Narrative:

A surface error occurred on a closed runway when an air carrier aircraft X was released for departure. The departure runway (runway 8) had been closed for maintenance by a NOTAM issued by the airport operator. The tower controller was unaware of the runway's closed status because the NOTAM information was inadvertently omitted from his status display area (ids-4); and no other communication had occurred between airport maintenance vehicles and the tower. At the time of the incident runway maintenance had not begun and the runway was clear. There are no formal procedures in place that require radio contact between tul tower controllers and airport vehicles before a movement area is closed or returned to service. While this coordination normally does occur; in this particular instance communications between tower and airport vehicles did not take place. The only thing that changed the open status of the runway were the hands of the clock. Because the tower controller had no way of knowing about the closure; he scanned the runway and cleared aircraft X for takeoff. This error would have been avoided had the current LOA between the tul ATCT and the airport contained radio communication procedures for runway closures. If we are to rely solely on electronic communications to open and close runways; the recurrence of this kind of error is likely. Tul ATCT has offered a revised LOA to tulsa airport authority/authorized that requires radio communication procedures associated with the closure and opening of runways and movement areas.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TUL SUPVR CTLR DESCRIBED TKOF INCIDENT WHEN LCL CTLR CLRED ACR FOR DEP ON CLOSED RWY; LACK OF STATUS INFO AND POOR COORD WITH ARPT CITED.

Narrative: A SURFACE ERROR OCCURRED ON A CLOSED RWY WHEN AN ACR ACFT X WAS RELEASED FOR DEP. THE DEP RWY (RWY 8) HAD BEEN CLOSED FOR MAINT BY A NOTAM ISSUED BY THE ARPT OPERATOR. THE TWR CTLR WAS UNAWARE OF THE RWY'S CLOSED STATUS BECAUSE THE NOTAM INFO WAS INADVERTENTLY OMITTED FROM HIS STATUS DISPLAY AREA (IDS-4); AND NO OTHER COM HAD OCCURRED BTWN ARPT MAINT VEHICLES AND THE TWR. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT RWY MAINT HAD NOT BEGUN AND THE RWY WAS CLR. THERE ARE NO FORMAL PROCS IN PLACE THAT REQUIRE RADIO CONTACT BTWN TUL TWR CTLRS AND ARPT VEHICLES BEFORE A MOVEMENT AREA IS CLOSED OR RETURNED TO SVC. WHILE THIS COORD NORMALLY DOES OCCUR; IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE COMS BTWN TWR AND ARPT VEHICLES DID NOT TAKE PLACE. THE ONLY THING THAT CHANGED THE OPEN STATUS OF THE RWY WERE THE HANDS OF THE CLOCK. BECAUSE THE TWR CTLR HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING ABOUT THE CLOSURE; HE SCANNED THE RWY AND CLRED ACFT X FOR TKOF. THIS ERROR WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED HAD THE CURRENT LOA BTWN THE TUL ATCT AND THE ARPT CONTAINED RADIO COM PROCS FOR RWY CLOSURES. IF WE ARE TO RELY SOLELY ON ELECTRONIC COMS TO OPEN AND CLOSE RWYS; THE RECURRENCE OF THIS KIND OF ERROR IS LIKELY. TUL ATCT HAS OFFERED A REVISED LOA TO TULSA ARPT AUTH THAT REQUIRES RADIO COM PROCS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CLOSURE AND OPENING OF RWYS AND MOVEMENT AREAS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.