Narrative:

During my descent into hnl; I took over the controls from my first officer. I have briefed my first officer that I want SOP's and profiles. 250 KTS below 10000 ft. During our descent into hnl; I noticed that we were at 280 KTS and 8000 ft. I told the first officer that we need to be at 250 KTS. The autoplt was engaged. He made no correction. I took over the controls and said I got it. We landed without incident. He did not respond when I told him to correct the airspeed. He just did not do anything. The first officer was complaining about pay issues; how bad it was to fly with another captain; and just complaining about everything in general. His mind was not set on flying the aircraft. I took over the flying duties and took over the control of the aircraft. I had the first officer released from flight duties and had him replaced. I am requesting that he be corrected and given additional training and get CRM education and maybe a medical evaluation. Supplemental information from acn 798893: while on descent into hnl; as PF; I did not slow the aircraft from 280 KIAS to 250 KIAS as I passed through 10000 ft MSL. I was flying the aircraft using a manually selected speed instead of the FMS speed selection. We were cruising at 13000 ft and were cleared for a visual approach into hnl. I selected a lower altitude on fcp (3000 ft for the shoreline). At approximately 7500 ft; the captain pointed out my speed was still 280 KIAS and directed me to slow the plane. I speed selected 250 KIAS. The captain then directed me to slow more quickly so I decreased our rate of descent to 500 FPM using the vertical speed wheel. I assume the captain decided the plane was not slowing in a timely enough manner as he then announced that he had the aircraft; clicked off the autoplt; and leveled the aircraft until the speed decreased below 250 KIAS. The captain then continued the descent and approach; maintaining control of the aircraft for the remainder of the flight. There was never any call from hcf approach concerning our speed. The captain pointed out my error. Although he refused to discuss the incident with me after the flight; I believe hcf approach vectoring other aircraft to maintain spacing to the runway made him aware of our speed. My belief is reinforced by hcf approach issuing us vectors for spacing right as the captain took control. The aircraft was slowed below 250 KIAS and the flight continued normally. While in cruise; the FMS speed was 275 KIAS. The captain directed me to cruise at 280 KIAS per company policy. I speed selected 280 KIAS. During the descent; I forgot that I had a manually selected speed set instead of using the FMS speed. The aircraft did not automatically slow to 245 KIAS by 10000 ft as would have been the case if I had been in FMS speed. The majority of the time; I cruise and descend in FMS speed and I fell victim to a habit pattern which resulted in a lapse of situational awareness. I had every intention of slowing to 250 KTS as we descended below 10000 ft as the captain had included this as part of his preflight briefing prior to our first flight earlier that afternoon. After the captain directed me to slow the aircraft; I did not slow as aggressively as he wished. At the time he pointed out my high airspeed; I believed we were greater than 12 NM offshore and; therefore; I did not believe we were in violation of the FARS. Further; hcf approach had not directed a speed reduction and had not yet given us any vectors for spacing. Taking all these factors into consideration; I felt I was slowing at a sufficient rate. I have since talked to other capts; conducted some research into the matter and now realize that this is a very gray area with conflicting opinions both among pilots and between various parts of the FAA. As such; I personally will now be treating 250 KIAS below 10000 ft MSL when outside 12 NM from shore as if it is undoubtedly an far limitation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPTAIN AND FO INBOUND TO HNL SUFFER BREAKDOWN IN CRM DUE TO FO FAILURE TO SLOW TO 250K BELOW 10K MSL. CAPTAIN TAKES OVER PF DUTIES AND HAS FO REMOVED FROM SUBSEQUENT FLT SEGMENTS.

Narrative: DURING MY DSCNT INTO HNL; I TOOK OVER THE CTLS FROM MY FO. I HAVE BRIEFED MY FO THAT I WANT SOP'S AND PROFILES. 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT. DURING OUR DSCNT INTO HNL; I NOTICED THAT WE WERE AT 280 KTS AND 8000 FT. I TOLD THE FO THAT WE NEED TO BE AT 250 KTS. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED. HE MADE NO CORRECTION. I TOOK OVER THE CTLS AND SAID I GOT IT. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. HE DID NOT RESPOND WHEN I TOLD HIM TO CORRECT THE AIRSPD. HE JUST DID NOT DO ANYTHING. THE FO WAS COMPLAINING ABOUT PAY ISSUES; HOW BAD IT WAS TO FLY WITH ANOTHER CAPT; AND JUST COMPLAINING ABOUT EVERYTHING IN GENERAL. HIS MIND WAS NOT SET ON FLYING THE ACFT. I TOOK OVER THE FLYING DUTIES AND TOOK OVER THE CTL OF THE ACFT. I HAD THE FO RELEASED FROM FLT DUTIES AND HAD HIM REPLACED. I AM REQUESTING THAT HE BE CORRECTED AND GIVEN ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND GET CRM EDUCATION AND MAYBE A MEDICAL EVALUATION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 798893: WHILE ON DSCNT INTO HNL; AS PF; I DID NOT SLOW THE ACFT FROM 280 KIAS TO 250 KIAS AS I PASSED THROUGH 10000 FT MSL. I WAS FLYING THE ACFT USING A MANUALLY SELECTED SPD INSTEAD OF THE FMS SPD SELECTION. WE WERE CRUISING AT 13000 FT AND WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH INTO HNL. I SELECTED A LOWER ALT ON FCP (3000 FT FOR THE SHORELINE). AT APPROX 7500 FT; THE CAPT POINTED OUT MY SPD WAS STILL 280 KIAS AND DIRECTED ME TO SLOW THE PLANE. I SPD SELECTED 250 KIAS. THE CAPT THEN DIRECTED ME TO SLOW MORE QUICKLY SO I DECREASED OUR RATE OF DSCNT TO 500 FPM USING THE VERT SPD WHEEL. I ASSUME THE CAPT DECIDED THE PLANE WAS NOT SLOWING IN A TIMELY ENOUGH MANNER AS HE THEN ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD THE ACFT; CLICKED OFF THE AUTOPLT; AND LEVELED THE ACFT UNTIL THE SPD DECREASED BELOW 250 KIAS. THE CAPT THEN CONTINUED THE DSCNT AND APCH; MAINTAINING CTL OF THE ACFT FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. THERE WAS NEVER ANY CALL FROM HCF APCH CONCERNING OUR SPD. THE CAPT POINTED OUT MY ERROR. ALTHOUGH HE REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT WITH ME AFTER THE FLT; I BELIEVE HCF APCH VECTORING OTHER ACFT TO MAINTAIN SPACING TO THE RWY MADE HIM AWARE OF OUR SPD. MY BELIEF IS REINFORCED BY HCF APCH ISSUING US VECTORS FOR SPACING RIGHT AS THE CAPT TOOK CTL. THE ACFT WAS SLOWED BELOW 250 KIAS AND THE FLT CONTINUED NORMALLY. WHILE IN CRUISE; THE FMS SPD WAS 275 KIAS. THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO CRUISE AT 280 KIAS PER COMPANY POLICY. I SPD SELECTED 280 KIAS. DURING THE DSCNT; I FORGOT THAT I HAD A MANUALLY SELECTED SPD SET INSTEAD OF USING THE FMS SPD. THE ACFT DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY SLOW TO 245 KIAS BY 10000 FT AS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE CASE IF I HAD BEEN IN FMS SPD. THE MAJORITY OF THE TIME; I CRUISE AND DSND IN FMS SPD AND I FELL VICTIM TO A HABIT PATTERN WHICH RESULTED IN A LAPSE OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. I HAD EVERY INTENTION OF SLOWING TO 250 KTS AS WE DSNDED BELOW 10000 FT AS THE CAPT HAD INCLUDED THIS AS PART OF HIS PREFLT BRIEFING PRIOR TO OUR FIRST FLT EARLIER THAT AFTERNOON. AFTER THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO SLOW THE ACFT; I DID NOT SLOW AS AGGRESSIVELY AS HE WISHED. AT THE TIME HE POINTED OUT MY HIGH AIRSPD; I BELIEVED WE WERE GREATER THAN 12 NM OFFSHORE AND; THEREFORE; I DID NOT BELIEVE WE WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE FARS. FURTHER; HCF APCH HAD NOT DIRECTED A SPD REDUCTION AND HAD NOT YET GIVEN US ANY VECTORS FOR SPACING. TAKING ALL THESE FACTORS INTO CONSIDERATION; I FELT I WAS SLOWING AT A SUFFICIENT RATE. I HAVE SINCE TALKED TO OTHER CAPTS; CONDUCTED SOME RESEARCH INTO THE MATTER AND NOW REALIZE THAT THIS IS A VERY GRAY AREA WITH CONFLICTING OPINIONS BOTH AMONG PLTS AND BTWN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE FAA. AS SUCH; I PERSONALLY WILL NOW BE TREATING 250 KIAS BELOW 10000 FT MSL WHEN OUTSIDE 12 NM FROM SHORE AS IF IT IS UNDOUBTEDLY AN FAR LIMITATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.