Narrative:

Aircraft shopping: aircraft X was routed through lihue in spite of a dispatcher note indicating likely refusal by a captain. The dispatcher indicated that his department no longer has the authority to prevent problematic aircraft routings. The aircraft had a mechanical defect (inoperative automatic speed brake deployment) that compromised ground stopping capability. The speed brakes could be deployed manually; albeit not so quickly or reliably as the automatic system. To maximize stopping capability; speed brakes provide drag and force aircraft weight to the main gear. Regulatory restrictions impose a landing weight penalty for this mechanical defect to ensure stopping capability during landing rollout. Regulations do not impose a corresponding takeoff weight penalty to ensure stopping capability during an aborted takeoff. Takeoff with this mechanical defect is completely prohibited (regardless of weight) in some conditions. The planned takeoff weight was very close to the maximum allowable for the runway. The runway at lihue is very short (6;500 ft). The lihue runway does not have an overrun. To the contrary; the environment off the runway end is extremely harsh consisting of volcanic rock and an abrupt drop into the water. Based on my experience; I judged it unwise to depart under the proposed conditions. The circumstance posed unacceptable risks against successful execution of either a high speed or low speed abort. High speed abort: a successful high speed aborted takeoff would require prompt and precise actions that are not rehearsed in this fleet. An element of muscle memory is required to reliably execute the proper actions. To rely solely on thinking one's way through the process would be somewhat akin to thinking one's way through a golf swing. Even the requisite muscle memory doesn't assure successful execution of an aborted takeoff with manually operated speed brakes. For example; during nearly 2 decades on the B727 the same actions required for a high speed abort with manually operated speed brakes were rehearsed on every landing. Even so; a decision to abort a takeoff at high speed was one of the most problematic maneuvers for even the most seasoned captains; reflected both by training data and an unfortunate history in actual practice. It is unrealistic to anticipate that a captain would crisply execute the manual speed brake maneuver absent practice. In fact; quite recently; during a landing in another aircraft with this condition; my hand awkwardly fumbled for the speed brake lever. Low speed abort: there is a very high risk that a captain who is preoccupied by anticipation of a possible high speed abort will botch a low speed abort on this fleet. This risk is a byproduct of the autothrottle system. With distractions present; it's very common for the captain to omit disarming of the autothrottle system. When released during the captain's reach for the speed brake handle; armed autothrottles will advance full power to the operating engine(s) with corresponding potential for a loss of directional control. It is rational and prudent for a captain to impose a takeoff safety margin for an inoperative automatic speed brake system. As such; although the manager was not immediately available; an agreement was reached through dispatch to reduce the takeoff weight via a reduced fuel load and then to stop at hnl; an airport that was directly on our planned route; to service the airplane for the pacific crossing. Notwithstanding the agreement; the company pursued an opportunity to foist the aircraft on a different captain. However; it was not sufficient to simply find a willing captain. The company sought to duplicate the conditions I faced as closely as possible. Upon learning of a willing captain; the company first attempted to have that captain and her crew operate my flight exactly as originally planned. This duplication effort failed due to illegalities associated with the other captain's cabin crew. The next attempt

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Large commercial aircraft Captain refuses an aircraft for an oceanic flight with deferred automatic speed brake deployment. Company proceeded to shop for another Captain that would take the flight and charged the refusing Captain with an operational disruption.

Narrative: Aircraft shopping: Aircraft X was routed through Lihue in spite of a Dispatcher note indicating likely refusal by a Captain. The Dispatcher indicated that his department no longer has the authority to prevent problematic aircraft routings. The aircraft had a mechanical defect (inoperative automatic speed brake deployment) that compromised ground stopping capability. The speed brakes could be deployed manually; albeit not so quickly or reliably as the automatic system. To maximize stopping capability; speed brakes provide drag and force aircraft weight to the main gear. Regulatory restrictions impose a landing weight penalty for this mechanical defect to ensure stopping capability during landing rollout. Regulations do not impose a corresponding takeoff weight penalty to ensure stopping capability during an aborted takeoff. Takeoff with this mechanical defect is completely prohibited (regardless of weight) in some conditions. The planned takeoff weight was very close to the maximum allowable for the runway. The runway at Lihue is very short (6;500 FT). The Lihue runway does not have an overrun. To the contrary; the environment off the runway end is extremely harsh consisting of volcanic rock and an abrupt drop into the water. Based on my experience; I judged it unwise to depart under the proposed conditions. The circumstance posed unacceptable risks against successful execution of either a high speed or low speed abort. High Speed Abort: A successful high speed aborted takeoff would require prompt and precise actions that are not rehearsed in this fleet. An element of muscle memory is required to reliably execute the proper actions. To rely solely on thinking one's way through the process would be somewhat akin to thinking one's way through a golf swing. Even the requisite muscle memory doesn't assure successful execution of an aborted takeoff with manually operated speed brakes. For example; during nearly 2 decades on the B727 the same actions required for a high speed abort with manually operated speed brakes were rehearsed on every landing. Even so; a decision to abort a takeoff at high speed was one of the most problematic maneuvers for even the most seasoned Captains; reflected both by training data and an unfortunate history in actual practice. It is unrealistic to anticipate that a Captain would crisply execute the manual speed brake maneuver absent practice. In fact; quite recently; during a landing in another aircraft with this condition; my hand awkwardly fumbled for the speed brake lever. Low Speed Abort: there is a very high risk that a Captain who is preoccupied by anticipation of a possible high speed abort will botch a low speed abort on this fleet. This risk is a byproduct of the Autothrottle system. With distractions present; it's very common for the Captain to omit disarming of the Autothrottle system. When released during the Captain's reach for the speed brake handle; armed autothrottles will advance full power to the operating engine(s) with corresponding potential for a loss of directional control. It is rational and prudent for a Captain to impose a takeoff safety margin for an inoperative automatic speed brake system. As such; although the Manager was not immediately available; an agreement was reached through dispatch to reduce the takeoff weight via a reduced fuel load and then to stop at HNL; an airport that was directly on our planned route; to service the airplane for the Pacific crossing. Notwithstanding the agreement; the company pursued an opportunity to foist the aircraft on a different Captain. However; it was not sufficient to simply find a willing Captain. The company sought to duplicate the conditions I faced as closely as possible. Upon learning of a willing Captain; the company first attempted to have that Captain and her crew operate my flight exactly as originally planned. This duplication effort failed due to illegalities associated with the other Captain's cabin crew. The next attempt

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.