Narrative:

My crew and I departed ZZZ. It was normal; night; VMC departure. As a newly upgraded captain 2 weeks ago out of IOE; I was the PNF on my second day of a cdo. At approximately 300 ft AGL; we experienced a bleed (2) overpress EICAS message. My first officer stated 'I have the controls and I'll handle ATC if you will run the QRH.' I did. The QRH index directed me to page xx where I was unsuccessful in resolving the problem. During this time I repeatedly and unsuccessfully tried to communicate with maintenance control. We were given frequencys for air carrier #1 maintenance; air carrier #2 maintenance and commercial radio who patched us through to operations twice who; which were of no help! I then pulled up the ecs synoptic page and discovered we had 'lost' our #2 pack and #2 bleed. With questionable maintenance at ZZZZ and still flying in the ZZZ1 vicinity; I decided to return to the gate. We made an uneventful approach and safe landing back at ZZZ1. We were met by air carrier #2 maintenance and while troubleshooting the problem with the mechanic; I discovered that in my haste and fixation and frustration in trying to communicate with someone in maintenance; I had read the wrong checklist. The QRH had directed me to page xx. I started at the top of the page with a bleed (2) leak checklist when in fact; I should have been reading the bleed (2) overpress checklist at the bottom of the page. While I am reluctant to make excuses and or rationalize my stupidity in any way; I believe contributing factors to the incident were my frustration with and the inability to communicate with maintenance control for help. Fatigue resulting from lack of rest due to the cdo and a QRH checklist which directed me to the right page but the wrong checklist was a factor. Had I run the correct checklist; it may or may not have fixed the problem. Finally; I have learned a great deal from this experience. That said; I think our checklist could be better. Possibly colored borders in the headers and 1 checklist per page. Also our company communication procedures with maintenance control need to be reworked and improved. While I take full responsibility for my fatigue; it should be noted that because of the convention in ZZZ1; and the late date at which I received my schedule (as it was a buildup line after my IOE) I could not get a hotel room and the crew room sleeping arrangement is inadequate. Please take all of my comments in the sincerest tone and candid and forthright manner in which they are intended. Thank you very much for your consideration to this matter.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ERJ-170 FLIGHT CREW NOTED A BLEED OVERPRESS EICAS MESSAGE. THE NEW CAPTAIN HAD SOME DIFFICULTY FINDING THE CORRECT PROCEDURE IN THE QRH; AND THEY ELECTED TO RETURN TO THEIR DEPARTURE AIRPORT.

Narrative: MY CREW AND I DEPARTED ZZZ. IT WAS NORMAL; NIGHT; VMC DEP. AS A NEWLY UPGRADED CAPT 2 WKS AGO OUT OF IOE; I WAS THE PNF ON MY SECOND DAY OF A CDO. AT APPROX 300 FT AGL; WE EXPERIENCED A BLEED (2) OVERPRESS EICAS MESSAGE. MY FO STATED 'I HAVE THE CTLS AND I'LL HANDLE ATC IF YOU WILL RUN THE QRH.' I DID. THE QRH INDEX DIRECTED ME TO PAGE XX WHERE I WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN RESOLVING THE PROB. DURING THIS TIME I REPEATEDLY AND UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED TO COMMUNICATE WITH MAINT CTL. WE WERE GIVEN FREQS FOR ACR #1 MAINT; ACR #2 MAINT AND COMMERCIAL RADIO WHO PATCHED US THROUGH TO OPS TWICE WHO; WHICH WERE OF NO HELP! I THEN PULLED UP THE ECS SYNOPTIC PAGE AND DISCOVERED WE HAD 'LOST' OUR #2 PACK AND #2 BLEED. WITH QUESTIONABLE MAINT AT ZZZZ AND STILL FLYING IN THE ZZZ1 VICINITY; I DECIDED TO RETURN TO THE GATE. WE MADE AN UNEVENTFUL APCH AND SAFE LNDG BACK AT ZZZ1. WE WERE MET BY ACR #2 MAINT AND WHILE TROUBLESHOOTING THE PROB WITH THE MECHANIC; I DISCOVERED THAT IN MY HASTE AND FIXATION AND FRUSTRATION IN TRYING TO COMMUNICATE WITH SOMEONE IN MAINT; I HAD READ THE WRONG CHKLIST. THE QRH HAD DIRECTED ME TO PAGE XX. I STARTED AT THE TOP OF THE PAGE WITH A BLEED (2) LEAK CHKLIST WHEN IN FACT; I SHOULD HAVE BEEN READING THE BLEED (2) OVERPRESS CHKLIST AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE. WHILE I AM RELUCTANT TO MAKE EXCUSES AND OR RATIONALIZE MY STUPIDITY IN ANY WAY; I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE INCIDENT WERE MY FRUSTRATION WITH AND THE INABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH MAINT CTL FOR HELP. FATIGUE RESULTING FROM LACK OF REST DUE TO THE CDO AND A QRH CHKLIST WHICH DIRECTED ME TO THE RIGHT PAGE BUT THE WRONG CHKLIST WAS A FACTOR. HAD I RUN THE CORRECT CHKLIST; IT MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE FIXED THE PROB. FINALLY; I HAVE LEARNED A GREAT DEAL FROM THIS EXPERIENCE. THAT SAID; I THINK OUR CHKLIST COULD BE BETTER. POSSIBLY COLORED BORDERS IN THE HEADERS AND 1 CHKLIST PER PAGE. ALSO OUR COMPANY COM PROCS WITH MAINT CTL NEED TO BE REWORKED AND IMPROVED. WHILE I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY FATIGUE; IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT BECAUSE OF THE CONVENTION IN ZZZ1; AND THE LATE DATE AT WHICH I RECEIVED MY SCHEDULE (AS IT WAS A BUILDUP LINE AFTER MY IOE) I COULD NOT GET A HOTEL ROOM AND THE CREW ROOM SLEEPING ARRANGEMENT IS INADEQUATE. PLEASE TAKE ALL OF MY COMMENTS IN THE SINCEREST TONE AND CANDID AND FORTHRIGHT MANNER IN WHICH THEY ARE INTENDED. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION TO THIS MATTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.