Narrative:

Initially during our descent from 16000 ft MSL on our way to ZZZ at roughly 15000 ft MSL; the event occurred. We were in icing conditions; but no ice was accumulating. We were in very light turbulence at the time as well. The event started as the #1 torque gauge slowly bleeding off. (We were at a power setting of roughly 90% torque at the time.) then we noticed the #1 fuel flow gauge also bleeding off. (We were at a fuel flow of roughly 650 pph.) at roughly 25% torque and 250 pph fuel flow; we noticed a slight yaw beginning to occur and I called for the #1 engine failure checklist. We ran the checklist; shut down the #1 engine; and declared an emergency. (Additional checklist ran were the engine cleanup items checklist and the single engine landing checklist and its associated parts.) while between checklists; I informed our flight attendant; 'we had an engine failure. We are planning a normal deplaning after we shut down on the runway and deplane. We had just over 5 mins for her to get ready. And that we would get back to her prior in about 5 mins.' I also reassured her that the aircraft was alright; other than the failed engine. We ran associated checklists; got a hold of dispatch and operations; and proceeded in for a single engine ILS approach. We shot the ILS approach and landed uneventfully. We proceeded to shut down on the runway with crash; fire; rescue already on scene. This took a few moments to collect our thoughts and shut down the #2 engine; due to an excess amount of adrenaline flowing. After crash; fire; rescue assured us the aircraft was secure; we shut the aircraft down; I opened the flight deck door; spoke briefly to the passenger (apologizing for exciting everyone; assuring them everything was ok; and informing them it would be a few more moments and we would be towed in). I opened the main cabin door; spoke to the crash; fire; rescue incident commander briefly; and talked face-to-face with the ZZZ air carrier escort team; tow team. We were towed in uneventfully and paperwork -- phone calls ensued. As a side note; we chose to shut down on the runway because: 1) we wanted to make sure that if we had inadvertently missed anything due to excess adrenaline; we would not have aggravated the situation trying to do too much or 2) if we had inadvertently missed anything due to having just previously completed a 12 hour day with a 9 hour overnight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DASH 8 Q200'S ENG FAILED BENIGNLY DURING DSCNT FOR LNDG. AN EMER WAS DECLARED FOLLOWED BY AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG.

Narrative: INITIALLY DURING OUR DSCNT FROM 16000 FT MSL ON OUR WAY TO ZZZ AT ROUGHLY 15000 FT MSL; THE EVENT OCCURRED. WE WERE IN ICING CONDITIONS; BUT NO ICE WAS ACCUMULATING. WE WERE IN VERY LIGHT TURB AT THE TIME AS WELL. THE EVENT STARTED AS THE #1 TORQUE GAUGE SLOWLY BLEEDING OFF. (WE WERE AT A PWR SETTING OF ROUGHLY 90% TORQUE AT THE TIME.) THEN WE NOTICED THE #1 FUEL FLOW GAUGE ALSO BLEEDING OFF. (WE WERE AT A FUEL FLOW OF ROUGHLY 650 PPH.) AT ROUGHLY 25% TORQUE AND 250 PPH FUEL FLOW; WE NOTICED A SLIGHT YAW BEGINNING TO OCCUR AND I CALLED FOR THE #1 ENG FAILURE CHKLIST. WE RAN THE CHKLIST; SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG; AND DECLARED AN EMER. (ADDITIONAL CHKLIST RAN WERE THE ENG CLEANUP ITEMS CHKLIST AND THE SINGLE ENG LNDG CHKLIST AND ITS ASSOCIATED PARTS.) WHILE BTWN CHKLISTS; I INFORMED OUR FLT ATTENDANT; 'WE HAD AN ENG FAILURE. WE ARE PLANNING A NORMAL DEPLANING AFTER WE SHUT DOWN ON THE RWY AND DEPLANE. WE HAD JUST OVER 5 MINS FOR HER TO GET READY. AND THAT WE WOULD GET BACK TO HER PRIOR IN ABOUT 5 MINS.' I ALSO REASSURED HER THAT THE ACFT WAS ALRIGHT; OTHER THAN THE FAILED ENG. WE RAN ASSOCIATED CHKLISTS; GOT A HOLD OF DISPATCH AND OPS; AND PROCEEDED IN FOR A SINGLE ENG ILS APCH. WE SHOT THE ILS APCH AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. WE PROCEEDED TO SHUT DOWN ON THE RWY WITH CRASH; FIRE; RESCUE ALREADY ON SCENE. THIS TOOK A FEW MOMENTS TO COLLECT OUR THOUGHTS AND SHUT DOWN THE #2 ENG; DUE TO AN EXCESS AMOUNT OF ADRENALINE FLOWING. AFTER CRASH; FIRE; RESCUE ASSURED US THE ACFT WAS SECURE; WE SHUT THE ACFT DOWN; I OPENED THE FLT DECK DOOR; SPOKE BRIEFLY TO THE PAX (APOLOGIZING FOR EXCITING EVERYONE; ASSURING THEM EVERYTHING WAS OK; AND INFORMING THEM IT WOULD BE A FEW MORE MOMENTS AND WE WOULD BE TOWED IN). I OPENED THE MAIN CABIN DOOR; SPOKE TO THE CRASH; FIRE; RESCUE INCIDENT COMMANDER BRIEFLY; AND TALKED FACE-TO-FACE WITH THE ZZZ ACR ESCORT TEAM; TOW TEAM. WE WERE TOWED IN UNEVENTFULLY AND PAPERWORK -- PHONE CALLS ENSUED. AS A SIDE NOTE; WE CHOSE TO SHUT DOWN ON THE RWY BECAUSE: 1) WE WANTED TO MAKE SURE THAT IF WE HAD INADVERTENTLY MISSED ANYTHING DUE TO EXCESS ADRENALINE; WE WOULD NOT HAVE AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION TRYING TO DO TOO MUCH OR 2) IF WE HAD INADVERTENTLY MISSED ANYTHING DUE TO HAVING JUST PREVIOUSLY COMPLETED A 12 HR DAY WITH A 9 HR OVERNIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.