Narrative:

Departing. Upon initial power reduction at 1000 ft AGL; severe vibration and loud banging experienced. First officer (pm) idented condition as compressor stall; and positively idented left engine (#1) as source. First officer reduced left thrust lever to idle while co (PF) continued to fly aircraft. Vibration and banging immediately ceased. Flight attendant reported observing 'sparks' coming from engine; and commuting pilot in cabin reported a 6-8 ft flame being emitted from engine. Since aircraft was climbing and accelerating safely away from congested ZZZ-ZZZ1 airspace; and headed in direction of destination (northeast; toward zzzzz intersection); crew applied CRM and decided to continue on northeast heading and use the time; altitude; and less congested airspace to their benefit to troubleshoot problem. (Note: there is no procedure or guidance in either QRH or pilot handbook regarding compressor stall. The only ECAM caution displayed was 'air; engine 1 bleed fault.' ECAM action complied with.) at idle power; all left engine readings (vibration; temperature; oil pressure; etc) were normal. Crew decided to level at 10000 ft MSL and attempt to restore power on left engine. As thrust lever was advanced slowly toward 40-50% N1; banging and vibration commenced again; co; who had reassumed PF role after checking QRH and checking all other sources for guidance; reduced thrust lever to idle; which again caused noise and vibration to stop. Crew decided to divert to ZZZ2 -- directly ahead of them; with a straight-in approach to a 9500 ft runway; clear skies; calm winds; and light traffic; as opposed to returning to heavily congested ny airspace and adding unnecessary stress to the situation. Crew declared emergency with ATC; contacted dispatch; contacted ZZZ2 operations; and briefed flight attendants to prepare for normal landing. Passenger also advised of decision to make precautionary landing. Flight made uneventful landing at ZZZ2 with left engine in idle. Follow-up call to maintenance control the morning after event; co advised engine was still being inspected by a ZZZ3 maintenance crew sent to ZZZ3 and that; judging by similar occurrences; internal damage to engine compressor section is suspected. Pilots are trained to always refer to QRH for guidance during abnormal situations. After turning flying duties over to first officer once aircraft was stabilized; co spent several precious mins searching the various indices and appendices of the QRH; finally discovering; to his disbelief; that there was no reference to this anomaly anywhere. Something as simple as instructing crew to reduce thrust to idle; and then examine engine parameters to determine if engine can be left running; and dissuade crews who may be spring-loaded to shut engine down; and further exacerbate situation; would be useful. Co recalls having compressor stall maybe once in simulator training; but several yrs ago. This event; with loud banging and vibrating; is very stressful to crew; flight attendants and passenger; and immediate guidance should be available to crew in QRH.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319'S LEFT ENG COMPRESSOR STALLS AFTER TKOF. WITH ENG AT IDLE; CREW DECLARED AN EMER AND FLEW TO A NEARBY ARPT. COMPRESSOR DAMAGE DISCOVERED.

Narrative: DEPARTING. UPON INITIAL PWR REDUCTION AT 1000 FT AGL; SEVERE VIBRATION AND LOUD BANGING EXPERIENCED. FO (PM) IDENTED CONDITION AS COMPRESSOR STALL; AND POSITIVELY IDENTED L ENG (#1) AS SOURCE. FO REDUCED L THRUST LEVER TO IDLE WHILE CO (PF) CONTINUED TO FLY ACFT. VIBRATION AND BANGING IMMEDIATELY CEASED. FLT ATTENDANT RPTED OBSERVING 'SPARKS' COMING FROM ENG; AND COMMUTING PLT IN CABIN RPTED A 6-8 FT FLAME BEING EMITTED FROM ENG. SINCE ACFT WAS CLBING AND ACCELERATING SAFELY AWAY FROM CONGESTED ZZZ-ZZZ1 AIRSPACE; AND HEADED IN DIRECTION OF DEST (NE; TOWARD ZZZZZ INTXN); CREW APPLIED CRM AND DECIDED TO CONTINUE ON NE HDG AND USE THE TIME; ALT; AND LESS CONGESTED AIRSPACE TO THEIR BENEFIT TO TROUBLESHOOT PROB. (NOTE: THERE IS NO PROC OR GUIDANCE IN EITHER QRH OR PLT HANDBOOK REGARDING COMPRESSOR STALL. THE ONLY ECAM CAUTION DISPLAYED WAS 'AIR; ENG 1 BLEED FAULT.' ECAM ACTION COMPLIED WITH.) AT IDLE PWR; ALL L ENG READINGS (VIBRATION; TEMP; OIL PRESSURE; ETC) WERE NORMAL. CREW DECIDED TO LEVEL AT 10000 FT MSL AND ATTEMPT TO RESTORE PWR ON L ENG. AS THRUST LEVER WAS ADVANCED SLOWLY TOWARD 40-50% N1; BANGING AND VIBRATION COMMENCED AGAIN; CO; WHO HAD REASSUMED PF ROLE AFTER CHKING QRH AND CHKING ALL OTHER SOURCES FOR GUIDANCE; REDUCED THRUST LEVER TO IDLE; WHICH AGAIN CAUSED NOISE AND VIBRATION TO STOP. CREW DECIDED TO DIVERT TO ZZZ2 -- DIRECTLY AHEAD OF THEM; WITH A STRAIGHT-IN APCH TO A 9500 FT RWY; CLR SKIES; CALM WINDS; AND LIGHT TFC; AS OPPOSED TO RETURNING TO HEAVILY CONGESTED NY AIRSPACE AND ADDING UNNECESSARY STRESS TO THE SITUATION. CREW DECLARED EMER WITH ATC; CONTACTED DISPATCH; CONTACTED ZZZ2 OPS; AND BRIEFED FLT ATTENDANTS TO PREPARE FOR NORMAL LNDG. PAX ALSO ADVISED OF DECISION TO MAKE PRECAUTIONARY LNDG. FLT MADE UNEVENTFUL LNDG AT ZZZ2 WITH L ENG IN IDLE. FOLLOW-UP CALL TO MAINT CTL THE MORNING AFTER EVENT; CO ADVISED ENG WAS STILL BEING INSPECTED BY A ZZZ3 MAINT CREW SENT TO ZZZ3 AND THAT; JUDGING BY SIMILAR OCCURRENCES; INTERNAL DAMAGE TO ENG COMPRESSOR SECTION IS SUSPECTED. PLTS ARE TRAINED TO ALWAYS REFER TO QRH FOR GUIDANCE DURING ABNORMAL SITUATIONS. AFTER TURNING FLYING DUTIES OVER TO FO ONCE ACFT WAS STABILIZED; CO SPENT SEVERAL PRECIOUS MINS SEARCHING THE VARIOUS INDICES AND APPENDICES OF THE QRH; FINALLY DISCOVERING; TO HIS DISBELIEF; THAT THERE WAS NO REF TO THIS ANOMALY ANYWHERE. SOMETHING AS SIMPLE AS INSTRUCTING CREW TO REDUCE THRUST TO IDLE; AND THEN EXAMINE ENG PARAMETERS TO DETERMINE IF ENG CAN BE LEFT RUNNING; AND DISSUADE CREWS WHO MAY BE SPRING-LOADED TO SHUT ENG DOWN; AND FURTHER EXACERBATE SITUATION; WOULD BE USEFUL. CO RECALLS HAVING COMPRESSOR STALL MAYBE ONCE IN SIMULATOR TRAINING; BUT SEVERAL YRS AGO. THIS EVENT; WITH LOUD BANGING AND VIBRATING; IS VERY STRESSFUL TO CREW; FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX; AND IMMEDIATE GUIDANCE SHOULD BE AVAILABLE TO CREW IN QRH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.