Narrative:

This report will cover the whole flight because we had an event during pushback that may have been related to the problems we had near the end of the flight. On pushback; a 'wheel nosewheel steering fault' was display on the ewd screen. About the same time the tug driver advised us that the 'nosewheel disconnect' pin had not been installed. This was a bit confusing to us as the 'nosewheel steering disconnect' message was displayed. We stopped the push and the tug driver sent the wing walker to get the pin. As we looked up the flight manual procedure for the ECAM; the warning disappeared. We had the pin installed and removed once or twice to verify that the 'nosewheel steering disconnect' was indicating correctly. We finally determined that everything was normal and observed that the cold temperature (-1 degree C) was probably contributing to our indications. Satisfied with the resolution; we completed the pushback. Just after the towbar was disconnected; a 'brakes system 1 fault' was displayed on the ewd screen. We had the tug driver remain on the headset while we completed the flight manual system fault reset procedure for this ECAM. The reset was successful so we completed the pushback procedure and saluted off the pushback crew. Just before the tug driver disconnected his headset; he advised that he would file a report on the pin issue. The flight departed and continued normally until an 'anti-ice standby pitot' was displayed on the ewd screen with about 1 hour or so to go in the flight. The flight manual procedure for this was a crew awareness issue with no action required unless using the standby instruments. A few minutes later; a 'landing gear shock absorber fault' was displayed on the ewd. Very shortly thereafter; the autopilot and the autothrust system disconnected and the flight directors disappeared. As I was the pilot flying; I assumed manual control of the aircraft and the first officer began to handle the ECAM procedures. We descended to FL280 with ATC clearance to get out of rvsm airspace. Without realizing it; maintenance later advised us that we were experiencing a 'dual FMGC' failure. However; it appeared that our maps were still functioning as well as the other associated navigation information. We backed up the map with raw data just to be sure. Maintenance had the first officer download some maintenance information from the mcdu which showed the 'dual FMGC' failure. At this point; my knowledge of the conversations and reset attempts that the first officer and maintenance were working through is limited. I continued to hand fly and handled the communications with ATC. I had no additional bandwidth to listen in with maintenance. We slowed to a maximum .67 mach and/or a 280 KT airspeed per the 'landing gear shock absorber ECAM' procedure. Maintenance and the first officer completed their communications and I was then briefed on the status. All of our problems were manageable with 1 small caveat. The 'landing gear shock absorber' issue may involve the 90 degree rotation of the nose gear. Maintenance felt this would not be an issue in our case; because the landing gear had retracted normally after departure from ZZZ. However; he couldn't rule it completely out; even though he felt the probability was extremely low. We discussed the situation with the flight attendants and gave them a cabin advisory. The passengers were told of the situation and reassured that we expected a normal arrival and landing in ZZZ1. We advised ATC that we would like to have the airport emergency equipment standing by for our landing and taxi in. We discussed what action we might want to take should we have a problem with the nose gear on extension. The topics included a flyby; potential fire; evacuation; and the landing itself. We continued to ZZZ1 normally and flew the arrival into ZZZ1. Somewhere after abcxx intersection; we got our flight directors; autopilot and autothrust systems back. However; we also got a 'landing gear disagree

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 had multiple EWD faults starting with a 'WHEEL NW STRG FAULT' on pushback. In flight 'ICE STBY PITOT' and 'L/G SHOCK ABSORBER FAULT' alerted; then dual FMGC and flight director failures. All indications returned to normal on descent but an emergency was declared.

Narrative: This report will cover the whole flight because we had an event during pushback that may have been related to the problems we had near the end of the flight. On pushback; a 'Wheel Nosewheel Steering Fault' was display on the EWD screen. About the same time the Tug Driver advised us that the 'Nosewheel Disconnect' pin had not been installed. This was a bit confusing to us as the 'Nosewheel Steering Disconnect' message was displayed. We stopped the push and the Tug Driver sent the Wing Walker to get the pin. As we looked up the Flight Manual procedure for the ECAM; the warning disappeared. We had the pin installed and removed once or twice to verify that the 'Nosewheel Steering Disconnect' was indicating correctly. We finally determined that everything was normal and observed that the cold temperature (-1 degree C) was probably contributing to our indications. Satisfied with the resolution; we completed the pushback. Just after the towbar was disconnected; a 'Brakes System 1 Fault' was displayed on the EWD screen. We had the Tug Driver remain on the headset while we completed the Flight Manual System Fault Reset procedure for this ECAM. The reset was successful so we completed the pushback procedure and saluted off the pushback crew. Just before the Tug Driver disconnected his headset; he advised that he would file a report on the pin issue. The flight departed and continued normally until an 'Anti-ice Standby Pitot' was displayed on the EWD screen with about 1 hour or so to go in the flight. The Flight Manual procedure for this was a crew awareness issue with no action required unless using the standby instruments. A few minutes later; a 'Landing Gear Shock Absorber Fault' was displayed on the EWD. Very shortly thereafter; the autopilot and the autothrust system disconnected and the Flight Directors disappeared. As I was the Pilot Flying; I assumed manual control of the aircraft and the First Officer began to handle the ECAM procedures. We descended to FL280 with ATC clearance to get out of RVSM airspace. Without realizing it; Maintenance later advised us that we were experiencing a 'Dual FMGC' failure. However; it appeared that our maps were still functioning as well as the other associated navigation information. We backed up the map with raw data just to be sure. Maintenance had the First Officer download some maintenance information from the MCDU which showed the 'Dual FMGC' failure. At this point; my knowledge of the conversations and reset attempts that the First Officer and Maintenance were working through is limited. I continued to hand fly and handled the communications with ATC. I had no additional bandwidth to listen in with Maintenance. We slowed to a maximum .67 Mach and/or a 280 KT airspeed per the 'Landing Gear Shock Absorber ECAM' procedure. Maintenance and the First Officer completed their communications and I was then briefed on the status. All of our problems were manageable with 1 small caveat. The 'Landing Gear Shock Absorber' issue may involve the 90 degree rotation of the nose gear. Maintenance felt this would not be an issue in our case; because the landing gear had retracted normally after departure from ZZZ. However; he couldn't rule it completely out; even though he felt the probability was extremely low. We discussed the situation with the Flight Attendants and gave them a Cabin Advisory. The passengers were told of the situation and reassured that we expected a normal arrival and landing in ZZZ1. We advised ATC that we would like to have the airport emergency equipment standing by for our landing and taxi in. We discussed what action we might want to take should we have a problem with the nose gear on extension. The topics included a flyby; potential fire; evacuation; and the landing itself. We continued to ZZZ1 normally and flew the arrival into ZZZ1. Somewhere after ABCXX Intersection; we got our Flight Directors; Autopilot and Autothrust systems back. However; we also got a 'Landing Gear Disagree

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.