Narrative:

1 hour prior to the incident; I learned that the union was discussing another change to the seniority policy that would have an adverse effect on my ability to choose my days off (work schedule) and bid my vacation leave. Approximately 5 mins prior to the incident; canada (vancouver approach control) was giving me (sea ARTCC) a handoff on a lear 55 with no flight plan information. At the time of the incident; I was attempting to input flight plan information into the computer in order to facilitate radar handoff to sea approach control. The incident began at XA59; vancouver approach called with a departure time on air carrier X off cyyj. At XB01 vancouver called with a radar handoff on air carrier X and I 'took radar' and departed the aircraft with a computer departure message. When I 'departed' air carrier X; I failed to notice that the aircraft was not on the proper transponder code. If the aircraft in question is on the computer assigned code; the computer will automatically force a full data block on the radar target. Since air carrier X was not on the host computer assigned code; no data block was presented. This particular scenario happens often and is not a significant issue. When the pilot checks on; the proper code is assigned and the radar controller can manually start the track and verify target correlation. The really unfortunate thing in the above scenario is that the pilot of air carrier X did not check on after the frequency change was made while the aircraft was still in canada's airspace. Air carrier X did not call anyone until approximately 10 NM from seatac international. The pilot failed to question why he was not given the appropriate restr published on the STAR. The pilot did finally call asking if he missed a handoff and needed lower in order to land. As the ATC controller; I accept responsibility for my mistake of not starting the track and failing to see the limited data block (code and altitude). It's a shame that the other 2 fail-safe items; automation and pilot/controller communications also failed at the same time. Air carrier X entered sea TRACON airspace without a handoff. The incident was classified as an operational deviation. The aircraft was never closer than 8 NM from any other aircraft.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZSE CTLR DESCRIBED OPDEV WHEN DEP; WITH NO TRANSPONDER; WAS NOT PROPERLY ID'D AND ENTERED ADJACENT AIRSPACE WITHOUT COORD AND/OR HDOF.

Narrative: 1 HR PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT; I LEARNED THAT THE UNION WAS DISCUSSING ANOTHER CHANGE TO THE SENIORITY POLICY THAT WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON MY ABILITY TO CHOOSE MY DAYS OFF (WORK SCHEDULE) AND BID MY VACATION LEAVE. APPROX 5 MINS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT; CANADA (VANCOUVER APCH CTL) WAS GIVING ME (SEA ARTCC) A HDOF ON A LEAR 55 WITH NO FLT PLAN INFO. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT; I WAS ATTEMPTING TO INPUT FLT PLAN INFO INTO THE COMPUTER IN ORDER TO FACILITATE RADAR HDOF TO SEA APCH CTL. THE INCIDENT BEGAN AT XA59; VANCOUVER APCH CALLED WITH A DEP TIME ON ACR X OFF CYYJ. AT XB01 VANCOUVER CALLED WITH A RADAR HDOF ON ACR X AND I 'TOOK RADAR' AND DEPARTED THE ACFT WITH A COMPUTER DEP MESSAGE. WHEN I 'DEPARTED' ACR X; I FAILED TO NOTICE THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT ON THE PROPER XPONDER CODE. IF THE ACFT IN QUESTION IS ON THE COMPUTER ASSIGNED CODE; THE COMPUTER WILL AUTOMATICALLY FORCE A FULL DATA BLOCK ON THE RADAR TARGET. SINCE ACR X WAS NOT ON THE HOST COMPUTER ASSIGNED CODE; NO DATA BLOCK WAS PRESENTED. THIS PARTICULAR SCENARIO HAPPENS OFTEN AND IS NOT A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE. WHEN THE PLT CHKS ON; THE PROPER CODE IS ASSIGNED AND THE RADAR CTLR CAN MANUALLY START THE TRACK AND VERIFY TARGET CORRELATION. THE REALLY UNFORTUNATE THING IN THE ABOVE SCENARIO IS THAT THE PLT OF ACR X DID NOT CHK ON AFTER THE FREQ CHANGE WAS MADE WHILE THE ACFT WAS STILL IN CANADA'S AIRSPACE. ACR X DID NOT CALL ANYONE UNTIL APPROX 10 NM FROM SEATAC INTL. THE PLT FAILED TO QUESTION WHY HE WAS NOT GIVEN THE APPROPRIATE RESTR PUBLISHED ON THE STAR. THE PLT DID FINALLY CALL ASKING IF HE MISSED A HDOF AND NEEDED LOWER IN ORDER TO LAND. AS THE ATC CTLR; I ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY MISTAKE OF NOT STARTING THE TRACK AND FAILING TO SEE THE LIMITED DATA BLOCK (CODE AND ALT). IT'S A SHAME THAT THE OTHER 2 FAIL-SAFE ITEMS; AUTOMATION AND PLT/CTLR COMS ALSO FAILED AT THE SAME TIME. ACR X ENTERED SEA TRACON AIRSPACE WITHOUT A HDOF. THE INCIDENT WAS CLASSIFIED AS AN OPDEV. THE ACFT WAS NEVER CLOSER THAN 8 NM FROM ANY OTHER ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.