Narrative:

We were filed the milton 3 arrival into lga. Prior to descent; I had briefed the arrival and then the approach. The ATIS had the winds at about 180 degrees at 9 KTS. The ATIS said ILS 22 was in use; and this is what I briefed. While on the last segment of the arrival; and at about the point we expected to get vectors up the hudson river for the ILS to runway 22; we were told by new york approach that the airport had just given them a 2 min notice the runway confign had been changed to the expressway visual 31. We were currently only a couple of mins away from the 2 tanks that start the approach; descending from 7000 ft to 4000 ft. Approach cleared us down to 2500 ft and for the expressway visual 31. I quickly started slowing the aircraft to 180 KTS and started configuring. I turned to page for the approach to review the important aspects of the approach. I had been previously based in the new york domicile and was familiar with the approach; although I had not flown the approach in some time. I did not see the tanks but talked with the first officer and pointed out the expressway and where we would turn towards the airport. The first officer got runway 31 loaded into the FMGC and I hand flew the approach as we had; in effect; been dumped into the approach at the last min. While configuring and slowing; I proceeded to fly along the expressway and started my left turn towards the runway; giving myself a little extra space instead of trying to turn hard into the runway and cutting in too close to shea stadium. I asked the first officer if he had contacted tower and he did at that point. The first officer; as I was trying to line up on final; stated that there was a solid crosswind from the left. This caused me to overshoot final by a couple hundred ft; but we still had enough altitude to bank back in towards the runway and get the aircraft aligned with runway 31. We were showing slightly high on the VASI's as we came around; which is where I preferred to be with all the buildings below us and from previous knowledge of the approach into runway 31. The aircraft was safely landed in the touchdown zone on speed and medium braking was used to slow the aircraft. In retrospect; I have some concerns about this approach. First; having what appeared to be little coordination between new york approach and lga airport put us in a position to potentially compromise safety. It seems absurd that their lack of coordination gets dumped onto the arriving crews when there had been no heads up for the change or options to get us the proper spacing/timing to position our aircraft. Second; in hindsight; it may have been better for me to decline the approach and insist on delay vectors to get better prepared. Both the first officer and I had previously been based in new york and both of us have extensive experience on the airbus. That being said; I felt that even though we knew the area around us; the short notice change of approach and significant change in workload taxed even an experienced crew. I felt that the two of us worked very well together to make sure everything was completed as per SOP. However; it was in a very high workload environment. I recognize that we had little room for error; as even the overshoot due to the strong left crosswind; if compounded with anything else; would have potentially task saturated us. From the learning curve perspective; with 9 yrs of first officer time on the airbus and now 7 months of captain experience on the airbus; I recognize that given the same circumstances; it would have been more prudent to take the delay vectors instead of counting on prior experience in the local area. The experience factor is better left to add an extra margin of safety than to compensate for a last min; unanticipated and un-briefed change.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HIS ACCEPTANCE OF A LAST MINUTE RWY TURNAROUND AT LGA CAUSES A320 CAPTAIN TO CONSIDER THE WISDOM OF HIS RESPONSE.

Narrative: WE WERE FILED THE MILTON 3 ARR INTO LGA. PRIOR TO DSCNT; I HAD BRIEFED THE ARR AND THEN THE APCH. THE ATIS HAD THE WINDS AT ABOUT 180 DEGS AT 9 KTS. THE ATIS SAID ILS 22 WAS IN USE; AND THIS IS WHAT I BRIEFED. WHILE ON THE LAST SEGMENT OF THE ARR; AND AT ABOUT THE POINT WE EXPECTED TO GET VECTORS UP THE HUDSON RIVER FOR THE ILS TO RWY 22; WE WERE TOLD BY NEW YORK APCH THAT THE ARPT HAD JUST GIVEN THEM A 2 MIN NOTICE THE RWY CONFIGN HAD BEEN CHANGED TO THE EXPRESSWAY VISUAL 31. WE WERE CURRENTLY ONLY A COUPLE OF MINS AWAY FROM THE 2 TANKS THAT START THE APCH; DSNDING FROM 7000 FT TO 4000 FT. APCH CLRED US DOWN TO 2500 FT AND FOR THE EXPRESSWAY VISUAL 31. I QUICKLY STARTED SLOWING THE ACFT TO 180 KTS AND STARTED CONFIGURING. I TURNED TO PAGE FOR THE APCH TO REVIEW THE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE APCH. I HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY BASED IN THE NEW YORK DOMICILE AND WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE APCH; ALTHOUGH I HAD NOT FLOWN THE APCH IN SOME TIME. I DID NOT SEE THE TANKS BUT TALKED WITH THE FO AND POINTED OUT THE EXPRESSWAY AND WHERE WE WOULD TURN TOWARDS THE ARPT. THE FO GOT RWY 31 LOADED INTO THE FMGC AND I HAND FLEW THE APCH AS WE HAD; IN EFFECT; BEEN DUMPED INTO THE APCH AT THE LAST MIN. WHILE CONFIGURING AND SLOWING; I PROCEEDED TO FLY ALONG THE EXPRESSWAY AND STARTED MY L TURN TOWARDS THE RWY; GIVING MYSELF A LITTLE EXTRA SPACE INSTEAD OF TRYING TO TURN HARD INTO THE RWY AND CUTTING IN TOO CLOSE TO SHEA STADIUM. I ASKED THE FO IF HE HAD CONTACTED TWR AND HE DID AT THAT POINT. THE FO; AS I WAS TRYING TO LINE UP ON FINAL; STATED THAT THERE WAS A SOLID XWIND FROM THE L. THIS CAUSED ME TO OVERSHOOT FINAL BY A COUPLE HUNDRED FT; BUT WE STILL HAD ENOUGH ALT TO BANK BACK IN TOWARDS THE RWY AND GET THE ACFT ALIGNED WITH RWY 31. WE WERE SHOWING SLIGHTLY HIGH ON THE VASI'S AS WE CAME AROUND; WHICH IS WHERE I PREFERRED TO BE WITH ALL THE BUILDINGS BELOW US AND FROM PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF THE APCH INTO RWY 31. THE ACFT WAS SAFELY LANDED IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE ON SPD AND MEDIUM BRAKING WAS USED TO SLOW THE ACFT. IN RETROSPECT; I HAVE SOME CONCERNS ABOUT THIS APCH. FIRST; HAVING WHAT APPEARED TO BE LITTLE COORD BTWN NEW YORK APCH AND LGA ARPT PUT US IN A POS TO POTENTIALLY COMPROMISE SAFETY. IT SEEMS ABSURD THAT THEIR LACK OF COORD GETS DUMPED ONTO THE ARRIVING CREWS WHEN THERE HAD BEEN NO HEADS UP FOR THE CHANGE OR OPTIONS TO GET US THE PROPER SPACING/TIMING TO POS OUR ACFT. SECOND; IN HINDSIGHT; IT MAY HAVE BEEN BETTER FOR ME TO DECLINE THE APCH AND INSIST ON DELAY VECTORS TO GET BETTER PREPARED. BOTH THE FO AND I HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN BASED IN NEW YORK AND BOTH OF US HAVE EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE ON THE AIRBUS. THAT BEING SAID; I FELT THAT EVEN THOUGH WE KNEW THE AREA AROUND US; THE SHORT NOTICE CHANGE OF APCH AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN WORKLOAD TAXED EVEN AN EXPERIENCED CREW. I FELT THAT THE TWO OF US WORKED VERY WELL TOGETHER TO MAKE SURE EVERYTHING WAS COMPLETED AS PER SOP. HOWEVER; IT WAS IN A VERY HIGH WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT. I RECOGNIZE THAT WE HAD LITTLE ROOM FOR ERROR; AS EVEN THE OVERSHOOT DUE TO THE STRONG L XWIND; IF COMPOUNDED WITH ANYTHING ELSE; WOULD HAVE POTENTIALLY TASK SATURATED US. FROM THE LEARNING CURVE PERSPECTIVE; WITH 9 YRS OF FO TIME ON THE AIRBUS AND NOW 7 MONTHS OF CAPT EXPERIENCE ON THE AIRBUS; I RECOGNIZE THAT GIVEN THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES; IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PRUDENT TO TAKE THE DELAY VECTORS INSTEAD OF COUNTING ON PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN THE LOCAL AREA. THE EXPERIENCE FACTOR IS BETTER LEFT TO ADD AN EXTRA MARGIN OF SAFETY THAN TO COMPENSATE FOR A LAST MIN; UNANTICIPATED AND UN-BRIEFED CHANGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.