Narrative:

I was sent down line to take over inspection on a fuel tank slat can repair on aircraft. When I got there; the mechanics and other inspector were gone. The paperwork was a mess and parts were scattered. No mechanics went there when I did. They came in later in the day. The mechanics and supervisor that came had never been on a down line before; so they were unfamiliar with the process. Having been down line; I was working as point of contact to get things going. At one point I was told by my supervision that engineering was throwing a fit because quality control is taking control up there and told me to stand down. We finished the repair and maintenance control made the call to ferry the aircraft and boro the slat cans. In all the confusion of picking up the job with no turnover; messed up paperwork and missing parts; all of us failed to notice a confined space entry form was never done at the time. When we started; the tank had been open at least 18 hours. Maintenance control should have sent a tank sniffer with the first guys who went and the changing of crews on down line trips is a serious safety hazard. The same crew who starts a job should see it through so situations like this don't happen.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 Inspector on a field trip describes the disorganized conditions he encountered when he arrived at a down line station involving no turnover; messed-up paperwork; missing parts; leading edge slat cans; open fuel tanks and failure to file an opened fuel tank entry form.

Narrative: I was sent down line to take over inspection on a fuel tank slat can repair on aircraft. When I got there; the mechanics and other Inspector were gone. The paperwork was a mess and parts were scattered. No mechanics went there when I did. They came in later in the day. The mechanics and Supervisor that came had never been on a down line before; so they were unfamiliar with the process. Having been down line; I was working as point of contact to get things going. At one point I was told by my supervision that engineering was throwing a fit because Quality Control is taking control up there and told me to stand down. We finished the repair and Maintenance Control made the call to ferry the aircraft and boro the slat cans. In all the confusion of picking up the job with no turnover; messed up paperwork and missing parts; all of us failed to notice a confined space entry form was never done at the time. When we started; the tank had been open at least 18 hours. Maintenance Control should have sent a tank sniffer with the first guys who went and the changing of crews on down line trips is a serious safety hazard. The same crew who starts a job should see it through so situations like this don't happen.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.