|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0601 To 1200|
|Locale Reference||atc facility : tin|
airport : ttn
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 1000|
agl bound upper : 1000
|Controlling Facilities||tower : ttn|
|Operator||general aviation : instructional|
|Make Model Name||Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear|
|Operator||general aviation : corporate|
|Make Model Name||Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng|
|Flight Phase||descent : approach|
|Function||instruction : trainee|
|Qualification||pilot : commercial|
pilot : instrument
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 13|
flight time total : 255
flight time type : 41
|Function||instruction : instructor|
|Qualification||pilot : cfi|
|Anomaly||conflict : nmac|
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Resolutory Action||flight crew : took evasive action|
|Miss Distance||horizontal : 400|
vertical : 100
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
While taking the flight test for a commercial pilot certificate I was involved in a near collision. The flight examiner directed me to proceed to a local tower controled airport. The WX was VMC with a 6000' ceiling and 15 mi visibility and we had anticollision and landing lights on. We were cleared to enter the traffic pattern on a right downwind, and were then cleared to begin performing touch-and-goes, left traffic. Traffic intensity was moderate to light for that facility. On the third trip around the pattern we reported midfield left downwind as directed. While turning final, I discovered that a business jet was on final (apparently on the ILS), and about 100' vertical and 400' horizontal from our position. I immediately took evasive action (a left 360 degree climbing turn, which placed us above the business jet on final). The flight examiner did not see the traffic until it was a couple of miles away on short final. I believe that a number of factors contributed to this problem. First, I believe that the tower controller exhibited unprofessional behavior. Although the traffic pattern was somewhat crowded and the CTAF was congested, he directed a number of incoming flts to make left or right downwind. This seems to be unnecessarily verbose and imprecise. Further, his traffic advisories were less than helpful. At one point he notified us of single engine traffic which was miles distant while failing to notify us of 4 engine turboprop traffic which was proceeding us by only a short distance on final. In another instance, he pointed us out to following traffic as being '2 mi final,' while at the time we were actually considerably less than 1 mi final. Furthermore, he seemed to have inadequate knowledge of our position in the pattern. Shortly after out close encounter he hurriedly asked, 'north , where are you?' his sequencing of traffic was also inadequate, as he extended us on extremely long downwinds twice, when we could have made a short pattern. One of these patterns placed us behind a large military helicopter and its wake turbulence. As an aside, the flight examiner commented that he thought this controller was rather unskilled. Another contributing factor to this problem was the workload imposed by the flight test. The flight examiner indicated at the end of the test that he was attempting to divert my attention during the test in order to ascertain my ability to function safely in the presence of distrs. He indicated that despite his efforts, I maintained safe control of the aircraft and had no difficulties with ATC calls. While this seems to be a worthwhile capability to test, in this particular instance, I believe that the safety of flight was somewhat jeopardized. Due to the high workload of performing touch-and-goes in a complex airplane, the problems in dealing with an ineffectual tower controller, the distrs the flight examiner was providing, and the pressure of a flight test, I was saturated. Fortunately, my vigilance was (just barely) adequate for the task. In order to prevent problems such as these, it is the duty of the pilot to remain vigilant, distrs or other problems and concerns to the contrary. A commercial pilot certificate will probably not be of much use in a midair collision.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SMA PLT GETTING COMMERCIAL FLT CHECK SAYS HE HAD NMAC IN TRAFFIC PATTERN WITH CORP JET ON FINAL. REPORTER STATES POOR ATC BY TWR CTLR.
Narrative: WHILE TAKING THE FLT TEST FOR A COMMERCIAL PLT CERTIFICATE I WAS INVOLVED IN A NEAR COLLISION. THE FLT EXAMINER DIRECTED ME TO PROCEED TO A LCL TWR CTLED ARPT. THE WX WAS VMC WITH A 6000' CEILING AND 15 MI VIS AND WE HAD ANTICOLLISION AND LNDG LIGHTS ON. WE WERE CLRED TO ENTER THE TFC PATTERN ON A RIGHT DOWNWIND, AND WERE THEN CLRED TO BEGIN PERFORMING TOUCH-AND-GOES, LEFT TFC. TFC INTENSITY WAS MODERATE TO LIGHT FOR THAT FAC. ON THE THIRD TRIP AROUND THE PATTERN WE RPTED MIDFIELD LEFT DOWNWIND AS DIRECTED. WHILE TURNING FINAL, I DISCOVERED THAT A BUSINESS JET WAS ON FINAL (APPARENTLY ON THE ILS), AND ABOUT 100' VERT AND 400' HORIZ FROM OUR POS. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK EVASIVE ACTION (A LEFT 360 DEG CLBING TURN, WHICH PLACED US ABOVE THE BUSINESS JET ON FINAL). THE FLT EXAMINER DID NOT SEE THE TFC UNTIL IT WAS A COUPLE OF MILES AWAY ON SHORT FINAL. I BELIEVE THAT A NUMBER OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS PROB. FIRST, I BELIEVE THAT THE TWR CTLR EXHIBITED UNPROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR. ALTHOUGH THE TFC PATTERN WAS SOMEWHAT CROWDED AND THE CTAF WAS CONGESTED, HE DIRECTED A NUMBER OF INCOMING FLTS TO MAKE LEFT OR RIGHT DOWNWIND. THIS SEEMS TO BE UNNECESSARILY VERBOSE AND IMPRECISE. FURTHER, HIS TFC ADVISORIES WERE LESS THAN HELPFUL. AT ONE POINT HE NOTIFIED US OF SINGLE ENG TFC WHICH WAS MILES DISTANT WHILE FAILING TO NOTIFY US OF 4 ENG TURBOPROP TFC WHICH WAS PROCEEDING US BY ONLY A SHORT DISTANCE ON FINAL. IN ANOTHER INSTANCE, HE POINTED US OUT TO FOLLOWING TFC AS BEING '2 MI FINAL,' WHILE AT THE TIME WE WERE ACTUALLY CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN 1 MI FINAL. FURTHERMORE, HE SEEMED TO HAVE INADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE OF OUR POS IN THE PATTERN. SHORTLY AFTER OUT CLOSE ENCOUNTER HE HURRIEDLY ASKED, 'N , WHERE ARE YOU?' HIS SEQUENCING OF TFC WAS ALSO INADEQUATE, AS HE EXTENDED US ON EXTREMELY LONG DOWNWINDS TWICE, WHEN WE COULD HAVE MADE A SHORT PATTERN. ONE OF THESE PATTERNS PLACED US BEHIND A LARGE MIL HELI AND ITS WAKE TURB. AS AN ASIDE, THE FLT EXAMINER COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT THIS CTLR WAS RATHER UNSKILLED. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS PROB WAS THE WORKLOAD IMPOSED BY THE FLT TEST. THE FLT EXAMINER INDICATED AT THE END OF THE TEST THAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO DIVERT MY ATTN DURING THE TEST IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN MY ABILITY TO FUNCTION SAFELY IN THE PRESENCE OF DISTRS. HE INDICATED THAT DESPITE HIS EFFORTS, I MAINTAINED SAFE CTL OF THE ACFT AND HAD NO DIFFICULTIES WITH ATC CALLS. WHILE THIS SEEMS TO BE A WORTHWHILE CAPABILITY TO TEST, IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE, I BELIEVE THAT THE SAFETY OF FLT WAS SOMEWHAT JEOPARDIZED. DUE TO THE HIGH WORKLOAD OF PERFORMING TOUCH-AND-GOES IN A COMPLEX AIRPLANE, THE PROBS IN DEALING WITH AN INEFFECTUAL TWR CTLR, THE DISTRS THE FLT EXAMINER WAS PROVIDING, AND THE PRESSURE OF A FLT TEST, I WAS SATURATED. FORTUNATELY, MY VIGILANCE WAS (JUST BARELY) ADEQUATE FOR THE TASK. IN ORDER TO PREVENT PROBS SUCH AS THESE, IT IS THE DUTY OF THE PLT TO REMAIN VIGILANT, DISTRS OR OTHER PROBS AND CONCERNS TO THE CONTRARY. A COMMERCIAL PLT CERTIFICATE WILL PROBABLY NOT BE OF MUCH USE IN A MIDAIR COLLISION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.