Narrative:

The forecast for ewr was winds 270 degrees at 27 KTS gusting to 36 KTS and ewr was using runway 29. Runway 29 was only 6502 ft for usable landing length and there was serious potential for LLWS and there were several airmets out for turbulence; as well as a SIGMET for severe turbulence from 8;000 ft -surface which included ewr. I was not comfortable with dispatching a DC8 to ewr under these conditions. I did not feel it was safe to dispatch this flight. Yes; we do have performance data for ewr on the DC8 for runway 29; but it would not have been a safe operation. However; I felt from the moment I stated I was uncomfortable dispatching this flight to ewr with these conditions; I received nothing but pressure to make this operation work. The initial response from the supervisor on duty when I told him I was not 100% comfortable with dispatching this flight was; 'well the winds are right down the runway.' I even went so far as to call the DC8 fleet engineer to get his opinion on the operation. After telling him the forecast weather and runway configuration at ewr; he stated he would not be comfortable operating a DC8 into ewr under those conditions. Although that was very useful information to me; it was still going to be the final decision of the captain and dispatcher as to whether or not the flight would operate. However; I don't think that even our managers understand far 121.533. When mr. X did not like what he heard regarding my comfort level with dispatching this flight; his response was something to the effect of; 'we'll just wait and see what the captain decides.' I immediately informed mr. X that the decision was between the captain and I; the dispatcher. The DC8 chief pilot called me and stated he would be comfortable with operating this flight into ewr. First off; I am not sure who contacted him or told him to call me; but he then went on to say it's the captain's decision. Again; company is conveying to me that there is only one person in the decision making process which directly contradicts far 121.533. After that; mr. X proceeded to tell me that the fleet engineer I talked with; who told me he would not be comfortable operating the flight into ewr; now had changed his mind. Mr. X stated the fleet engineer did not hear me correctly about the runway length and he had 2 hearing aids and could not hear very well. Mr. X also said had the fleet engineer known it was a 6;502 ft runway length; he would have said he was comfortable operating this flight into ewr. This also contradicts what the fleet engineer told me as he stated he would not be comfortable with a runway length less than 7;000 ft. To me; this was just another one of the things that was said to get me to make this unsafe operation happen. Mr. X also told me he didn't see the problem with going since just the night before; we operated the DC8 with LLWS and occasional severe turbulence and lots of wind out of the west. I immediately informed him this is not a valid comparison since runway in ZZZ is over 1;000 ft longer than runway 29 in ewr. Again; I felt right there mr. X was trying to talk me into going to ewr in telling me that we ran the 'same' operation the night before and nothing happened. That kind of attitude is going to cause an accident and I think people need to take notice of my warning. And; it reminded me of the hundreds of videos I have seen about accidents and how they happened. After my conversations with mr. X informing him that this decision was not his; the fleet engineer called me back and advised me he had changed his mind after talking with mr. X. So; if the dispatcher is supposed to be the point of contact for the operation; can someone tell me why mr. X is calling the sme without my knowledge? Also; it appeared to me that mr. X somehow convinced the fleet engineer that this was a safe operation so therefore the fleet engineer changed his tune. I asked the sme why he now thought it was a safe operation and his answer was; 'I did not kn

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Dispatcher related his discomfort with the pressures from his managers to dispatch a flight to EWR intended to land on Runway 29 with heavy winds and wind shear warnings.

Narrative: The forecast for EWR was winds 270 degrees at 27 KTS gusting to 36 KTS and EWR was using Runway 29. Runway 29 was only 6502 FT for usable landing length and there was serious potential for LLWS and there were several AIRMETs out for turbulence; as well as a SIGMET for severe turbulence from 8;000 FT -surface which included EWR. I was not comfortable with dispatching a DC8 to EWR under these conditions. I did not feel it was safe to dispatch this flight. Yes; we do have performance data for EWR on the DC8 for Runway 29; but it would not have been a safe operation. However; I felt from the moment I stated I was uncomfortable dispatching this flight to EWR with these conditions; I received nothing but pressure to make this operation work. The initial response from the Supervisor on duty when I told him I was not 100% comfortable with dispatching this flight was; 'well the winds are right down the runway.' I even went so far as to call the DC8 fleet engineer to get his opinion on the Operation. After telling him the forecast weather and runway configuration at EWR; he stated he would not be comfortable operating a DC8 into EWR under those conditions. Although that was very useful information to me; it was still going to be the final decision of the Captain and Dispatcher as to whether or not the flight would operate. However; I don't think that even our managers understand FAR 121.533. When Mr. X did not like what he heard regarding my comfort level with dispatching this flight; his response was something to the effect of; 'we'll just wait and see what the Captain decides.' I immediately informed Mr. X that the decision was between the Captain and I; the Dispatcher. The DC8 Chief Pilot called me and stated he would be comfortable with operating this flight into EWR. First off; I am not sure who contacted him or told him to call me; but he then went on to say it's the Captain's decision. Again; company is conveying to me that there is only one person in the decision making process which directly contradicts FAR 121.533. After that; Mr. X proceeded to tell me that the fleet engineer I talked with; who told me he would not be comfortable operating the flight into EWR; now had changed his mind. Mr. X stated the fleet engineer did not hear me correctly about the runway length and he had 2 hearing aids and could not hear very well. Mr. X also said had the fleet engineer known it was a 6;502 FT runway length; he would have said he was comfortable operating this flight into EWR. This also contradicts what the fleet engineer told me as he stated he would not be comfortable with a runway length less than 7;000 FT. To me; this was just another one of the things that was said to get me to make this unsafe operation happen. Mr. X also told me he didn't see the problem with going since just the night before; we operated the DC8 with LLWS and occasional severe turbulence and lots of wind out of the west. I immediately informed him this is not a valid comparison since runway in ZZZ is over 1;000 FT longer than Runway 29 in EWR. Again; I felt right there Mr. X was trying to talk me into going to EWR in telling me that we ran the 'same' operation the night before and nothing happened. That kind of attitude is going to cause an accident and I think people need to take notice of my warning. And; it reminded me of the hundreds of videos I have seen about accidents and how they happened. After my conversations with Mr. X informing him that this decision was not his; the fleet engineer called me back and advised me he had changed his mind after talking with Mr. X. So; if the Dispatcher is supposed to be the point of contact for the Operation; can someone tell me why Mr. X is calling the SME without my knowledge? Also; it appeared to me that Mr. X somehow convinced the fleet engineer that this was a safe operation so therefore the fleet engineer changed his tune. I asked the SME why he now thought it was a safe operation and his answer was; 'I did not kn

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.