Narrative:

During pushback with the APU operating; the first officer started the right engine under the direction of the captain which resulted in a normal start. The captain commanded that the left engine be started; to which the first officer complied. Just prior to starter cutout at approximately 45% N2; the entire AC electrical system went offline; the emergency lights activated; the 'maintenance battery circuit breaker' popped; both the aileron and rudder trims moved hard left; and the left engine simultaneously indicated a hot start; to which the first officer immediately responded by following the specified hot start immediate action items. Numerous electrical system related caution and status messages showed on EICAS. The captain's side rtu was blank and none of the menu buttons that control the EICAS synoptic pages worked with the exception of the 4 buttons wired directly into the system (step; etc.). Upon review of the electrical synoptic page; we were able to see that AC bus 1 had been isolated and was surrounded in magenta color. The captain directed the ground crew to tow us back into another gate as another aircraft had parked at our pushback gate. During this time the flight crew was unable to communicate with the flight attendants via the interphone system nor make a PA as the electrical event had apparently rendered the interphone system inoperative so the flight deck door was opened and secured in the open position to allow communication. The flight attendants were also unable to make any pas from either of their interphone stations. I feel that this is a major concern because there was no way to command an immediate evacuation if the need had arisen. As the passengers were deplaning; we began to catch whiffs of electrical smoke in the cockpit; but the source was unable to be determined and the smell gradually subsided. A local mechanic showed up and we were directed to start the engines at the gate with the APU operating (all passengers had been deplaned). We initiated the start for the right engine (the engine that had not experienced hot start indication) and just prior to starter cutout; we smelled much stronger electrical smoke than we had previously smelled. The start was aborted; the flight attendants were directed to get off the airplane; and the entire airplane was shut down.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL65 flight crew experienced electrical failure during start of second engine after pushback. Engine over temps and is shut down. EICAS shows AC1 is isolated and aircraft was returned to the gate.

Narrative: During pushback with the APU operating; the First Officer started the right engine under the direction of the Captain which resulted in a normal start. The Captain commanded that the left engine be started; to which the First Officer complied. Just prior to starter cutout at approximately 45% N2; the entire AC electrical system went offline; the emergency lights activated; the 'maintenance battery CB' popped; both the aileron and rudder trims moved hard left; and the left engine simultaneously indicated a hot start; to which the First Officer immediately responded by following the specified Hot Start Immediate Action items. Numerous electrical system related caution and status messages showed on EICAS. The Captain's side RTU was blank and none of the menu buttons that control the EICAS synoptic pages worked with the exception of the 4 buttons wired directly into the system (STEP; etc.). Upon review of the electrical synoptic page; we were able to see that AC Bus 1 had been isolated and was surrounded in magenta color. The Captain directed the Ground Crew to tow us back into another gate as another aircraft had parked at our pushback gate. During this time the Flight Crew was unable to communicate with the Flight Attendants via the interphone system nor make a PA as the electrical event had apparently rendered the interphone system inoperative so the flight deck door was opened and secured in the open position to allow communication. The Flight Attendants were also unable to make any PAs from either of their interphone stations. I feel that this is a major concern because there was no way to command an immediate evacuation if the need had arisen. As the passengers were deplaning; we began to catch whiffs of electrical smoke in the cockpit; but the source was unable to be determined and the smell gradually subsided. A local mechanic showed up and we were directed to start the engines at the gate with the APU operating (all passengers had been deplaned). We initiated the start for the right engine (the engine that had not experienced Hot Start indication) and just prior to starter cutout; we smelled much stronger electrical smoke than we had previously smelled. The start was aborted; the Flight Attendants were directed to get off the airplane; and the entire airplane was shut down.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.