Narrative:

While taxiing out to runway 36; my first officer and I noticed a spoilerons fault status message on the EICAS. We stopped at the end of the runway and pulled out our manual and went to chapter 7 to correct the problem. After reading that it was just a status message; my first officer told me about a corrective action. My first officer then went to fault reset procedures and read to me the procedure for the spoilerons fault message. We completed the procedure and the status message disappeared and everything checked out as normal. We proceeded to get our takeoff clearance and flew to ZZZ1. After discussing it later that evening with my first officer; we realized we should have gone back to the beginning of the chapter and read the procedure where a maintenance entry was required. This event occurred because of a combination of a number of things: 1) we felt the manual was slightly misleading in that you had to go the beginning of the chapter to find that a entry needed to be made; 2) my lack of knowledge of this procedure also played a part in it; and 3) there also was confusion in the manual in that this was considered a status message in one chapter but called a caution message in another. Supplemental information from acn 809079: I was acting as a crj-200 first officer as part of the required crew (aircraft XXX). We left the gate at XA45. After a pushback; we disconnected as normal. During the engine start; I noticed a white status message 'spoileron fault.' in my experience; until 2 generators are on; it is common to see fault messages as some functions are load shed while one generator such as during engine start with the APU supplying power to the aircraft. I stated to the captain we had a spoileron fault message. He stated we would taxi to runway xx and while holding short find the procedure for a fault reset. I had been a first officer on a flight leaving ZZZ in aircraft XXX with a different captain when the same fault message appeared. Captain said he had this problem in aircraft XXX before and stated there was a procedure to remove the fault; but it was hard to find. We first looked where it says under the EICAS message index; under spoilerons fault. It states 'spoilerons fault detected; one PCU on one side; or one secu module. Spoilerons operate normally.' under flight controls; spoilerons; it states to land with flaps 20 degrees. Indicating an in-flight procedure. Captain stated it was hard to find; and we both looked through the book. He found it under another chapter supplementary procedure. Specifically; the fault reset procedure. When captain and I went through the procedure it called to pull 4 circuit breakers and then re-set them and call maintenance; which we did. As to flight XXX; I opened to the index to read backgnd procedure. It states this procedure is to clear messages that may be nuisance or erroneous in nature. I read through the procedure. I then opened to EICAS message spoilerons fault; message level C (note it is not a caution message; but a status message). It states to take the following actions: open secu 1; 2; A1; and 2B and close them. Checked on the EICAS flight control page and make sure that all boxes are green. Cycle the spoilers and make sure they do not fail. The procedure worked and all boxes were green. I then went back to the first procedure. It asks if the message persists. No was the answer; and I read in full 'the message displayed was erroneous. Make an entry in the maintenance logbook according to the example given on the next page. Contact the maintenance controller to provide the appropriate entry information.' the captain said; 'oh well; the problem is fixed so we don't have to write it up.' and I stated; 'no we have to write it up either way. If we fix it we have to make a note of it and call maintenance control. If it is not fixed then maintenance action required.' as the captain did not have a manual in front of him; I gave him mine and pointed to the section where it says to write it up either way; and follow the example. I even turned the page to show the example. He stated he would write it up when we got back to ZZZ1. I questioned him by saying 'what?' as I did not expect that response. He stated again we would write it up when we got back to ZZZ1. We left the ZZZ airport and completed flight XXX to ZZZ1 arriving at XB52. After the passenger left; the captain asked for the termination check. I said 'don't you want to call maintenance and write up what we did?' and the captain stated 'no...I am not going to.' I stated 'you said we would call maintenance and write this up.' he again stated 'no; I think I will just let the next guy do it.' I stated 'I have had this problem before in this aircraft and I think it is an ongoing problem and should be noted so they can track it.' he shook his head and terminated the aircraft. As an first officer; I am not allowed at air carrier X to write up any items in the maintenance manual. I didn't know what to do.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ200 CREW IS CONFUSED BY THE COMPLEX PRE-TKOF PROCEDURE TO CLEAR A 'SPOILERON FAULT' STATUS LIGHT. THE CAPT FAILS TO NOTIFY MAINT AFTER THE FLT.

Narrative: WHILE TAXIING OUT TO RWY 36; MY FO AND I NOTICED A SPOILERONS FAULT STATUS MESSAGE ON THE EICAS. WE STOPPED AT THE END OF THE RWY AND PULLED OUT OUR MANUAL AND WENT TO CHAPTER 7 TO CORRECT THE PROB. AFTER READING THAT IT WAS JUST A STATUS MESSAGE; MY FO TOLD ME ABOUT A CORRECTIVE ACTION. MY FO THEN WENT TO FAULT RESET PROCS AND READ TO ME THE PROC FOR THE SPOILERONS FAULT MESSAGE. WE COMPLETED THE PROC AND THE STATUS MESSAGE DISAPPEARED AND EVERYTHING CHKED OUT AS NORMAL. WE PROCEEDED TO GET OUR TKOF CLRNC AND FLEW TO ZZZ1. AFTER DISCUSSING IT LATER THAT EVENING WITH MY FO; WE REALIZED WE SHOULD HAVE GONE BACK TO THE BEGINNING OF THE CHAPTER AND READ THE PROC WHERE A MAINT ENTRY WAS REQUIRED. THIS EVENT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF A COMBINATION OF A NUMBER OF THINGS: 1) WE FELT THE MANUAL WAS SLIGHTLY MISLEADING IN THAT YOU HAD TO GO THE BEGINNING OF THE CHAPTER TO FIND THAT A ENTRY NEEDED TO BE MADE; 2) MY LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THIS PROC ALSO PLAYED A PART IN IT; AND 3) THERE ALSO WAS CONFUSION IN THE MANUAL IN THAT THIS WAS CONSIDERED A STATUS MESSAGE IN ONE CHAPTER BUT CALLED A CAUTION MESSAGE IN ANOTHER. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 809079: I WAS ACTING AS A CRJ-200 FO AS PART OF THE REQUIRED CREW (ACFT XXX). WE LEFT THE GATE AT XA45. AFTER A PUSHBACK; WE DISCONNECTED AS NORMAL. DURING THE ENG START; I NOTICED A WHITE STATUS MESSAGE 'SPOILERON FAULT.' IN MY EXPERIENCE; UNTIL 2 GENERATORS ARE ON; IT IS COMMON TO SEE FAULT MESSAGES AS SOME FUNCTIONS ARE LOAD SHED WHILE ONE GENERATOR SUCH AS DURING ENG START WITH THE APU SUPPLYING PWR TO THE ACFT. I STATED TO THE CAPT WE HAD A SPOILERON FAULT MESSAGE. HE STATED WE WOULD TAXI TO RWY XX AND WHILE HOLDING SHORT FIND THE PROC FOR A FAULT RESET. I HAD BEEN A FO ON A FLT LEAVING ZZZ IN ACFT XXX WITH A DIFFERENT CAPT WHEN THE SAME FAULT MESSAGE APPEARED. CAPT SAID HE HAD THIS PROB IN ACFT XXX BEFORE AND STATED THERE WAS A PROC TO REMOVE THE FAULT; BUT IT WAS HARD TO FIND. WE FIRST LOOKED WHERE IT SAYS UNDER THE EICAS MESSAGE INDEX; UNDER SPOILERONS FAULT. IT STATES 'SPOILERONS FAULT DETECTED; ONE PCU ON ONE SIDE; OR ONE SECU MODULE. SPOILERONS OPERATE NORMALLY.' UNDER FLT CTLS; SPOILERONS; IT STATES TO LAND WITH FLAPS 20 DEGS. INDICATING AN INFLT PROC. CAPT STATED IT WAS HARD TO FIND; AND WE BOTH LOOKED THROUGH THE BOOK. HE FOUND IT UNDER ANOTHER CHAPTER SUPPLEMENTARY PROC. SPECIFICALLY; THE FAULT RESET PROC. WHEN CAPT AND I WENT THROUGH THE PROC IT CALLED TO PULL 4 CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND THEN RE-SET THEM AND CALL MAINT; WHICH WE DID. AS TO FLT XXX; I OPENED TO THE INDEX TO READ BACKGND PROC. IT STATES THIS PROC IS TO CLEAR MESSAGES THAT MAY BE NUISANCE OR ERRONEOUS IN NATURE. I READ THROUGH THE PROC. I THEN OPENED TO EICAS MESSAGE SPOILERONS FAULT; MESSAGE LEVEL C (NOTE IT IS NOT A CAUTION MESSAGE; BUT A STATUS MESSAGE). IT STATES TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS: OPEN SECU 1; 2; A1; AND 2B AND CLOSE THEM. CHKED ON THE EICAS FLT CTL PAGE AND MAKE SURE THAT ALL BOXES ARE GREEN. CYCLE THE SPOILERS AND MAKE SURE THEY DO NOT FAIL. THE PROC WORKED AND ALL BOXES WERE GREEN. I THEN WENT BACK TO THE FIRST PROC. IT ASKS IF THE MESSAGE PERSISTS. NO WAS THE ANSWER; AND I READ IN FULL 'THE MESSAGE DISPLAYED WAS ERRONEOUS. MAKE AN ENTRY IN THE MAINT LOGBOOK ACCORDING TO THE EXAMPLE GIVEN ON THE NEXT PAGE. CONTACT THE MAINT CTLR TO PROVIDE THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY INFO.' THE CAPT SAID; 'OH WELL; THE PROB IS FIXED SO WE DON'T HAVE TO WRITE IT UP.' AND I STATED; 'NO WE HAVE TO WRITE IT UP EITHER WAY. IF WE FIX IT WE HAVE TO MAKE A NOTE OF IT AND CALL MAINT CTL. IF IT IS NOT FIXED THEN MAINT ACTION REQUIRED.' AS THE CAPT DID NOT HAVE A MANUAL IN FRONT OF HIM; I GAVE HIM MINE AND POINTED TO THE SECTION WHERE IT SAYS TO WRITE IT UP EITHER WAY; AND FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE. I EVEN TURNED THE PAGE TO SHOW THE EXAMPLE. HE STATED HE WOULD WRITE IT UP WHEN WE GOT BACK TO ZZZ1. I QUESTIONED HIM BY SAYING 'WHAT?' AS I DID NOT EXPECT THAT RESPONSE. HE STATED AGAIN WE WOULD WRITE IT UP WHEN WE GOT BACK TO ZZZ1. WE LEFT THE ZZZ ARPT AND COMPLETED FLT XXX TO ZZZ1 ARRIVING AT XB52. AFTER THE PAX LEFT; THE CAPT ASKED FOR THE TERMINATION CHK. I SAID 'DON'T YOU WANT TO CALL MAINT AND WRITE UP WHAT WE DID?' AND THE CAPT STATED 'NO...I AM NOT GOING TO.' I STATED 'YOU SAID WE WOULD CALL MAINT AND WRITE THIS UP.' HE AGAIN STATED 'NO; I THINK I WILL JUST LET THE NEXT GUY DO IT.' I STATED 'I HAVE HAD THIS PROB BEFORE IN THIS ACFT AND I THINK IT IS AN ONGOING PROB AND SHOULD BE NOTED SO THEY CAN TRACK IT.' HE SHOOK HIS HEAD AND TERMINATED THE ACFT. AS AN FO; I AM NOT ALLOWED AT ACR X TO WRITE UP ANY ITEMS IN THE MAINT MANUAL. I DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TO DO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.