Narrative:

I was copilot on mlt on initial takeoff climb out on the nual 4 pmd we turned to 110 degree mh per the SID and contacted bur departure control (124.6). The controller assigned us a 060 degree mh vector, cleared us to 7000' MSL (expedite through 3000' MSL), and called out traffic at 11 O'clock additional traffic at 1 and 2 O'clock. I responded that I 'had all the traffic'. During the turn and in the climb, the controller repeated the warning of the 11 O'clock traffic (which now had moved to our approximately 9 O'clock position). Although we were still cognizant of the previously called 1 O'clock traffic the controller seemed more worried about the 11 O'clock traffic that we knew was no factor, and it was difficult to distinguish whether or not the 1 O'clock traffic was coming or going. At approximately 3000' MSL 3 NM east of vny it became obvious we were on collision course. The pilot and I simultaneously pushed the airplane over with the other aircraft passing approximately 100'-200' directly overhead. The other pilot said he never had us in sight. This incident was one of those rare instances where everyone was in the right, but two aircraft were almost killed. The controller felt we had the traffic and vectored us accordingly. We did have all the traffic but since the traffic calls referred to '11 O'clock traffic' as being the threat, didn't recognize the traffic at 1 O'clock as a factor until we got right up on him (because of the lack of depth perception at night); and the second (despite our landing lights, strobe, and rotating beacon). Had the other aircraft had an encoding altimeter, the controller would probably have seen the problem developing and given us an avoidance vector. I've been flying for a fair amount of time, but this is the first time that I've run into a situation where predicting the flight path of another aircraft proved so difficult. Supplemental information from acn 82637: at night, while in a climb it's difficult to tell how far away distant traffic really is and what its altitude is. Controllers should be aware of this and give vectors allowing for greater lateral and vertical separation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NIGHT OPERATION RESULTED IN NMAC WITH POINTED OUT TRAFFIC, EVASIVE ACTION TAKEN.

Narrative: I WAS COPLT ON MLT ON INITIAL TKOF CLIMB OUT ON THE NUAL 4 PMD WE TURNED TO 110 DEG MH PER THE SID AND CONTACTED BUR DEP CTL (124.6). THE CTLR ASSIGNED US A 060 DEG MH VECTOR, CLRED US TO 7000' MSL (EXPEDITE THROUGH 3000' MSL), AND CALLED OUT TFC AT 11 O'CLOCK ADDITIONAL TFC AT 1 AND 2 O'CLOCK. I RESPONDED THAT I 'HAD ALL THE TFC'. DURING THE TURN AND IN THE CLIMB, THE CTLR REPEATED THE WARNING OF THE 11 O'CLOCK TFC (WHICH NOW HAD MOVED TO OUR APPROX 9 O'CLOCK POSITION). ALTHOUGH WE WERE STILL COGNIZANT OF THE PREVIOUSLY CALLED 1 O'CLOCK TFC THE CTLR SEEMED MORE WORRIED ABOUT THE 11 O'CLOCK TFC THAT WE KNEW WAS NO FACTOR, AND IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH WHETHER OR NOT THE 1 O'CLOCK TFC WAS COMING OR GOING. AT APPROX 3000' MSL 3 NM E OF VNY IT BECAME OBVIOUS WE WERE ON COLLISION COURSE. THE PLT AND I SIMULTANEOUSLY PUSHED THE AIRPLANE OVER WITH THE OTHER ACFT PASSING APPROX 100'-200' DIRECTLY OVERHEAD. THE OTHER PLT SAID HE NEVER HAD US IN SIGHT. THIS INCIDENT WAS ONE OF THOSE RARE INSTANCES WHERE EVERYONE WAS IN THE RIGHT, BUT TWO ACFT WERE ALMOST KILLED. THE CTLR FELT WE HAD THE TFC AND VECTORED US ACCORDINGLY. WE DID HAVE ALL THE TFC BUT SINCE THE TFC CALLS REFERRED TO '11 O'CLOCK TFC' AS BEING THE THREAT, DIDN'T RECOGNIZE THE TFC AT 1 O'CLOCK AS A FACTOR UNTIL WE GOT RIGHT UP ON HIM (BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF DEPTH PERCEPTION AT NIGHT); AND THE SECOND (DESPITE OUR LNDG LIGHTS, STROBE, AND ROTATING BEACON). HAD THE OTHER ACFT HAD AN ENCODING ALTIMETER, THE CTLR WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SEEN THE PROBLEM DEVELOPING AND GIVEN US AN AVOIDANCE VECTOR. I'VE BEEN FLYING FOR A FAIR AMOUNT OF TIME, BUT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT I'VE RUN INTO A SITUATION WHERE PREDICTING THE FLT PATH OF ANOTHER ACFT PROVED SO DIFFICULT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 82637: AT NIGHT, WHILE IN A CLIMB IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL HOW FAR AWAY DISTANT TFC REALLY IS AND WHAT ITS ALT IS. CTLRS SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS AND GIVE VECTORS ALLOWING FOR GREATER LATERAL AND VERTICAL SEPARATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.