Narrative:

We were given instruction to taxi to runway 18R; turning right on taxiway D out of the ramp and then a left on taxiway right to hold short of runway 18L; also in use. After traffic had cleared runway 18L; we were given instruction to cross runway 18L at taxiway right; make a left turn on taxiway a and proceed via taxiway a to hold short of taxiway A4. Nearing A4; the ground controller then further cleared us to turn right onto A4 and cross runway 23. Taxiway A4 is a very short taxiway. As we made the turn onto A4; we 'cleared' the approach end of runway 5; visually and verbally; I called for anti-collision lights 'on;' and we both then looked right as our aircraft rounded the corner. We then visually and verbally 'cleared' right; down runway 23; noting 2 military transport aircraft holding in position on the runway. As all of this was occurring; we simultaneously crossed the hold short markings for runway 23 and I called 'clear to cross runway 23.' which my first officer acknowledged in the affirmative. We then proceeded across runway 23. As we crossed over the runway centerline; the ground controller instructed us to 'stop!' this instruction completely surprised both of us; as we didn't know why he was saying this. As we were now in the center of a runway with aircraft holding in position; I deemed it safe and prudent to not stop and continue to the other side of the runway; and clear. As we cleared runway 23; the ground controller then advised us that he had told us to hold short of runway 23; on taxiway A4. This again surprised us; as we both thought we had been cleared to cross. At no time did we; as a flight crew; have any doubt; nor any reason to question remark. The ground controller then gave us further instruction to taxi to runway 18R. Upon reaching the approach end of runway 18R we were advised by the tower controller to copy a phone number to call as soon as possible; regarding a 'pilot deviation.' I did so upon landing at our destination and was advised that we had crossed runway 23 at clt without clearance to do so; and that the ground control tape recording substantiated that fact. My information was collected and I was told to expect to be contacted by the clt FSDO for further investigation of this matter. Listed below are some factors which I feel may have contributed to this event: 1) assignment of departure runway including a long taxi across multiple runways with numerous taxiway changes; when closer runways were active; in use; and presumably available. 2) what sounded like 1 ground controller working 2 ground control frequencys during an extremely busy time. 3) attempt by the flight crew to complete the aircraft's taxi checklist while maneuvering; communicating with ATC; and pausing or suspending the checklist for 2 runway xings. 4) relatively inexperienced first officer with no prior experience at clt. 5) task saturation of PIC. 6) fatigue -- crew on duty 9 of last 11 days; on day of event.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COM BREAKDOWN BETWEEN GND CTL AND BIZJET RESULTS IN RWY INCURSION AT CLT.

Narrative: WE WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTION TO TAXI TO RWY 18R; TURNING R ON TXWY D OUT OF THE RAMP AND THEN A L ON TXWY R TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 18L; ALSO IN USE. AFTER TFC HAD CLRED RWY 18L; WE WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTION TO CROSS RWY 18L AT TXWY R; MAKE A L TURN ON TXWY A AND PROCEED VIA TXWY A TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY A4. NEARING A4; THE GND CTLR THEN FURTHER CLRED US TO TURN R ONTO A4 AND CROSS RWY 23. TXWY A4 IS A VERY SHORT TXWY. AS WE MADE THE TURN ONTO A4; WE 'CLRED' THE APCH END OF RWY 5; VISUALLY AND VERBALLY; I CALLED FOR ANTI-COLLISION LIGHTS 'ON;' AND WE BOTH THEN LOOKED R AS OUR ACFT ROUNDED THE CORNER. WE THEN VISUALLY AND VERBALLY 'CLRED' R; DOWN RWY 23; NOTING 2 MIL TRANSPORT ACFT HOLDING IN POS ON THE RWY. AS ALL OF THIS WAS OCCURRING; WE SIMULTANEOUSLY CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT MARKINGS FOR RWY 23 AND I CALLED 'CLR TO CROSS RWY 23.' WHICH MY FO ACKNOWLEDGED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. WE THEN PROCEEDED ACROSS RWY 23. AS WE CROSSED OVER THE RWY CTRLINE; THE GND CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO 'STOP!' THIS INSTRUCTION COMPLETELY SURPRISED BOTH OF US; AS WE DIDN'T KNOW WHY HE WAS SAYING THIS. AS WE WERE NOW IN THE CTR OF A RWY WITH ACFT HOLDING IN POS; I DEEMED IT SAFE AND PRUDENT TO NOT STOP AND CONTINUE TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RWY; AND CLR. AS WE CLRED RWY 23; THE GND CTLR THEN ADVISED US THAT HE HAD TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 23; ON TXWY A4. THIS AGAIN SURPRISED US; AS WE BOTH THOUGHT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS. AT NO TIME DID WE; AS A FLT CREW; HAVE ANY DOUBT; NOR ANY REASON TO QUESTION REMARK. THE GND CTLR THEN GAVE US FURTHER INSTRUCTION TO TAXI TO RWY 18R. UPON REACHING THE APCH END OF RWY 18R WE WERE ADVISED BY THE TWR CTLR TO COPY A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL ASAP; REGARDING A 'PLTDEV.' I DID SO UPON LNDG AT OUR DEST AND WAS ADVISED THAT WE HAD CROSSED RWY 23 AT CLT WITHOUT CLRNC TO DO SO; AND THAT THE GND CTL TAPE RECORDING SUBSTANTIATED THAT FACT. MY INFO WAS COLLECTED AND I WAS TOLD TO EXPECT TO BE CONTACTED BY THE CLT FSDO FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THIS MATTER. LISTED BELOW ARE SOME FACTORS WHICH I FEEL MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT: 1) ASSIGNMENT OF DEP RWY INCLUDING A LONG TAXI ACROSS MULTIPLE RWYS WITH NUMEROUS TXWY CHANGES; WHEN CLOSER RWYS WERE ACTIVE; IN USE; AND PRESUMABLY AVAILABLE. 2) WHAT SOUNDED LIKE 1 GND CTLR WORKING 2 GND CTL FREQS DURING AN EXTREMELY BUSY TIME. 3) ATTEMPT BY THE FLT CREW TO COMPLETE THE ACFT'S TAXI CHKLIST WHILE MANEUVERING; COMMUNICATING WITH ATC; AND PAUSING OR SUSPENDING THE CHKLIST FOR 2 RWY XINGS. 4) RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED FO WITH NO PRIOR EXPERIENCE AT CLT. 5) TASK SATURATION OF PIC. 6) FATIGUE -- CREW ON DUTY 9 OF LAST 11 DAYS; ON DAY OF EVENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.