Narrative:

Reference log page #3 leading edge slat rod end wires missing conduit on anti-ice duct. I don't recall the specifics; but I think a small portion of the conduit was damaged/missing. I asked if the wires were secure. They were! At this time I felt a deferral for the conduit was ok and approved it. I placed this on a maintenance note with replacement part listed. I did not feel there was any problem with this deferral as the non essential function list for MEL 25-10 seemed to deal primarily with cabin items and did not sufficiently address miscellaneous items outside the cabin. It seems that MEL 25-10 would have been more appropriate in dealing with this missing conduit; which; in our opinion; 'had no affect on the safe operation of the aircraft.' I find that MEL 25-10 would have fit better than the maintenance note. In conversation with the mechanic; we felt that there was no 'safety-of-flight concern.' a portion of the conduit had deteriorated. The slat indication system was svcable and functional. As far as preventing occurrences such as this in the future; I have reviewed and will review again; the requirements of non essential function items; maintenance notes and the procedures manual. It is my job to provide accurate information to the mechanics. I endeavor each day to be as correct and accurate as humanly possible with safety first. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated the issue of using the non-essential function (nef) list under MEL chapter 25-10 for a damaged braided conduit of the #3 leading edge slat indication system was raised by a quality assurance (qa) audit. Qa believed the braided conduit should have been deferred under MEL chapter 27-88. Reporter stated the nef list flowchart; as described in the FAA's nef program; would allow for the type of deferral they had encountered. Reporter stated the problem was; many of the maintenance controllers were not familiar with the approved program and had not been utilizing the deferral procedure available to them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MAINTENANCE CONTROLLER REPORTS ON THE USE OF THE NON-ESSENTIAL FUNCTION (NEF) LIST FOR DEFERRING A DAMAGED #3 LEADING EDGE SLAT ROD-END WIRES BRAIDED CONDUIT UNDER MEL CHAPTER 25-10 FOR A B737-500 AIRCRAFT.

Narrative: REF LOG PAGE #3 LEADING EDGE SLAT ROD END WIRES MISSING CONDUIT ON ANTI-ICE DUCT. I DON'T RECALL THE SPECIFICS; BUT I THINK A SMALL PORTION OF THE CONDUIT WAS DAMAGED/MISSING. I ASKED IF THE WIRES WERE SECURE. THEY WERE! AT THIS TIME I FELT A DEFERRAL FOR THE CONDUIT WAS OK AND APPROVED IT. I PLACED THIS ON A MAINT NOTE WITH REPLACEMENT PART LISTED. I DID NOT FEEL THERE WAS ANY PROB WITH THIS DEFERRAL AS THE NON ESSENTIAL FUNCTION LIST FOR MEL 25-10 SEEMED TO DEAL PRIMARILY WITH CABIN ITEMS AND DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ADDRESS MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS OUTSIDE THE CABIN. IT SEEMS THAT MEL 25-10 WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE APPROPRIATE IN DEALING WITH THIS MISSING CONDUIT; WHICH; IN OUR OPINION; 'HAD NO AFFECT ON THE SAFE OP OF THE ACFT.' I FIND THAT MEL 25-10 WOULD HAVE FIT BETTER THAN THE MAINT NOTE. IN CONVERSATION WITH THE MECH; WE FELT THAT THERE WAS NO 'SAFETY-OF-FLT CONCERN.' A PORTION OF THE CONDUIT HAD DETERIORATED. THE SLAT INDICATION SYS WAS SVCABLE AND FUNCTIONAL. AS FAR AS PREVENTING OCCURRENCES SUCH AS THIS IN THE FUTURE; I HAVE REVIEWED AND WILL REVIEW AGAIN; THE REQUIREMENTS OF NON ESSENTIAL FUNCTION ITEMS; MAINT NOTES AND THE PROCS MANUAL. IT IS MY JOB TO PROVIDE ACCURATE INFO TO THE MECHS. I ENDEAVOR EACH DAY TO BE AS CORRECT AND ACCURATE AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE WITH SAFETY FIRST. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE ISSUE OF USING THE NON-ESSENTIAL FUNCTION (NEF) LIST UNDER MEL CHAPTER 25-10 FOR A DAMAGED BRAIDED CONDUIT OF THE #3 LEADING EDGE SLAT INDICATION SYSTEM WAS RAISED BY A QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) AUDIT. QA BELIEVED THE BRAIDED CONDUIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEFERRED UNDER MEL CHAPTER 27-88. REPORTER STATED THE NEF LIST FLOWCHART; AS DESCRIBED IN THE FAA'S NEF PROGRAM; WOULD ALLOW FOR THE TYPE OF DEFERRAL THEY HAD ENCOUNTERED. REPORTER STATED THE PROBLEM WAS; MANY OF THE MAINTENANCE CONTROLLERS WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE APPROVED PROGRAM AND HAD NOT BEEN UTILIZING THE DEFERRAL PROCEDURE AVAILABLE TO THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.