Narrative:

En route; both PF and PNF read and discussed the flight operations information bulletin titled 'flap overspeeds and unstable approachs.' we both stated that we would not ever use flaps as a drag device and thus cause needless costs in critical times for our company. On arrival; ATC had asked our maximum mach capability and I stated mach .83. During our descent; ATC repeated maximum forward speed on crossover. 10 mi prior to my desired speed reduction point; I used full speed brakes to make our speed reduction and leveled the jet to allow a higher rate of speed reduction. I called for 'flaps 1 degree' at which I knew would be less than the maximum speed of 250 KTS. The PNF stated that he saw 260 KTS when I called for 'flaps 1 degree' and I replied 'it's ok with me if you call the speeds in accordance with the bulletin we've been discussing; even if it would be premature.' my thought was that he wanted to try and use the speed callouts from the bulletin as it would apply to our current flight operation. The PNF then stated that he would not extend flaps at excess speed. I was fatigued and confused by the PNF resistance to operation of the flaps. I called for 'gear down' thinking that maybe if I can get slower he will operate the flaps. It worked and with speed brakes still fully extended; gear down and flaps 1 degree; we entered final approach above glide path. I called for 'flaps 5 degrees' well below maximum flaps 5 degree speed reduction continuing at full speed brakes and gear extended still above glide path. There was discussion of whether we were cleared to land and the PNF stated that he had not yet contacted tower. On final above GS and flaps extending to 5 degrees; I got a stick shaker and immediately retracted speed brakes and recovered. We continued the remainder of approach and landing normally. I believe that we had discussed flap overspeed to the point of distraction and that; combined with fatigue; caused us both to be more concerned with overspeed than underspeed. An earlier speed reduction that would have allowed more time for us to communication and coordination our crew operations would have helped to avert this situation. Supplemental information from acn 798678: I was the relief pilot on this flight. I was able to rest/sleep in the crew rest seat for about 50 mins during the first break. If you have flown relief pilot you are aware of the acute fatigue in the last 1 hour of flight on these international all-nighters. The following information is provided from the jumpseat position where I do not have a full view of the instruments and also while very tired. The captain was flying and during the approach I notice the following items: 1) rapid deployment and retraction of the speed brakes. 2) turning the autoplt off and on 3-4 times during the approach. 3) some deviation with the GS on final -- DOT high to 1/2 DOT low. 4) argumentative with the first officer when the first officer questioned speed to lower flaps 1 degree. 5) stick shaker activation due to gear down/flaps 20 degrees and full speed brakes out. I called the speed brakes twice with no response and unbuckled my harness to try to get the brakes stowed; however; the captain did stow them just as I was about to push them forward. By 1000 ft; the approach was reasonably stabilized and a normal landing was made. Speed was under control and the PAPI indicated a good angle of descent. I feel this was a fatigue issue. The captain was a reserve pilot and it is difficult to get the rest required for these all-nighters.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FATIGUED B767 CREW DISCUSSES THE CAPT'S DISTRACTION WITH FLAP SPEEDS; POOR SPD CONTROL; AND UNSTABILIZED APCH.

Narrative: ENRTE; BOTH PF AND PNF READ AND DISCUSSED THE FLT OPS INFO BULLETIN TITLED 'FLAP OVERSPEEDS AND UNSTABLE APCHS.' WE BOTH STATED THAT WE WOULD NOT EVER USE FLAPS AS A DRAG DEVICE AND THUS CAUSE NEEDLESS COSTS IN CRITICAL TIMES FOR OUR COMPANY. ON ARR; ATC HAD ASKED OUR MAX MACH CAPABILITY AND I STATED MACH .83. DURING OUR DSCNT; ATC REPEATED MAX FORWARD SPD ON CROSSOVER. 10 MI PRIOR TO MY DESIRED SPD REDUCTION POINT; I USED FULL SPD BRAKES TO MAKE OUR SPD REDUCTION AND LEVELED THE JET TO ALLOW A HIGHER RATE OF SPD REDUCTION. I CALLED FOR 'FLAPS 1 DEG' AT WHICH I KNEW WOULD BE LESS THAN THE MAX SPD OF 250 KTS. THE PNF STATED THAT HE SAW 260 KTS WHEN I CALLED FOR 'FLAPS 1 DEG' AND I REPLIED 'IT'S OK WITH ME IF YOU CALL THE SPDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BULLETIN WE'VE BEEN DISCUSSING; EVEN IF IT WOULD BE PREMATURE.' MY THOUGHT WAS THAT HE WANTED TO TRY AND USE THE SPD CALLOUTS FROM THE BULLETIN AS IT WOULD APPLY TO OUR CURRENT FLT OP. THE PNF THEN STATED THAT HE WOULD NOT EXTEND FLAPS AT EXCESS SPD. I WAS FATIGUED AND CONFUSED BY THE PNF RESISTANCE TO OP OF THE FLAPS. I CALLED FOR 'GEAR DOWN' THINKING THAT MAYBE IF I CAN GET SLOWER HE WILL OPERATE THE FLAPS. IT WORKED AND WITH SPD BRAKES STILL FULLY EXTENDED; GEAR DOWN AND FLAPS 1 DEG; WE ENTERED FINAL APCH ABOVE GLIDE PATH. I CALLED FOR 'FLAPS 5 DEGS' WELL BELOW MAX FLAPS 5 DEG SPD REDUCTION CONTINUING AT FULL SPD BRAKES AND GEAR EXTENDED STILL ABOVE GLIDE PATH. THERE WAS DISCUSSION OF WHETHER WE WERE CLRED TO LAND AND THE PNF STATED THAT HE HAD NOT YET CONTACTED TWR. ON FINAL ABOVE GS AND FLAPS EXTENDING TO 5 DEGS; I GOT A STICK SHAKER AND IMMEDIATELY RETRACTED SPD BRAKES AND RECOVERED. WE CONTINUED THE REMAINDER OF APCH AND LNDG NORMALLY. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAD DISCUSSED FLAP OVERSPEED TO THE POINT OF DISTR AND THAT; COMBINED WITH FATIGUE; CAUSED US BOTH TO BE MORE CONCERNED WITH OVERSPEED THAN UNDERSPEED. AN EARLIER SPD REDUCTION THAT WOULD HAVE ALLOWED MORE TIME FOR US TO COM AND COORD OUR CREW OPS WOULD HAVE HELPED TO AVERT THIS SITUATION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 798678: I WAS THE RELIEF PLT ON THIS FLT. I WAS ABLE TO REST/SLEEP IN THE CREW REST SEAT FOR ABOUT 50 MINS DURING THE FIRST BREAK. IF YOU HAVE FLOWN RELIEF PLT YOU ARE AWARE OF THE ACUTE FATIGUE IN THE LAST 1 HR OF FLT ON THESE INTL ALL-NIGHTERS. THE FOLLOWING INFO IS PROVIDED FROM THE JUMPSEAT POS WHERE I DO NOT HAVE A FULL VIEW OF THE INSTS AND ALSO WHILE VERY TIRED. THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND DURING THE APCH I NOTICE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS: 1) RAPID DEPLOYMENT AND RETRACTION OF THE SPD BRAKES. 2) TURNING THE AUTOPLT OFF AND ON 3-4 TIMES DURING THE APCH. 3) SOME DEV WITH THE GS ON FINAL -- DOT HIGH TO 1/2 DOT LOW. 4) ARGUMENTATIVE WITH THE FO WHEN THE FO QUESTIONED SPD TO LOWER FLAPS 1 DEG. 5) STICK SHAKER ACTIVATION DUE TO GEAR DOWN/FLAPS 20 DEGS AND FULL SPD BRAKES OUT. I CALLED THE SPD BRAKES TWICE WITH NO RESPONSE AND UNBUCKLED MY HARNESS TO TRY TO GET THE BRAKES STOWED; HOWEVER; THE CAPT DID STOW THEM JUST AS I WAS ABOUT TO PUSH THEM FORWARD. BY 1000 FT; THE APCH WAS REASONABLY STABILIZED AND A NORMAL LNDG WAS MADE. SPD WAS UNDER CTL AND THE PAPI INDICATED A GOOD ANGLE OF DSCNT. I FEEL THIS WAS A FATIGUE ISSUE. THE CAPT WAS A RESERVE PLT AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET THE REST REQUIRED FOR THESE ALL-NIGHTERS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.