|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : zzz.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||B737-700|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||ground : maintenance|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||maintenance : technician|
|Qualification||technician : powerplant|
technician : airframe
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : less severe|
maintenance problem : improper documentation
non adherence : far
non adherence : published procedure
|Independent Detector||other other : 1|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : detected after the fact|
|Maintenance||contributing factor : briefing|
performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements
performance deficiency : logbook entry
|Problem Areas||Maintenance Human Performance|
|Primary Problem||Maintenance Human Performance|
We called maintenance control to check in and to try to get an idea of what history the aircraft had. After discussing what may have caused the leak; we decided to run hydraulics. So; with X in the cockpit and me on the ground; we ran the 'B' system hydraulics and quickly noticed the fluid leak out of the #6 slat actuator. After shutting down hydraulics and doing a quick clean-up of the slat area we deplaned to get a little more access to the lines and the actuator. We ran hydraulics again and I noticed the fluid coming out of the inboard hydraulic line b-nut then determined that being the cause of the leak. Suspecting that it was simply a loose b-nut; I attempted to secure the line and while doing so noticed that the line was cracked. Since this was the second occurrence of a broken line on the #6 slat actuator; we decided that perhaps the swivel where it attaches to might be the cause of the problem and decided then to change both the line and the swivel. After calling maintenance control and asking them to send us a new line and swivel; it was determined that we were 'not in stock' on the line and that the swivel would arrive sometime later on in the night. We cleaned up and waited for our part. After the part arrived we proceeded with the removal of the line and the swivel. We installed the new swivel and a temporary hydraulic simultaneously because of the limited amount of work space and visibility. Secured the line to the actuator and then did our leak and operations checks per the maintenance manual. After completing our checks and feeling satisfied with the results; we installed the access panels and went into the aircraft to sign off the logbook. My signoff consisted of the discovery of the #6 slat actuator retract line connected to swivel as being cracked. I also included the installation of the temperature-line at the #6 actuator retract port. I felt this signoff to be precise and conclusive with regards to the amount of work that we performed. Only; very recently I have been informed; that perhaps my signoff may be somewhat incomplete. Reflecting back on the events that occurred leading up to my signoff; I have to agree that perhaps a more thorough description should have been written. The fact that the swivel was indeed replaced for precautionary measures should have been included in my signoff. I now realize this fact and agree that my logbook sign was incomplete.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MECHANIC IS INFORMED HIS LOGBOOK SIGNOFF MAY HAVE BEEN INCOMPLETE AFTER THE INSTALLATION OF A HYD TEMPORARY LINE AND SWIVEL FITTING ON THE #6 SLAT ACTUATOR OF A B737-700 ACFT.
Narrative: WE CALLED MAINT CTL TO CHK IN AND TO TRY TO GET AN IDEA OF WHAT HISTORY THE ACFT HAD. AFTER DISCUSSING WHAT MAY HAVE CAUSED THE LEAK; WE DECIDED TO RUN HYDS. SO; WITH X IN THE COCKPIT AND ME ON THE GND; WE RAN THE 'B' SYS HYDS AND QUICKLY NOTICED THE FLUID LEAK OUT OF THE #6 SLAT ACTUATOR. AFTER SHUTTING DOWN HYDS AND DOING A QUICK CLEAN-UP OF THE SLAT AREA WE DEPLANED TO GET A LITTLE MORE ACCESS TO THE LINES AND THE ACTUATOR. WE RAN HYDS AGAIN AND I NOTICED THE FLUID COMING OUT OF THE INBOARD HYD LINE B-NUT THEN DETERMINED THAT BEING THE CAUSE OF THE LEAK. SUSPECTING THAT IT WAS SIMPLY A LOOSE B-NUT; I ATTEMPTED TO SECURE THE LINE AND WHILE DOING SO NOTICED THAT THE LINE WAS CRACKED. SINCE THIS WAS THE SECOND OCCURRENCE OF A BROKEN LINE ON THE #6 SLAT ACTUATOR; WE DECIDED THAT PERHAPS THE SWIVEL WHERE IT ATTACHES TO MIGHT BE THE CAUSE OF THE PROB AND DECIDED THEN TO CHANGE BOTH THE LINE AND THE SWIVEL. AFTER CALLING MAINT CTL AND ASKING THEM TO SEND US A NEW LINE AND SWIVEL; IT WAS DETERMINED THAT WE WERE 'NOT IN STOCK' ON THE LINE AND THAT THE SWIVEL WOULD ARRIVE SOMETIME LATER ON IN THE NIGHT. WE CLEANED UP AND WAITED FOR OUR PART. AFTER THE PART ARRIVED WE PROCEEDED WITH THE REMOVAL OF THE LINE AND THE SWIVEL. WE INSTALLED THE NEW SWIVEL AND A TEMPORARY HYD SIMULTANEOUSLY BECAUSE OF THE LIMITED AMOUNT OF WORK SPACE AND VISIBILITY. SECURED THE LINE TO THE ACTUATOR AND THEN DID OUR LEAK AND OPS CHKS PER THE MAINT MANUAL. AFTER COMPLETING OUR CHKS AND FEELING SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS; WE INSTALLED THE ACCESS PANELS AND WENT INTO THE ACFT TO SIGN OFF THE LOGBOOK. MY SIGNOFF CONSISTED OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE #6 SLAT ACTUATOR RETRACT LINE CONNECTED TO SWIVEL AS BEING CRACKED. I ALSO INCLUDED THE INSTALLATION OF THE TEMP-LINE AT THE #6 ACTUATOR RETRACT PORT. I FELT THIS SIGNOFF TO BE PRECISE AND CONCLUSIVE WITH REGARDS TO THE AMOUNT OF WORK THAT WE PERFORMED. ONLY; VERY RECENTLY I HAVE BEEN INFORMED; THAT PERHAPS MY SIGNOFF MAY BE SOMEWHAT INCOMPLETE. REFLECTING BACK ON THE EVENTS THAT OCCURRED LEADING UP TO MY SIGNOFF; I HAVE TO AGREE THAT PERHAPS A MORE THOROUGH DESCRIPTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN. THE FACT THAT THE SWIVEL WAS INDEED REPLACED FOR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN MY SIGNOFF. I NOW REALIZE THIS FACT AND AGREE THAT MY LOGBOOK SIGN WAS INCOMPLETE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.