot asphalt requires higher breakaway thrust. Upon reaching the end of the runway; I pointed out the temperature difference of #3 brakes compared to all the others; #3 at 250c; #4 90c; and #1; #2 around 120c. I had been using primarily the left brake on taxi out to try and keep the temps equal on both sides. There was no pulling of the aircraft whatsoever. After discussion with the first officer we agreed that it might possibly be a dragging brake and elected to perform flaps 2 toga takeoff as our reduced atgw was within 900 pounds of our actual weight. The first officer performed the takeoff and immediately after airborne we had a hot brakes ECAM. I directed the first officer to fly the aircraft and I would work the ECAM and radio. Initially; on contact with departure control we were cleared to 17000 ft but I informed them we needed a lower altitude until we resolved our brake overheat condition. We were subsequently cleared to 10000 ft. The first officer called for flap retraction on schedule and asked for 220 KTS selected speed on climb out to keep the aircraft within airspeed limitations for gear retraction. We left the gear down for a few minutes in accordance with the ECAM and I made an announcement over the PA explaining why we were leaving the gear down and that it was a normal procedure for a hot brake condition until the brake cooled. The temperature reached a maximum of approximately 590c during climb and after climbing through approximately 4800 ft we retracted the gear once the temperature was below 250c and declining. This completed the ECAM; we completed the after takeoff checklist and continued our climb to cruise. We continued to monitor the temperature on climb and en route and the temperature continued to fall. Thinking through what happened; we as a crew concluded that this very well may be a dragging or now locked brake. We reviewed the fom and flight manual for guidance on when and if to declare an emergency and requesting fire and rescue support on landing. We concluded declaring an emergency in approach airspace would be sufficient. I initiated a phone patch with dispatch and conferred with maintenance to discuss any and all considerations. Maintenance recommended the longest runway possible to delay brake application and also brought up that it could very likely be just a temperature sensor malfunction. The first officer and I both felt that if it were; then the temperature might not have come down as it did after leaving the gear extended for the climbout. I informed dispatch that we wanted to have fire trucks meet us upon landing. We also stated we did not need to declare an emergency until reaching our destination airspace. Dispatched agreed. I brought the purser up to brief her on our plan of action and to do a cabin advisory and that I would advise her when we were nearing top of descent. The next couple of hours we spent reviewing evacuation procedures; and considerations; as well as general hypothetical scenarios. We had 2 jumpseaters and included them in our discussion. Of these we concluded that applying brakes soon after touchdown makes the most sense due to the theory that if it is a dragging brake a long roll out would exacerbate the overheat problem on the #3 brake since it would be the only one working; and by applying brakes on all sets the energy would be more equally distributed and reduce the chance of an extreme overheat on the #3 brake. (This was the first officer's idea; brilliant I thought). We also discussed who should land and directional control issues due to the history of the airbus here. After several ideas we agreed I would land the aircraft with autobrakes off; and that if I lost directional control with rudders only that I would direct 'full stick forward' as I transitioned to the tiller to give us maximum directional control capability. As we further discussed the issues we decided we needed to have a tug available in case we exceeded the temperature parameter limits set forth under the brake cooling considerations section of the flight manual limits section. We also decided that 14R was the best runway for winds and length available. We sent another message to dispatch and advised them of these requests and they concurred and coordinated with the ATC liaison for 14R. Subsequently the winds started to shift and 32L became favorable; we notified dispatch and they informed the airport was much happier with that as well. Just prior to descent I went back for a physiological break and took the opportunity to check with the purser and #2 flight attendant. I just wanted to make sure they were ready and ok. I told them that we expected a normal landing and because this was a controlled scenario with fire crews immediately on the scene that we were going to trust their eyes for our decision to evacuate and that command for evacuation would come solely from the cockpit; even if they might see smoke from the brakes to wait for the command from us. I also briefed the purser that after I made my announcement to the passengers about the emergency landing that they should designate helpers then; for our 4 wheelchair passengers and 4 unaccompanied minors. Even though it was just an advisory; if an evacuation became necessary it would be too late at that point. We also discussed that should the reason for evacuation indeed be because for a wheel well fire on the right side of the aircraft that an evacuation would be necessary from the left side of the aircraft only and to be ready for that as well. Before descent we briefed the approach and landing to 32L and discussed getting configured early. As we passed through approximately 25;000 ft I made an announcement to the passengers of the pending emergency landing and fire crews meeting the aircraft as a precaution in reference to our brake over temp on takeoff. I assured them we expected a normal landing but as a precaution to be ready to follow the flight attendants directions should an evacuation become necessary. We completed the approach descent checklist; approach and landing uneventfully. After reaching taxi speed we saw the #3 brake rapidly rise and set off the hot brakes ECAM soon after clearing the runway. Brake numbers 1; 2; and 4 were around 100c. We stopped the aircraft and did not set the parking brake. The fire trucks arrived; I heard the fire chief on the radio and I informed the fire chief over the radio of our indicated brake temperature on the inboard right main. Soon after a fireman plugged in to interphone and established contact with me. (A brief note here; the call horn kept going off over and over causing significant distraction to communication. I tried resetting repeatedly and even holding the reset until it dawned on me the fireman was pushing the call button as a push to talk button. After I told him he didn't need to do that it stopped.) we coordinated putting chocks in and I released brakes. The first officer in the mean time looked up our brake temp condition and advised me we had indeed exceeded the limit difference of 200 between average temperatures of both trucks; so we needed to be towed in. We informed the fire crew and they handed the control of the aircraft over to maintenance. This took a few minutes and by the time maintenance hooked up the number 1; 2; and 4 brakes reached approximately 225c and the average was back within limits. The #3 brake reached approximately 490c. We elected to continue with the tow in as the limit had been exceeded. We performed the tow in checklist and were towed to the gate uneventfully. After reaching the gate we debriefed line maintenance who were pretty sure it was an indicator malfunction. I called dispatch and told them our block in time and debriefed with maintenance and the duty manager. Overall we had excellent crew resource management amongst the entire crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A320's number 3 brake heated abnormally during landing; on the subsequent takeoff; and again on landing. Because a brake malfunction was suspected; an emergency was declared for the subsequent landing.

Narrative: FLight was uneventful with the exception of hot brakes on landing which was normal considering the conditions at our destination; approximately 88F. After blocking in at XA:50L the First Officer requested chocks and fans. After I returned to the cockpit the First Officer informed me he had the fans placed on the mains and I noticed the inboard brakes on the right main (#3) were a higher temp than the outboard (#4); and made the comment 'Its obvious where they put the fan!' inferring the reason why the #3 brake temp was higher. The wheels cooled down to acceptable temps before taxing. On the next flight we blocked out at XB:46L. It seemed to take an inordinate amount of thrust to break away on initial taxi and I made the comment 'We must be hot and heavy today' again inferring hot asphalt requires higher breakaway thrust. Upon reaching the end of the runway; I pointed out the temperature difference of #3 brakes compared to all the others; #3 at 250c; #4 90c; and #1; #2 around 120c. I had been using primarily the left brake on taxi out to try and keep the temps equal on both sides. There was no pulling of the aircraft whatsoever. After discussion with the First Officer we agreed that it might possibly be a dragging brake and elected to perform Flaps 2 TOGA takeoff as our reduced ATGW was within 900 LBS of our actual weight. The First Officer performed the takeoff and immediately after airborne we had a HOT BRAKES ECAM. I directed the First Officer to fly the aircraft and I would work the ECAM and radio. Initially; on contact with departure control we were cleared to 17000 FT but I informed them we needed a lower altitude until we resolved our brake overheat condition. We were subsequently cleared to 10000 FT. The First Officer called for flap retraction on schedule and asked for 220 KTS selected speed on climb out to keep the aircraft within airspeed limitations for gear retraction. We left the gear down for a few minutes IAW the ECAM and I made an announcement over the PA explaining why we were leaving the gear down and that it was a normal procedure for a hot brake condition until the brake cooled. The temperature reached a maximum of approximately 590c during climb and after climbing through approximately 4800 FT we retracted the gear once the temperature was below 250c and declining. This completed the ECAM; we completed the after takeoff checklist and continued our climb to cruise. We continued to monitor the temperature on climb and en route and the temperature continued to fall. Thinking through what happened; we as a crew concluded that this very well may be a dragging or now locked brake. We reviewed the FOM and flight manual for guidance on when and if to declare an emergency and requesting fire and rescue support on landing. We concluded declaring an emergency in approach airspace would be sufficient. I initiated a phone patch with Dispatch and conferred with Maintenance to discuss any and all considerations. Maintenance recommended the longest runway possible to delay brake application and also brought up that it could very likely be just a temperature sensor malfunction. The First Officer and I both felt that if it were; then the temperature might not have come down as it did after leaving the gear extended for the climbout. I informed Dispatch that we wanted to have fire trucks meet us upon landing. We also stated we did not need to declare an emergency until reaching our destination airspace. Dispatched agreed. I brought the Purser up to brief her on our plan of action and to do a cabin advisory and that I would advise her when we were nearing top of descent. The next couple of hours we spent reviewing evacuation procedures; and considerations; as well as general hypothetical scenarios. We had 2 jumpseaters and included them in our discussion. Of these we concluded that applying brakes soon after touchdown makes the most sense due to the theory that if it is a dragging brake a long roll out would exacerbate the overheat problem on the #3 brake since it would be the only one working; and by applying brakes on all sets the energy would be more equally distributed and reduce the chance of an extreme overheat on the #3 brake. (This was the First Officer's idea; brilliant I thought). We also discussed who should land and directional control issues due to the history of the Airbus here. After several ideas we agreed I would land the Aircraft with autobrakes off; and that if I lost directional control with rudders only that I would direct 'full stick forward' as I transitioned to the tiller to give us maximum directional control capability. As we further discussed the issues we decided we needed to have a tug available in case we exceeded the temperature parameter limits set forth under the Brake cooling considerations section of the flight manual limits section. We also decided that 14R was the best runway for winds and length available. We sent another message to Dispatch and advised them of these requests and they concurred and coordinated with the ATC Liaison for 14R. Subsequently the winds started to shift and 32L became favorable; we notified Dispatch and they informed the airport was much happier with that as well. Just prior to descent I went back for a physiological break and took the opportunity to check with the Purser and #2 Flight Attendant. I just wanted to make sure they were ready and OK. I told them that we expected a normal landing and because this was a controlled scenario with fire crews immediately on the scene that we were going to trust their eyes for our decision to evacuate and that command for evacuation would come solely from the cockpit; even if they might see smoke from the brakes to wait for the command from us. I also briefed the Purser that after I made my announcement to the passengers about the emergency landing that they should designate helpers then; for our 4 wheelchair passengers and 4 unaccompanied minors. Even though it was just an advisory; if an evacuation became necessary it would be too late at that point. We also discussed that should the reason for evacuation indeed be because for a wheel well fire on the right side of the aircraft that an evacuation would be necessary from the left side of the aircraft only and to be ready for that as well. Before descent we briefed the approach and landing to 32L and discussed getting configured early. As we passed through approximately 25;000 FT I made an announcement to the passengers of the pending emergency landing and fire crews meeting the aircraft as a precaution in reference to our brake over temp on takeoff. I assured them we expected a normal landing but as a precaution to be ready to follow the flight attendants directions should an evacuation become necessary. We completed the approach descent checklist; approach and landing uneventfully. After reaching taxi speed we saw the #3 brake rapidly rise and set off the HOT BRAKES ECAM soon after clearing the runway. Brake numbers 1; 2; and 4 were around 100c. We stopped the aircraft and did not set the parking brake. The fire trucks arrived; I heard the fire chief on the radio and I informed the fire chief over the radio of our indicated brake temperature on the inboard right main. Soon after a fireman plugged in to interphone and established contact with me. (A brief note here; the call horn kept going off over and over causing significant distraction to communication. I tried resetting repeatedly and even holding the reset until it dawned on me the fireman was pushing the call button as a push to talk button. After I told him he didn't need to do that it stopped.) We coordinated putting chocks in and I released brakes. The First Officer in the mean time looked up our brake temp condition and advised me we had indeed exceeded the limit difference of 200 between average temperatures of both trucks; so we needed to be towed in. We informed the fire crew and they handed the control of the aircraft over to Maintenance. This took a few minutes and by the time Maintenance hooked up the number 1; 2; and 4 brakes reached approximately 225c and the average was back within limits. The #3 brake reached approximately 490c. We elected to continue with the tow in as the limit had been exceeded. We performed the tow in checklist and were towed to the gate uneventfully. After reaching the gate we debriefed line maintenance who were pretty sure it was an indicator malfunction. I called dispatch and told them our block in time and debriefed with Maintenance and the Duty Manager. Overall we had excellent crew resource management amongst the entire crew.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.