Narrative:

During walkaround; technician found a leaking hydraulic line in ceiling of the left wheel well. Found previously repaired h-fitting leaking. Couldn't stop leak and fitting was galled onto line; causing there to be too much tubing required for removal for installation of another h-fitting. Tube part #XXX wasn't stocked in our system. After discussing different possibilities with the maintenance controller; we decided to cap both ends of the pressure line and the leaking line and placard the main gear steering inoperative to preclude a lengthy delay. I had a technician cap the lines and the deferral procedure was complied with for MEL. I placarded the main gear steering inoperative per the MEL. Engineering authority/authorized was issued the day after the next ron visit. After reviewing all pertinent documentation; I concluded that I didn't have proper authority/authorized to cap the tube and dispatch the aircraft in this confign. Further in the future; I will consult with our field engineering department in these matters. Communication: the technician on this job was never informed that he wasn't working under proper authority/authorized engineering authority/authorized. I told him what to do; so he trusted that I had taken the appropriate measures to assure the paperwork was correct. In the past; it was company practice to cap hydraulic lines and deactivate system. I haven't done it in yrs and don't recall the specifics of previous incidents. Supplemental information from acn 793326: they supplied fluid only to the steering actuator. The leaking tube was capped.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MAINT SUPERVISOR AND MAINT CONTROLLER REPORT REALIZE LATER THEY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DEFER AND CAP OFF THE HYD PRESSURE LINES FOR A B777-200 'H' FITTING IN THE LEFT WHEEL WELL CEILING TO THE MAIN GEAR STEERING ACTUATOR.

Narrative: DURING WALKAROUND; TECHNICIAN FOUND A LEAKING HYD LINE IN CEILING OF THE L WHEEL WELL. FOUND PREVIOUSLY REPAIRED H-FITTING LEAKING. COULDN'T STOP LEAK AND FITTING WAS GALLED ONTO LINE; CAUSING THERE TO BE TOO MUCH TUBING REQUIRED FOR REMOVAL FOR INSTALLATION OF ANOTHER H-FITTING. TUBE PART #XXX WASN'T STOCKED IN OUR SYS. AFTER DISCUSSING DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES WITH THE MAINT CTLR; WE DECIDED TO CAP BOTH ENDS OF THE PRESSURE LINE AND THE LEAKING LINE AND PLACARD THE MAIN GEAR STEERING INOP TO PRECLUDE A LENGTHY DELAY. I HAD A TECHNICIAN CAP THE LINES AND THE DEFERRAL PROC WAS COMPLIED WITH FOR MEL. I PLACARDED THE MAIN GEAR STEERING INOP PER THE MEL. ENGINEERING AUTH WAS ISSUED THE DAY AFTER THE NEXT RON VISIT. AFTER REVIEWING ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTATION; I CONCLUDED THAT I DIDN'T HAVE PROPER AUTH TO CAP THE TUBE AND DISPATCH THE ACFT IN THIS CONFIGN. FURTHER IN THE FUTURE; I WILL CONSULT WITH OUR FIELD ENGINEERING DEPT IN THESE MATTERS. COM: THE TECHNICIAN ON THIS JOB WAS NEVER INFORMED THAT HE WASN'T WORKING UNDER PROPER AUTH ENGINEERING AUTH. I TOLD HIM WHAT TO DO; SO HE TRUSTED THAT I HAD TAKEN THE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ASSURE THE PAPERWORK WAS CORRECT. IN THE PAST; IT WAS COMPANY PRACTICE TO CAP HYD LINES AND DEACTIVATE SYS. I HAVEN'T DONE IT IN YRS AND DON'T RECALL THE SPECIFICS OF PREVIOUS INCIDENTS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 793326: THEY SUPPLIED FLUID ONLY TO THE STEERING ACTUATOR. THE LEAKING TUBE WAS CAPPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.