Narrative:

After arriving to ZZZ for departure flight first officer began the preflight and I began my cockpit scan and first flight of the day checks. Aircraft was hot and had just been pulled up to the gate by maintenance. A gate agent on the aircraft complained about the aircraft being brought up so late. Shortly afterward; maintenance brought the aml and I signed off the logbook. Then maintenance came back and took the aml from me. Meanwhile; I began looking at the release and flight plan. I noticed at that point that there was a discrepancy between the aml and the release. Specifically; the release showed a MEL that was not in the aml; the igniter system. When the aml was returned; now signed off for rvsm; I asked about MEL on the release and the maintenance technician said that MEL had been cleared. So I began that coordination with dispatch. A delay was taken of approximately 12 mins while waiting for dispatch. I'm conveying these details to expose the atmosphere on that morning because it displays the frenzied nature that maintenance had taken. Shortly after takeoff I received an EICAS message stall fail which would come and go erratically. At times it remained off. The aircraft was written up for the discrepancy upon arrival at ZZZ. I learned later that tape had been found on one of the aoa vanes; from maintenance doing some of their checks. It's my belief that the aml should be checked on board before any checks are done; including the cockpit safety scan or included there within. Further; flight attendants and passenger should not be allowed to board until the aircraft is properly released to the line. Maintenance discovered the tape on the aoa after it was written in the aml. Event occurred because first officer did not observe the tape on the aoa vane. Maintenance should not release an aircraft until all required log entries are complete. I believe that the maintenance technician should not be trying to complete his duties while the aircraft is being boarded and pilots are trying to complete cockpit checks. Either the aircraft is ready to be released to the line or it's not. Additionally; first officer is at fault for not discovering the tape on the aoa vane. Supplemental information from acn 794153: I was informed that there was an in-flight caution message stall fail that occurred on aircraft. Upon inspection there was speed tape found on right aoa vane. Tape was removed and aircraft was returned to service. This was a fairly routine task; however there were several people working this task. I personally did not install the speed tape but obviously it was and not detected before departure by maintenance or the flight crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ700 RECEIVED INTERMITTENT 'STALL FAIL' MSG'S AFTER TKOF. MAINT FAILED TO REMOVE TAPE FROM AN AOA VANE AFTER TESTING IT AND THE FO MISSED IT ON PREFLT.

Narrative: AFTER ARRIVING TO ZZZ FOR DEP FLT FO BEGAN THE PREFLT AND I BEGAN MY COCKPIT SCAN AND FIRST FLT OF THE DAY CHKS. ACFT WAS HOT AND HAD JUST BEEN PULLED UP TO THE GATE BY MAINT. A GATE AGENT ON THE ACFT COMPLAINED ABOUT THE ACFT BEING BROUGHT UP SO LATE. SHORTLY AFTERWARD; MAINT BROUGHT THE AML AND I SIGNED OFF THE LOGBOOK. THEN MAINT CAME BACK AND TOOK THE AML FROM ME. MEANWHILE; I BEGAN LOOKING AT THE RELEASE AND FLT PLAN. I NOTICED AT THAT POINT THAT THERE WAS A DISCREPANCY BTWN THE AML AND THE RELEASE. SPECIFICALLY; THE RELEASE SHOWED A MEL THAT WAS NOT IN THE AML; THE IGNITER SYS. WHEN THE AML WAS RETURNED; NOW SIGNED OFF FOR RVSM; I ASKED ABOUT MEL ON THE RELEASE AND THE MAINT TECHNICIAN SAID THAT MEL HAD BEEN CLRED. SO I BEGAN THAT COORD WITH DISPATCH. A DELAY WAS TAKEN OF APPROX 12 MINS WHILE WAITING FOR DISPATCH. I'M CONVEYING THESE DETAILS TO EXPOSE THE ATMOSPHERE ON THAT MORNING BECAUSE IT DISPLAYS THE FRENZIED NATURE THAT MAINT HAD TAKEN. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF I RECEIVED AN EICAS MESSAGE STALL FAIL WHICH WOULD COME AND GO ERRATICALLY. AT TIMES IT REMAINED OFF. THE ACFT WAS WRITTEN UP FOR THE DISCREPANCY UPON ARR AT ZZZ. I LEARNED LATER THAT TAPE HAD BEEN FOUND ON ONE OF THE AOA VANES; FROM MAINT DOING SOME OF THEIR CHKS. IT'S MY BELIEF THAT THE AML SHOULD BE CHKED ON BOARD BEFORE ANY CHKS ARE DONE; INCLUDING THE COCKPIT SAFETY SCAN OR INCLUDED THERE WITHIN. FURTHER; FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BOARD UNTIL THE ACFT IS PROPERLY RELEASED TO THE LINE. MAINT DISCOVERED THE TAPE ON THE AOA AFTER IT WAS WRITTEN IN THE AML. EVENT OCCURRED BECAUSE FO DID NOT OBSERVE THE TAPE ON THE AOA VANE. MAINT SHOULD NOT RELEASE AN ACFT UNTIL ALL REQUIRED LOG ENTRIES ARE COMPLETE. I BELIEVE THAT THE MAINT TECHNICIAN SHOULD NOT BE TRYING TO COMPLETE HIS DUTIES WHILE THE ACFT IS BEING BOARDED AND PLTS ARE TRYING TO COMPLETE COCKPIT CHKS. EITHER THE ACFT IS READY TO BE RELEASED TO THE LINE OR IT'S NOT. ADDITIONALLY; FO IS AT FAULT FOR NOT DISCOVERING THE TAPE ON THE AOA VANE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 794153: I WAS INFORMED THAT THERE WAS AN INFLT CAUTION MESSAGE STALL FAIL THAT OCCURRED ON ACFT. UPON INSPECTION THERE WAS SPD TAPE FOUND ON R AOA VANE. TAPE WAS REMOVED AND ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SVC. THIS WAS A FAIRLY ROUTINE TASK; HOWEVER THERE WERE SEVERAL PEOPLE WORKING THIS TASK. I PERSONALLY DID NOT INSTALL THE SPD TAPE BUT OBVIOUSLY IT WAS AND NOT DETECTED BEFORE DEP BY MAINT OR THE FLT CREW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.