Narrative:

A tfr has been issued covering the time period of our departure. The tfr encompasses an area surrounding the building in nyc including most of ewr's eastern airspace and directly on the ewr 7 departure for runway 4L. Clearance delivery was queried about GA aircraft departure procedures due to the tfr. Crew was advised a heading would be assigned by ground control in order for GA to remain outside the tfr. (This was witnessed on landing; an HS125 departed and was given a left turn to 340 degrees departing from runway 4L). Aircraft was cleared to taxi via taxiway Z; taxiway south; taxiway P; taxiway PA; short of taxiway pd. Aircraft was held on taxiway PA short of taxiway pd for 1 hour 28 mins in VMC due to indefinite delays for GA departures. No information or time was given for departure. After the delay; ground control announced that releases were given and the aircraft was instructed to contact tower; no heading assignment was given. Tower cleared the aircraft into position; and for takeoff. Flight crew requested a heading. Tower's response 'fly the published SID.' flight crew asked whether the tfr was still active. Tower's response 'fly the published SID.' aircraft takeoff was initiated; and PF initiated a maximum effort V2 in an attempt to climb beyond the vertical boundary of the tfr. Departure controller gave the first indication of what was occurring. He stated that GA were being released through the tfr on a discrete basis. We are not positive as to whether the tfr was entered -- aircraft climb rate and departure controller turn may have allowed us not to enter. We are also unsure about ATC's authority/authorized to allow us to transit the tfr; although airliners do so every departure. This is a classic example of poor communication exhibited by many controllers in situations which are not within normal operations. We operate at ewr and jfk actively and are familiar with these operations. New york area tower and ground controllers tend to not communicate with flight crews effectively. If questions are asked; their typical response can be hostile at times. We realize the enormous stress and need to move aircraft; but all in aviation are tasked with the safety and security of operations. In this incident; a statement by the tower controller that GA was released on a discrete basis would have been sufficient. We still need to clarify their legal authority/authorized to do so for future occurrences. The increasing use of tfr's to limit GA traffic while allowing air carrier operations should be a concern for all in aviation. Cpr aviation maintains a safety and security record comparable to the major airlines. Yet we are singled out as a higher threat; and our operations become less safe while attempting to comply with tfr restrs which change constantly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EWR IFR DEP DESCRIBED POSSIBLE TFR ENTRY WHEN COMPLYING WITH ATC DEP CLRNC.

Narrative: A TFR HAS BEEN ISSUED COVERING THE TIME PERIOD OF OUR DEP. THE TFR ENCOMPASSES AN AREA SURROUNDING THE BUILDING IN NYC INCLUDING MOST OF EWR'S EASTERN AIRSPACE AND DIRECTLY ON THE EWR 7 DEP FOR RWY 4L. CLRNC DELIVERY WAS QUERIED ABOUT GA ACFT DEP PROCS DUE TO THE TFR. CREW WAS ADVISED A HDG WOULD BE ASSIGNED BY GND CTL IN ORDER FOR GA TO REMAIN OUTSIDE THE TFR. (THIS WAS WITNESSED ON LNDG; AN HS125 DEPARTED AND WAS GIVEN A L TURN TO 340 DEGS DEPARTING FROM RWY 4L). ACFT WAS CLRED TO TAXI VIA TXWY Z; TXWY S; TXWY P; TXWY PA; SHORT OF TXWY PD. ACFT WAS HELD ON TXWY PA SHORT OF TXWY PD FOR 1 HR 28 MINS IN VMC DUE TO INDEFINITE DELAYS FOR GA DEPS. NO INFO OR TIME WAS GIVEN FOR DEP. AFTER THE DELAY; GND CTL ANNOUNCED THAT RELEASES WERE GIVEN AND THE ACFT WAS INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT TWR; NO HDG ASSIGNMENT WAS GIVEN. TWR CLRED THE ACFT INTO POS; AND FOR TKOF. FLT CREW REQUESTED A HDG. TWR'S RESPONSE 'FLY THE PUBLISHED SID.' FLT CREW ASKED WHETHER THE TFR WAS STILL ACTIVE. TWR'S RESPONSE 'FLY THE PUBLISHED SID.' ACFT TKOF WAS INITIATED; AND PF INITIATED A MAX EFFORT V2 IN AN ATTEMPT TO CLB BEYOND THE VERT BOUNDARY OF THE TFR. DEP CTLR GAVE THE FIRST INDICATION OF WHAT WAS OCCURRING. HE STATED THAT GA WERE BEING RELEASED THROUGH THE TFR ON A DISCRETE BASIS. WE ARE NOT POSITIVE AS TO WHETHER THE TFR WAS ENTERED -- ACFT CLB RATE AND DEP CTLR TURN MAY HAVE ALLOWED US NOT TO ENTER. WE ARE ALSO UNSURE ABOUT ATC'S AUTH TO ALLOW US TO TRANSIT THE TFR; ALTHOUGH AIRLINERS DO SO EVERY DEP. THIS IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF POOR COM EXHIBITED BY MANY CTLRS IN SITUATIONS WHICH ARE NOT WITHIN NORMAL OPS. WE OPERATE AT EWR AND JFK ACTIVELY AND ARE FAMILIAR WITH THESE OPS. NEW YORK AREA TWR AND GND CTLRS TEND TO NOT COMMUNICATE WITH FLT CREWS EFFECTIVELY. IF QUESTIONS ARE ASKED; THEIR TYPICAL RESPONSE CAN BE HOSTILE AT TIMES. WE REALIZE THE ENORMOUS STRESS AND NEED TO MOVE ACFT; BUT ALL IN AVIATION ARE TASKED WITH THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF OPS. IN THIS INCIDENT; A STATEMENT BY THE TWR CTLR THAT GA WAS RELEASED ON A DISCRETE BASIS WOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT. WE STILL NEED TO CLARIFY THEIR LEGAL AUTH TO DO SO FOR FUTURE OCCURRENCES. THE INCREASING USE OF TFR'S TO LIMIT GA TFC WHILE ALLOWING ACR OPS SHOULD BE A CONCERN FOR ALL IN AVIATION. CPR AVIATION MAINTAINS A SAFETY AND SECURITY RECORD COMPARABLE TO THE MAJOR AIRLINES. YET WE ARE SINGLED OUT AS A HIGHER THREAT; AND OUR OPS BECOME LESS SAFE WHILE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLY WITH TFR RESTRS WHICH CHANGE CONSTANTLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.