Narrative:

We were late getting fueled for our flight. About 4 minutes before departure; the fueler came upstairs and gave us our fuel sheet. At this time I completed the last preflight items and called for the before start checklist. It was at this time the first officer noticed the right center fuel tank pressure light was not illuminated -- when it should have been. We immediately called this anomaly into maintenance after we cycled the fuel pump switch. The mechanics came out and began their work of cycling circuit breakers and following the maintenance manual (including checking the fueling door). After some time; they handed me a MEL item which would allow us to operate the aircraft with a center tank pump inoperative. We had 14;000 pounds in the center tank and the first officer and I immediately began to research the MEL in order to comply with the incredibly lengthy procedure. The first item that caught our attention was the reference that we had to take into account 'the effect on aircraft balance; in the event fuel cannot be used.' we contacted dispatch and talked with maintenance and I expressed my concerns which included the abnormal procedure to use with the fuel panel to burn the fuel; a potential overweight landing; a diversion to the west coast in case we could not burn the center tank fuel as well as the potential imbalance if we could not burn the center tank fuel. Dispatch attempted to conference in load planning to answer our balance questions -- but dispatch said that they had no idea what we were talking about since they are only 'number crunchers;' with weight and balance. Dispatch had no good reference guides concerning aircraft weight and balance either. We were confused as to the abnormal procedure we would use for our fuel panel configuration if we went with 1 inoperative center tank pump. After we talked more with dispatch; he finally expressed his frustration with the procedure as well and refused the aircraft. Operations assigned delay to the crew --which was false -- I never refused the aircraft. The mechanics had been working hard on the aircraft as if it were refused; and eventually fixed it 3 hours late. Maintenance did an exceptional job. Needless to say; getting a crew caused refusal delay was disheartening since we worked so hard to comply with the MEL and fly the jet. The procedures and 4 pages of the MEL are confusing and incomplete and frankly poorly written. Our issues were simply -- lack of good procedural guidance in how to run the fuel panel -- which is a huge issue in our fleet and a lack of real weight and balance information and help from load planning and dispatch. We all tried as hard as we could to make it work; but in the end; maintenance fixed the problem with a new pressure sensor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Difficulty in interpreting MEL procedure for dispatch with an inoperative center tank fuel pump resulted in a lengthy delay and a dispute over responsibility for the delay for a B767-300 flight crew.

Narrative: We were late getting fueled for our flight. About 4 minutes before departure; the Fueler came upstairs and gave us our fuel sheet. At this time I completed the last preflight items and called for the Before Start checklist. It was at this time the First Officer noticed the right center fuel tank pressure light was not illuminated -- when it should have been. We immediately called this anomaly into maintenance after we cycled the fuel pump switch. The Mechanics came out and began their work of cycling circuit breakers and following the Maintenance Manual (including checking the fueling door). After some time; they handed me a MEL item which would allow us to operate the aircraft with a center tank pump inoperative. We had 14;000 LBS in the center tank and the First Officer and I immediately began to research the MEL in order to comply with the incredibly lengthy procedure. The first item that caught our attention was the reference that we had to take into account 'the effect on aircraft balance; in the event fuel cannot be used.' We contacted Dispatch and talked with Maintenance and I expressed my concerns which included the abnormal procedure to use with the fuel panel to burn the fuel; a potential overweight landing; a diversion to the West Coast in case we could not burn the center tank fuel as well as the potential imbalance if we could not burn the center tank fuel. Dispatch attempted to conference in load planning to answer our balance questions -- but Dispatch said that they had no idea what we were talking about since they are only 'number crunchers;' with weight and balance. Dispatch had no good reference guides concerning aircraft weight and balance either. We were confused as to the abnormal procedure we would use for our fuel panel configuration if we went with 1 inoperative center tank pump. After we talked more with Dispatch; he finally expressed his frustration with the procedure as well and refused the aircraft. Operations assigned delay to the crew --which was false -- I never refused the aircraft. The Mechanics had been working hard on the aircraft as if it were refused; and eventually fixed it 3 hours late. Maintenance did an exceptional job. Needless to say; getting a crew caused refusal delay was disheartening since we worked so hard to comply with the MEL and fly the jet. The procedures and 4 pages of the MEL are confusing and incomplete and frankly poorly written. Our issues were simply -- lack of good procedural guidance in how to run the fuel panel -- which is a huge issue in our fleet and a lack of real weight and balance information and help from Load Planning and Dispatch. We all tried as hard as we could to make it work; but in the end; maintenance fixed the problem with a new pressure sensor.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.