Narrative:

Problem occurred on a business/training flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. We were talking with approach at the time who advised us of light to moderate precipitation near our destination. I had filed the flight plan for 4;000 ft to make sure we stayed out of potential icing conditions near the destination. We were actually clear of clouds at 4;000 ft. There were airmets for icing conditions from the surface to 12;000 ft the evening before the flight; but were revised to 9;000-12;000 ft the morning of the flight. I discussed the icing airmets specifically with an FSS briefer when filing the IFR flight plans at approximately XA00 UTC that morning. We agreed icing should not be an issue. We were descended to 3;000 ft and received approach clearance direct to ZZZ2 VOR for a GPS approach to runway 23. During the descent; we entered clouds and began picking up light to moderate rime ice. Outside air temperature was -4 degrees C when we leveled at 3;000 ft and we were actually in VFR conditions (ceiling approximately 6;000 ft; visibility greater than 10 SM). We requested and were cleared direct to the airport and were given a frequency change at the same time to ZZZ approach on frequency 127.1 we thought. Actually the frequency given was 120.1; which is a clearance delivery frequency; and not 126.4; which we already had set in the radio from the approach plate. This caused a major distraction and delay in being able to deal with a problem of sleet and freezing rain which began about the same time as the frequency change was given. In hindsight; the best thing to have done would have been to cancel the IFR flight plan with approach rather than taking the handoff to ZZZ approach since we were already VFR and actually had the field in sight by this time. Since we were still in sleet and freezing rain; even in VFR conditions; I started a descent to what hopefully would be warmer air below. We descended to 1;700 ft. We were unable to raise any one on the radio because of the misunderstood frequency and did not feel we should delay the descent any longer. ATC still expected us to be at 3;000 ft since we had not canceled IFR and had not yet been cleared for a visual approach to the airport. They most likely received low altitude alerts for us and neither could talk to us because of the wrong frequency. I finally switched back to approach and canceled the IFR flight plan. We continued VFR to the airport in air warm enough to melt the ice before we landed. Immediately after landing; I called FSS and reported the unforecast icing conditions and reviewed current airmets to make sure we had not missed anything during the planning. Airmets had been revised again and now forecast icing at 4;000 ft. I have not had any communication with ATC and was not asked to call anyone to discuss this. Several factors contributed to this incident. There are important lessons here and possibly some situations which; if addressed; would make flying safer and reduce pilot workload at critical times during a flight. There was a student pilot in the left seat with only 3 previous flights. The flight instructor had training but only about 20 hours in the new cirrus perspective avionics package. He had over 1;700 hours in cirrus aircraft; most in the older avidyne avionics package. Several factors raised the workload significantly at a critical time in flight. The weather issues have already been discussed above. Airmets for icing proved to not be correct for the area we were flying in. They were revised at least 3 times in the previous 12 hours. Changing the ATC controlling agency after receiving approach clearance adds to pilot workload when that workload is already the highest of any realm of flight. Adding to this is a frequency that is not as published on the approach plate. The listed frequency; which was already set in the radio; was not given. The frequency given was listed on the airport page as a clearance delivery frequency. I have flown in many areas where these th

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An SR-22 instructor pilot and student flew IFR into un-forecast icing conditions and descended below an approach clearance altitude in order to shed ice prior to canceling IFR. The pilot's lack of familiarity with a new avionics package contributed to the NORDO event.

Narrative: Problem occurred on a business/training flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. We were talking with Approach at the time who advised us of light to moderate precipitation near our destination. I had filed the flight plan for 4;000 FT to make sure we stayed out of potential icing conditions near the destination. We were actually clear of clouds at 4;000 FT. There were AIRMETs for icing conditions from the surface to 12;000 FT the evening before the flight; but were revised to 9;000-12;000 FT the morning of the flight. I discussed the icing AIRMETs specifically with an FSS briefer when filing the IFR flight plans at approximately XA00 UTC that morning. We agreed icing should not be an issue. We were descended to 3;000 FT and received approach clearance direct to ZZZ2 VOR for a GPS approach to Runway 23. During the descent; we entered clouds and began picking up light to moderate rime ice. Outside air temperature was -4 degrees C when we leveled at 3;000 FT and we were actually in VFR conditions (ceiling approximately 6;000 FT; visibility greater than 10 SM). We requested and were cleared direct to the airport and were given a frequency change at the same time to ZZZ Approach on frequency 127.1 we thought. Actually the frequency given was 120.1; which is a clearance delivery frequency; and not 126.4; which we already had set in the radio from the approach plate. This caused a major distraction and delay in being able to deal with a problem of sleet and freezing rain which began about the same time as the frequency change was given. In hindsight; the best thing to have done would have been to cancel the IFR flight plan with Approach rather than taking the handoff to ZZZ Approach since we were already VFR and actually had the field in sight by this time. Since we were still in sleet and freezing rain; even in VFR conditions; I started a descent to what hopefully would be warmer air below. We descended to 1;700 FT. We were unable to raise any one on the radio because of the misunderstood frequency and did not feel we should delay the descent any longer. ATC still expected us to be at 3;000 FT since we had not canceled IFR and had not yet been cleared for a visual approach to the airport. They most likely received low altitude alerts for us and neither could talk to us because of the wrong frequency. I finally switched back to Approach and canceled the IFR flight plan. We continued VFR to the airport in air warm enough to melt the ice before we landed. Immediately after landing; I called FSS and reported the unforecast icing conditions and reviewed current AIRMETs to make sure we had not missed anything during the planning. AIRMETs had been revised again and now forecast icing at 4;000 FT. I have not had any communication with ATC and was not asked to call anyone to discuss this. Several factors contributed to this incident. There are important lessons here and possibly some situations which; if addressed; would make flying safer and reduce pilot workload at critical times during a flight. There was a student pilot in the left seat with only 3 previous flights. The flight instructor had training but only about 20 hours in the new Cirrus Perspective Avionics package. He had over 1;700 hours in Cirrus aircraft; most in the older Avidyne avionics package. Several factors raised the workload significantly at a critical time in flight. The weather issues have already been discussed above. AIRMETs for icing proved to not be correct for the area we were flying in. They were revised at least 3 times in the previous 12 hours. Changing the ATC controlling agency after receiving approach clearance adds to pilot workload when that workload is already the highest of any realm of flight. Adding to this is a frequency that is not as published on the approach plate. The listed frequency; which was already set in the radio; was not given. The frequency given was listed on the airport page as a clearance delivery frequency. I have flown in many areas where these th

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.