|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Locale Reference||airport : zzz.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Function||maintenance : technician|
|Qualification||technician : powerplant|
technician : airframe
|Experience||maintenance technician : 20|
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : critical|
maintenance problem : improper maintenance
non adherence : published procedure
non adherence : far
|Independent Detector||other other : 1|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : detected after the fact|
|Maintenance||contributing factor : briefing|
performance deficiency : installation
performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements
performance deficiency : scheduled maintenance
performance deficiency : inspection
|Problem Areas||Maintenance Human Performance|
Flight Crew Human Performance
|Primary Problem||Maintenance Human Performance|
ZZZ flight test had received a B767 converted freighter from ZZZZ2 in ZZZZ2 to perform smoke tests and to validate confign for certification. After arrival at ZZZ; it was discovered that the flight deck evacuate/evacuation ropes had not been installed prior to the flight from ZZZZ2 to ZZZ. There was no inspection called for to verify if the evacuate/evacuation ropes were installed but they were discovered missing when mechanics were installing overwing ropes and went to look at the flight deck installation as a reference. It was at that point that the missing installation was discovered. It was unclr what corrective action or notification had taken place. It was very apparent though that the flight had occurred with no documentation alerting the crew to the missing evacuate/evacuation ropes on an uncertified aircraft. Somehow the installation had been overlooked in the processes at ZZZZ2 and the ropes themselves were in fact still at ZZZZ2 and had to be delivered to ZZZ for installation before we could fly again.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A MECHANIC WORKING A B767 CONVERTED FREIGHTER FROM AN INTERNATIONAL AIRFRAME HEAVY MAINT AND MODIFICATION PROVIDER; REPORTS THE FLT DECK EVACUATION ROPES HAD NOT BEEN INSTALLED PRIOR TO FLT FROM INT'L STATION TO DOMESTIC POINT.
Narrative: ZZZ FLT TEST HAD RECEIVED A B767 CONVERTED FREIGHTER FROM ZZZZ2 IN ZZZZ2 TO PERFORM SMOKE TESTS AND TO VALIDATE CONFIGN FOR CERTIFICATION. AFTER ARR AT ZZZ; IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE FLT DECK EVAC ROPES HAD NOT BEEN INSTALLED PRIOR TO THE FLT FROM ZZZZ2 TO ZZZ. THERE WAS NO INSPECTION CALLED FOR TO VERIFY IF THE EVAC ROPES WERE INSTALLED BUT THEY WERE DISCOVERED MISSING WHEN MECHS WERE INSTALLING OVERWING ROPES AND WENT TO LOOK AT THE FLT DECK INSTALLATION AS A REF. IT WAS AT THAT POINT THAT THE MISSING INSTALLATION WAS DISCOVERED. IT WAS UNCLR WHAT CORRECTIVE ACTION OR NOTIFICATION HAD TAKEN PLACE. IT WAS VERY APPARENT THOUGH THAT THE FLT HAD OCCURRED WITH NO DOCUMENTATION ALERTING THE CREW TO THE MISSING EVAC ROPES ON AN UNCERTIFIED ACFT. SOMEHOW THE INSTALLATION HAD BEEN OVERLOOKED IN THE PROCESSES AT ZZZZ2 AND THE ROPES THEMSELVES WERE IN FACT STILL AT ZZZZ2 AND HAD TO BE DELIVERED TO ZZZ FOR INSTALLATION BEFORE WE COULD FLY AGAIN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.