Narrative:

We were conducting a visual approach to runway 23 at charlotte. We joined the final about 30 mi from the threshold. The approach controller was talking to a flight of 5 blackhawk helicopters. It caught my attention because the lead blackhawk (who was doing all the radio work for the flight) was not using standard phraseology and seemed to have trouble even communicating with ATC. It struck me that his experience level must be really low. When we were on about a 20 mi final; the approach controller slowed us to 170 KTS and advised us that we were following a flight of 5 helicopters. He then noticed that the helicopters had slowed and instructed them not to slow but the flight lead responded that they needed to slow for their own purposes. This put them on a 5 mi final doing 100 KTS and us on a 20 mi final indicating 170 KTS. It sounded to me like it would probably still work out. I also asked approach if they needed to use the runway. It seemed to me that they could have just made their approach to the ramp and stayed south of the final for runway 23. The controller replied that they had said they needed the runway. We were switched to the tower and he immediately told us to slow to our final approach speed and asked what that was. We complied and told him we could go as slow as 133 KIAS. This exchange led me to believe that we were closing on the flight and losing separation. The tower told the helicopter flight to plan minimum time on the runway and plan a left turn at taxiway D which was just 1000 ft or so down the runway. He acknowledged the call barely. His radio skills were so low that I wasn't sure he got the message or had any idea that we were closing on him from behind. As we approached about a 3 or 4 mi final; the first of the helicopters began arriving to a very slow hover over the numbers of 23. They then proceeded slowly down taxiway D and turned to the left. After the flight lead (first helicopter) had proceeded south a couple hundred ft; he came to a stationary hover and stopped. All of the rest of the helicopters behind him stopped too and that left the last 2 hovering over the runway. The tower repeated a couple times for them to clear the runway at taxiway D but at this point; none of the 5 helicopters were on the tower frequency. I think the flight lead had changed to ground and was in some kind of discussion with them about where to park and the rest were gone too. At 400 ft AGL we initiated a go around. In my judgement; we were running out of time for them to clear the runway and even if they had cleared; I couldn't trust that they wouldn't wander back onto the runway. This flight of 5 had convinced me that none of them had the slightest idea that charlotte is a very busy place where the runway utilization is very high and you can't stop and camp out on a runway.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CAPT REPORTS GAR AFTER FLIGHT OF 5 HELICOPTERS DOES NOT CLEAR RWY AFTER LANDING.

Narrative: WE WERE CONDUCTING A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 23 AT CHARLOTTE. WE JOINED THE FINAL ABOUT 30 MI FROM THE THRESHOLD. THE APCH CTLR WAS TALKING TO A FLT OF 5 BLACKHAWK HELIS. IT CAUGHT MY ATTN BECAUSE THE LEAD BLACKHAWK (WHO WAS DOING ALL THE RADIO WORK FOR THE FLT) WAS NOT USING STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY AND SEEMED TO HAVE TROUBLE EVEN COMMUNICATING WITH ATC. IT STRUCK ME THAT HIS EXPERIENCE LEVEL MUST BE REALLY LOW. WHEN WE WERE ON ABOUT A 20 MI FINAL; THE APCH CTLR SLOWED US TO 170 KTS AND ADVISED US THAT WE WERE FOLLOWING A FLT OF 5 HELIS. HE THEN NOTICED THAT THE HELIS HAD SLOWED AND INSTRUCTED THEM NOT TO SLOW BUT THE FLT LEAD RESPONDED THAT THEY NEEDED TO SLOW FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES. THIS PUT THEM ON A 5 MI FINAL DOING 100 KTS AND US ON A 20 MI FINAL INDICATING 170 KTS. IT SOUNDED TO ME LIKE IT WOULD PROBABLY STILL WORK OUT. I ALSO ASKED APCH IF THEY NEEDED TO USE THE RWY. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THEY COULD HAVE JUST MADE THEIR APCH TO THE RAMP AND STAYED S OF THE FINAL FOR RWY 23. THE CTLR REPLIED THAT THEY HAD SAID THEY NEEDED THE RWY. WE WERE SWITCHED TO THE TWR AND HE IMMEDIATELY TOLD US TO SLOW TO OUR FINAL APCH SPD AND ASKED WHAT THAT WAS. WE COMPLIED AND TOLD HIM WE COULD GO AS SLOW AS 133 KIAS. THIS EXCHANGE LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT WE WERE CLOSING ON THE FLT AND LOSING SEPARATION. THE TWR TOLD THE HELI FLT TO PLAN MINIMUM TIME ON THE RWY AND PLAN A L TURN AT TXWY D WHICH WAS JUST 1000 FT OR SO DOWN THE RWY. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE CALL BARELY. HIS RADIO SKILLS WERE SO LOW THAT I WASN'T SURE HE GOT THE MESSAGE OR HAD ANY IDEA THAT WE WERE CLOSING ON HIM FROM BEHIND. AS WE APCHED ABOUT A 3 OR 4 MI FINAL; THE FIRST OF THE HELIS BEGAN ARRIVING TO A VERY SLOW HOVER OVER THE NUMBERS OF 23. THEY THEN PROCEEDED SLOWLY DOWN TXWY D AND TURNED TO THE L. AFTER THE FLT LEAD (FIRST HELI) HAD PROCEEDED S A COUPLE HUNDRED FT; HE CAME TO A STATIONARY HOVER AND STOPPED. ALL OF THE REST OF THE HELIS BEHIND HIM STOPPED TOO AND THAT LEFT THE LAST 2 HOVERING OVER THE RWY. THE TWR REPEATED A COUPLE TIMES FOR THEM TO CLR THE RWY AT TXWY D BUT AT THIS POINT; NONE OF THE 5 HELIS WERE ON THE TWR FREQ. I THINK THE FLT LEAD HAD CHANGED TO GND AND WAS IN SOME KIND OF DISCUSSION WITH THEM ABOUT WHERE TO PARK AND THE REST WERE GONE TOO. AT 400 FT AGL WE INITIATED A GAR. IN MY JUDGEMENT; WE WERE RUNNING OUT OF TIME FOR THEM TO CLR THE RWY AND EVEN IF THEY HAD CLRED; I COULDN'T TRUST THAT THEY WOULDN'T WANDER BACK ONTO THE RWY. THIS FLT OF 5 HAD CONVINCED ME THAT NONE OF THEM HAD THE SLIGHTEST IDEA THAT CHARLOTTE IS A VERY BUSY PLACE WHERE THE RWY UTILIZATION IS VERY HIGH AND YOU CAN'T STOP AND CAMP OUT ON A RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.