Narrative:

I was performing IOE with my first officer and we were on final approach in visual conditions. We were doing training and my first officer had been consistently high on his approachs and this was debriefed beforehand on several legs. During this approach; he remained high and I let it go as far as I thought was safe before I started talking him down. We were about 1 mi outside FAF at about 4000 ft and at 200 KTS with flaps at 20 degrees. I suggested that he slow and get more flaps out and he extended the spoilers halfway. I then reached down and extended them fully as he slowed further. Since we were still high; I suggested he remain at or near flight idle to get down to the GS. As we descended; he configured gear down; flaps 30 degrees; then flaps 45 degrees with a reference speed of around 140 KTS. As we approached reference speed; I realized that the spoilers were still out and that we were below the minimum spoiler extended speed; and that we had the spoilers out with flaps 45 degrees. Just as I reached out to retract the spoilers; we got the shaker for a duration of about 1 second. Looking back on this event; I realized that my desire to train and talk to the student through this approach was a contributing factor to the incident. This high workload situation coupled with an inexperienced crew member was a distraction to me at a bad time. I should have taken control of the airplane when I realized that we were too high on the approach and flown the approach. My desire to teach and show the student the consequences of being high on the approach backfired and led to 2 limitations being violated. In the future I will take the controls much earlier when a student is high on final; and be much more aware of the speeds when the spoilers are extended.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 CHECK CAPT AND IOE STUDENT GAR AFTER APPROACH BECOMES UNSTABILIZED.

Narrative: I WAS PERFORMING IOE WITH MY FO AND WE WERE ON FINAL APCH IN VISUAL CONDITIONS. WE WERE DOING TRAINING AND MY FO HAD BEEN CONSISTENTLY HIGH ON HIS APCHS AND THIS WAS DEBRIEFED BEFOREHAND ON SEVERAL LEGS. DURING THIS APCH; HE REMAINED HIGH AND I LET IT GO AS FAR AS I THOUGHT WAS SAFE BEFORE I STARTED TALKING HIM DOWN. WE WERE ABOUT 1 MI OUTSIDE FAF AT ABOUT 4000 FT AND AT 200 KTS WITH FLAPS AT 20 DEGS. I SUGGESTED THAT HE SLOW AND GET MORE FLAPS OUT AND HE EXTENDED THE SPOILERS HALFWAY. I THEN REACHED DOWN AND EXTENDED THEM FULLY AS HE SLOWED FURTHER. SINCE WE WERE STILL HIGH; I SUGGESTED HE REMAIN AT OR NEAR FLT IDLE TO GET DOWN TO THE GS. AS WE DSNDED; HE CONFIGURED GEAR DOWN; FLAPS 30 DEGS; THEN FLAPS 45 DEGS WITH A REF SPD OF AROUND 140 KTS. AS WE APCHED REF SPD; I REALIZED THAT THE SPOILERS WERE STILL OUT AND THAT WE WERE BELOW THE MINIMUM SPOILER EXTENDED SPD; AND THAT WE HAD THE SPOILERS OUT WITH FLAPS 45 DEGS. JUST AS I REACHED OUT TO RETRACT THE SPOILERS; WE GOT THE SHAKER FOR A DURATION OF ABOUT 1 SECOND. LOOKING BACK ON THIS EVENT; I REALIZED THAT MY DESIRE TO TRAIN AND TALK TO THE STUDENT THROUGH THIS APCH WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE INCIDENT. THIS HIGH WORKLOAD SITUATION COUPLED WITH AN INEXPERIENCED CREW MEMBER WAS A DISTR TO ME AT A BAD TIME. I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN CTL OF THE AIRPLANE WHEN I REALIZED THAT WE WERE TOO HIGH ON THE APCH AND FLOWN THE APCH. MY DESIRE TO TEACH AND SHOW THE STUDENT THE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING HIGH ON THE APCH BACKFIRED AND LED TO 2 LIMITATIONS BEING VIOLATED. IN THE FUTURE I WILL TAKE THE CTLS MUCH EARLIER WHEN A STUDENT IS HIGH ON FINAL; AND BE MUCH MORE AWARE OF THE SPDS WHEN THE SPOILERS ARE EXTENDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.