Narrative:

On pushback; we noticed blue hydraulic system page had an indication of partial pressure. We told ground we would be a while as we would have to handle the issue with maintenance and asked where they would like us to park. They directed us to a spot. We taxied over to the spot and contacted maintenance. We got a hold of maintenance and began to troubleshoot the problem. It initially took a while as maintenance was thinking the problem to be something other. I explained to maintenance that I know the problem to be a pressure fault sensor as I am familiar with it. Basically we were finally on agreement but it took a while to resolve the clarity of the problem. The problem was that while working with maintenance; the flight attendants called to advise that a passenger needed to go to the lavatory; then ground control directed us to call operations. ATC then began to query us how long it would take us to move and we told them we were still working on the maintenance issue troubleshooting. ATC began to get impatient. The first officer then called operations and began to have to answer a lot of unnecessary questions as to what our situation was and detracting his ability to continue to help with the troubleshoot and maintain vigilant situational awareness while holding at a precarious spot as aircraft were taxiing for takeoff all around us. As the first officer was still involved with operations; the flight attendant called to advise us of the passenger status and at that same moment I hear the 'mechanic' call buzzer go off?! Needless to say; it caught me totally by surprise. I answered the call and found myself talking to a ground crew?! When I answered; he said that operations sent him out?! To an active taxiway without our knowledge?! I immediately told him we did not need him and to disconnect. The multiple calls from maintenance; flight attendants; ground control; operations and ground crew was hazardous and caused momentary loss of communication with ground and created serious situational awareness distraction at a critical point; on the ground on an active taxiway near the departure end. I also am alarmed to have had the ground crew approach the airplane without my clear understanding or knowledge of this intent as it was and could have been dangerous. We were just about to start the engines and taxi and this would have posed the ground crew to be in danger! Operations acted overzealously in sending out the ground crew without my knowledge and concurrence and their prime objective is to support our operation and not vice versa. To finish the event as we waited for maintenance to send the new release our printer paper was out and we had to restock causing another delay as the print was in mid process. While we waited for the release; ground control was allowing airplanes (B757's) to taxi between our spot and the terminal! In the wake of our mandatory on-the-line day course; I find the chain of events to be unprofessionally and unsafely handled at such a critical point of flight with little patience and the pressure to hurry and answer to all. I; however; did not allow this to exacerbate and slowed the tempo and made sure everything was done calculating and safely.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLT CREW LAMENTS ABUNDANCE OF 'HELP' OFFERED DURING MAINTENANCE TROUBLESHOOTING EXERCISE AT BUSY ARPT BY ATC; OPS; MAINTENANCE; AND FA'S.

Narrative: ON PUSHBACK; WE NOTICED BLUE HYD SYS PAGE HAD AN INDICATION OF PARTIAL PRESSURE. WE TOLD GND WE WOULD BE A WHILE AS WE WOULD HAVE TO HANDLE THE ISSUE WITH MAINT AND ASKED WHERE THEY WOULD LIKE US TO PARK. THEY DIRECTED US TO A SPOT. WE TAXIED OVER TO THE SPOT AND CONTACTED MAINT. WE GOT A HOLD OF MAINT AND BEGAN TO TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB. IT INITIALLY TOOK A WHILE AS MAINT WAS THINKING THE PROB TO BE SOMETHING OTHER. I EXPLAINED TO MAINT THAT I KNOW THE PROB TO BE A PRESSURE FAULT SENSOR AS I AM FAMILIAR WITH IT. BASICALLY WE WERE FINALLY ON AGREEMENT BUT IT TOOK A WHILE TO RESOLVE THE CLARITY OF THE PROB. THE PROB WAS THAT WHILE WORKING WITH MAINT; THE FLT ATTENDANTS CALLED TO ADVISE THAT A PAX NEEDED TO GO TO THE LAVATORY; THEN GND CTL DIRECTED US TO CALL OPS. ATC THEN BEGAN TO QUERY US HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE US TO MOVE AND WE TOLD THEM WE WERE STILL WORKING ON THE MAINT ISSUE TROUBLESHOOTING. ATC BEGAN TO GET IMPATIENT. THE FO THEN CALLED OPS AND BEGAN TO HAVE TO ANSWER A LOT OF UNNECESSARY QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT OUR SITUATION WAS AND DETRACTING HIS ABILITY TO CONTINUE TO HELP WITH THE TROUBLESHOOT AND MAINTAIN VIGILANT SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WHILE HOLDING AT A PRECARIOUS SPOT AS ACFT WERE TAXIING FOR TKOF ALL AROUND US. AS THE FO WAS STILL INVOLVED WITH OPS; THE FLT ATTENDANT CALLED TO ADVISE US OF THE PAX STATUS AND AT THAT SAME MOMENT I HEAR THE 'MECH' CALL BUZZER GO OFF?! NEEDLESS TO SAY; IT CAUGHT ME TOTALLY BY SURPRISE. I ANSWERED THE CALL AND FOUND MYSELF TALKING TO A GND CREW?! WHEN I ANSWERED; HE SAID THAT OPS SENT HIM OUT?! TO AN ACTIVE TXWY WITHOUT OUR KNOWLEDGE?! I IMMEDIATELY TOLD HIM WE DID NOT NEED HIM AND TO DISCONNECT. THE MULTIPLE CALLS FROM MAINT; FLT ATTENDANTS; GND CTL; OPS AND GND CREW WAS HAZARDOUS AND CAUSED MOMENTARY LOSS OF COM WITH GND AND CREATED SERIOUS SITUATIONAL AWARENESS DISTR AT A CRITICAL POINT; ON THE GND ON AN ACTIVE TXWY NEAR THE DEP END. I ALSO AM ALARMED TO HAVE HAD THE GND CREW APCH THE AIRPLANE WITHOUT MY CLR UNDERSTANDING OR KNOWLEDGE OF THIS INTENT AS IT WAS AND COULD HAVE BEEN DANGEROUS. WE WERE JUST ABOUT TO START THE ENGS AND TAXI AND THIS WOULD HAVE POSED THE GND CREW TO BE IN DANGER! OPS ACTED OVERZEALOUSLY IN SENDING OUT THE GND CREW WITHOUT MY KNOWLEDGE AND CONCURRENCE AND THEIR PRIME OBJECTIVE IS TO SUPPORT OUR OP AND NOT VICE VERSA. TO FINISH THE EVENT AS WE WAITED FOR MAINT TO SEND THE NEW RELEASE OUR PRINTER PAPER WAS OUT AND WE HAD TO RESTOCK CAUSING ANOTHER DELAY AS THE PRINT WAS IN MID PROCESS. WHILE WE WAITED FOR THE RELEASE; GND CTL WAS ALLOWING AIRPLANES (B757'S) TO TAXI BTWN OUR SPOT AND THE TERMINAL! IN THE WAKE OF OUR MANDATORY ON-THE-LINE DAY COURSE; I FIND THE CHAIN OF EVENTS TO BE UNPROFESSIONALLY AND UNSAFELY HANDLED AT SUCH A CRITICAL POINT OF FLT WITH LITTLE PATIENCE AND THE PRESSURE TO HURRY AND ANSWER TO ALL. I; HOWEVER; DID NOT ALLOW THIS TO EXACERBATE AND SLOWED THE TEMPO AND MADE SURE EVERYTHING WAS DONE CALCULATING AND SAFELY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.