Narrative:

Upon review of the aircraft maintenance log; I noticed multiple (7) write-ups within the last 15 days on hydraulic system #1. Started aircraft up and initiated the first flight of the day checks. Upon reaching hydraulics; I turned pump 1B on and noticed an abrupt surge of power through the aircraft. Hydraulic synoptic page showed pressure in system #1 at 0-200 psi; all other system ok. Could not get system #1 to regulate so I called maintenance control to coordination contract maintenance. Discussed exactly what happened and history of aircraft. Contract maintenance showed up with no knowledge of history and said he wasn't sure what he was going to do. Originally could not get system to work until he cleaned the cannon plug. System returned to normal pressure although that was the same fix they used on the other multiple write-ups. He signed the aircraft off and we pushed off the gate. Hydraulics were fine until about 2 mins into taxi. With both engines running; all pumps on; we noticed the same low pressure and received the outboard and spoiler and flight spoiler cautions. Taxied back to the gate and called maintenance control again. Same mechanic showed up and started troubleshooting again. Upon doing so he noticed a 'bad bundle of wires' to hydraulic #1 that were loose and not connected. His impression was we were not going to be going anywhere in that plane until he could get some parts. After talking with maintenance control though; they decided that was causing an indication problem again and they were going to defer it. Don't know how the wires were missed earlier. Maintenance signed off the aircraft and he was ready to go but I had to call maintenance control back to remind them of the spoiler problems. Contract maintenance ran a check and could not duplicate the spoiler problem. I called maintenance control back to discuss the 'bad wires;' the spoiler problem; and why we were deferring the same problem for the third time in 2 weeks. I felt the issue was not getting adhered to properly. Maintenance control stated 'there was something wrong with the aircraft.' contract maintenance was telling me there was 'bad wiring' and after maintenance signed the aircraft off for the third time that day; I found loose and fried wiring to hydraulic #1 in the aft bay. At that point; I felt the aircraft needed to be properly looked at without abusing the MEL system and look into a potential fire hazard with bad wiring. I felt it unsafe for my passenger and my crew so I refused the aircraft until it could be properly fixed. Unfortunately; the company only removed me from the aircraft but kept the ship in service. Blatant disregard for safety! Brief summary of the aircraft maintenance book write-up lists 10 write-ups on the aircraft; all pertaining to hydraulic system #1.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ200 PLT DESCRIBES REPEATED UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO FIX A HYD PROBLEM. ACR ASSIGNED REPORTER TO ANOTHER ACFT; KEEPING THE REFUSED ACFT IN SVC.

Narrative: UPON REVIEW OF THE ACFT MAINT LOG; I NOTICED MULTIPLE (7) WRITE-UPS WITHIN THE LAST 15 DAYS ON HYD SYS #1. STARTED ACFT UP AND INITIATED THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY CHKS. UPON REACHING HYDS; I TURNED PUMP 1B ON AND NOTICED AN ABRUPT SURGE OF PWR THROUGH THE ACFT. HYD SYNOPTIC PAGE SHOWED PRESSURE IN SYS #1 AT 0-200 PSI; ALL OTHER SYS OK. COULD NOT GET SYS #1 TO REGULATE SO I CALLED MAINT CTL TO COORD CONTRACT MAINT. DISCUSSED EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED AND HISTORY OF ACFT. CONTRACT MAINT SHOWED UP WITH NO KNOWLEDGE OF HISTORY AND SAID HE WASN'T SURE WHAT HE WAS GOING TO DO. ORIGINALLY COULD NOT GET SYS TO WORK UNTIL HE CLEANED THE CANNON PLUG. SYS RETURNED TO NORMAL PRESSURE ALTHOUGH THAT WAS THE SAME FIX THEY USED ON THE OTHER MULTIPLE WRITE-UPS. HE SIGNED THE ACFT OFF AND WE PUSHED OFF THE GATE. HYDS WERE FINE UNTIL ABOUT 2 MINS INTO TAXI. WITH BOTH ENGS RUNNING; ALL PUMPS ON; WE NOTICED THE SAME LOW PRESSURE AND RECEIVED THE OUTBOARD AND SPOILER AND FLT SPOILER CAUTIONS. TAXIED BACK TO THE GATE AND CALLED MAINT CTL AGAIN. SAME MECH SHOWED UP AND STARTED TROUBLESHOOTING AGAIN. UPON DOING SO HE NOTICED A 'BAD BUNDLE OF WIRES' TO HYD #1 THAT WERE LOOSE AND NOT CONNECTED. HIS IMPRESSION WAS WE WERE NOT GOING TO BE GOING ANYWHERE IN THAT PLANE UNTIL HE COULD GET SOME PARTS. AFTER TALKING WITH MAINT CTL THOUGH; THEY DECIDED THAT WAS CAUSING AN INDICATION PROB AGAIN AND THEY WERE GOING TO DEFER IT. DON'T KNOW HOW THE WIRES WERE MISSED EARLIER. MAINT SIGNED OFF THE ACFT AND HE WAS READY TO GO BUT I HAD TO CALL MAINT CTL BACK TO REMIND THEM OF THE SPOILER PROBS. CONTRACT MAINT RAN A CHK AND COULD NOT DUPLICATE THE SPOILER PROB. I CALLED MAINT CTL BACK TO DISCUSS THE 'BAD WIRES;' THE SPOILER PROB; AND WHY WE WERE DEFERRING THE SAME PROB FOR THE THIRD TIME IN 2 WKS. I FELT THE ISSUE WAS NOT GETTING ADHERED TO PROPERLY. MAINT CTL STATED 'THERE WAS SOMETHING WRONG WITH THE ACFT.' CONTRACT MAINT WAS TELLING ME THERE WAS 'BAD WIRING' AND AFTER MAINT SIGNED THE ACFT OFF FOR THE THIRD TIME THAT DAY; I FOUND LOOSE AND FRIED WIRING TO HYD #1 IN THE AFT BAY. AT THAT POINT; I FELT THE ACFT NEEDED TO BE PROPERLY LOOKED AT WITHOUT ABUSING THE MEL SYS AND LOOK INTO A POTENTIAL FIRE HAZARD WITH BAD WIRING. I FELT IT UNSAFE FOR MY PAX AND MY CREW SO I REFUSED THE ACFT UNTIL IT COULD BE PROPERLY FIXED. UNFORTUNATELY; THE COMPANY ONLY REMOVED ME FROM THE ACFT BUT KEPT THE SHIP IN SVC. BLATANT DISREGARD FOR SAFETY! BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE ACFT MAINT BOOK WRITE-UP LISTS 10 WRITE-UPS ON THE ACFT; ALL PERTAINING TO HYD SYS #1.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.