Narrative:

During preflight on the ground at ZZZ; the first officer's oxygen mask was checked per the approved procedures. Those procedures once required us to remove the mask and physically don it; but approved procedures now permitted us to test the flow without removing the mask. The integrity of the harness cannot be verified before flight. Upon reaching cruise flight for approximately 30 mins; the captain exited his seat to obtain the crew meals. Per regulations; the first officer removed his mask; and upon donning it; the mask harness would not inflate. An inspection of the mask proved that lower harness loop had separated; and oxygen flow would not inflate it. The captain and first officer discussed the implications of continuation of the flight; and the conditions by which they could practically and legally fulfill their duties. They briefly reviewed the MEL and understood that an entry would not be available from the MEL. Their first initiative and requirement was to invoke a response from dispatch and maintenance. On ACARS we sent a message to dispatch and solicited their input. From: dispatch stand by will cont fodo did the mask check out ok before you departed in your preflight check? The immediate implication we perceived was naturally one of a threatening; accusatory stance by our company. This tone would thus permeate the remainder of our interactions. The captain responded via ACARS that the new procedures did not require us to check the harness; and that the problem was only detectable when the mask was removed by the first officer as required when the captain left his station to receive the crew meals. While waiting for another response; the first officer examined the oxygen connectors and determined that either 1 of the 2 spare oxygen masks in the flight deck would easily and readily fit in its place. We discussed the implications of FAA part 43 which prohibited any kind of maintenance performed by pilots operating under part 121. As a practical safeguard; while we waited for a determination to be offered by dispatch; the first officer removed the oxygen mask from the jumpseat station behind him and rested it beside him on the center pedestal. The line and oxygen connection were long enough to permit easy donning in case it were required in a rapid decompression. The next response from dispatch was received 9 mins later: from dispatch/fodo from: dispatch manager options for captain's decision making process: maintenance control says mask at jumpseat position is interchangeable plug and play if you will but he cannot authority/authorized a swap. You have captain's emergency authority/authorized if you decide to. Maintenance says the connectors will fit in a swap. -- Another manager suggestion would be a portable oxygen bottle. Please advise captain's decision on this. -- Chief dispatch: maintenance 'cannot authority/authorized a swap;' but the captain could override something maintenance would not do by exercising his emergency authority/authorized on a maintenance item? This response made us feel pressured to continue the flight; but all accountability for its continuation would be borne solely by the flight crew. The message made us feel like we could count on little company support if the FAA did not approve of the crew action. The crew then discussed some of the legal implications of performing this exercise. Since the aircraft was approved using the quick don system; would a portable oxygen bottle suffice as an acceptable substitute? Could the crew exercise emergency authority/authorized without declaring an emergency? The captain sent another ACARS to dispatch inquiring; 'if we do not declare an emergency; what are our options? Can we continue?' the next response was: from dispatch manager from: dispatch exercising emergency authority/authorized is not the same as 'does not require' declaring an emergency with ATC. This message seemed evasive and deliberately non specific. The context of our interaction appeared to becoming more legal in nature than directly supportive. The captain pulled out his fom; and we read each sentence structure to see if it was directly applicable to our circumstance. The section referred to by the dispatcher read: 'the captain and dispatcher are granted emergency authority/authorized; which auths them to take action necessary to protect the safety of flight. When such authority/authorized is exercised; the captain shall; to the extent possible; keep dispatch and ATC fully informed regarding progress of flight. When emergency situations arise; dispatchers shall immediately take appropriate steps to give the captain all possible assistance. 'It is not intended that an occurrence or a condition must become critical before emergency authority/authorized is exercised. If it is believed that a potential emergency exists or may be created; it is prudent and permissible to exercise emergency authority/authorized. 'The captain or the dispatcher are not required to 'declare an emergency' with ATC in order to utilize emergency authority/authorized. The decision to declare an emergency should be based on the severity of the situation and the need for expedited handling from ATC. Do not hesitate to declare an emergency if the situation warrants it.' after reviewing the text; the crew decided to descend to FL240. While examining the fom and its implications; the question arose over whether the intent of this text was directly applicable to our condition. A maintenance logbook record would have to be made regarding the event. It would have to state that the captain used his emergency authority/authorized to swap out an oxygen mask. That would then beg several important questions: 1) by what authority/authorized could a captain override an far; particularly if there then existed a written acknowledgement that would evidence the violation of an far? 2) would the FAA ultimately permit the use of emergency authority/authorized; without a co-existing record of the captain being in a place where that authority/authorized was necessary? 3) would the company support the crew position if the FAA questioned the crew about their operation? Or would they be out on their own after they valiantly made an unnoticed effort to bring the flight home without interruption? The captain asked dispatch via ACARS to clarify their understanding of our paradox. I called again to confirm. He says yes captain has the emergency authority/authorized to swap it. We did not feel like this clarified the ordeal. We understood that we had emergency authority/authorized to do anything; but if we performed this on our own; and a logbook entry made; would the FAA ask later; 'did you declare an emergency? If not; why did you exercise emergency authority/authorized?' the captain sent a message to dispatch explaining that we had descended to FL240; and the fuel remaining at ZZZ2 would be 5.0; not enough remaining for alternate fuel. The dispatch response was: from: dispatch 'copy FL240 and fuel 5.0 ZZZ2 we can delete alternate and use another if needed as alternate.' none of these messages assured us we were not going down a primrose path. Although a good; spare oxygen mask was removed and resting beside the first officer; and the situation well under practical control; written messages had been already sent verifying our condition for future scrutiny. If cabin decompression occurred while in an unapproved condition; could we defend ourselves later as having done everything in harmony with the FARS? The captain then sent another message to dispatch inquiring if we could continue the flight at FL240. The next response was: our input from: dispatch 'going to FL240 does not solve issue. Oxygen is required above 12500 ft and your mask is defective. Our input is to swap mask. Have a good mask available; go to proper altitude. You have the right to exercise your authority/authorized.' this response immediately cornered us to make a timely; definite decision. We could not reasonably continue the flight to ZZZ2 at 12500 ft. We had a choice to accept 1 of 2 conditions: 1) continue the flight with a swapped mask. Make a logbook entry in the maintenance logbook about using emergency authority/authorized to make the swap. Accept the risk that the FAA may not approve of their action; without any other record made available that explained the need for the action; and possibly without company support. 2) declare the emergency; explain to ATC that it was procedural only in nature; without any existing hazardous condition; and that the declaration would give us authority/authorized to swap out an oxygen mask in the flight deck. Given the options and weighing the outcomes; we figured it would be better to be criticized for declaring an emergency and swapping out the masks;than to later discover the FAA's displeasure that we did not declare an emergency and had improperly acted on our own. The captain explained the situation to ZZZ1 ARTCC and declared our aircraft to be an emergency aircraft. The first officer replaced the faulty mask in the receptacle with the spare that had been lying on the center pedestal. The captain sent an ACARS message to dispatch telling them that we had declared an emergency. In the meantime; dispatch had sent us another message detailing fuel burns and amending our release to drop the alternate for FL240 flight. Shortly afterwards; dispatch acknowledged our emergency: from: dispatch copy emergency with ZZZ1. After the declaration of an emergency; with the problem immediately cured; we requested and were granted a clearance back up to FL380. Upon reaching our altitude; the landing fuel at ZZZ2 boosted back up to 7.4. The captain made an entry in the logbook; 'under captain emergency authority/authorized; first officer mask was swapped out with jumpseat mask.' the rest of the flight was completed uneventfully. Upon landing; maintenance greeted the airplane and explained to us that we legally needed a maintenance approved en route MEL to complete the flight. We told him that we had the emergency authority/authorized to make the swap; and that an en route MEL was not possible. We left the airplane without a worry about what anyone might say; given the fact we had officially declared an emergency. Conclusions: the time from when dispatch first recognized our situation; until we declared an emergency and dispatch acknowledged it; was 48 mins. During that time; our focus was on an item that could have reasonably been resolved and set aside in a couple mins. However; with an interesting chain of regulations and policies; flight crews must typically weigh repercussions and expectations that can long outlive a completed flight. Pilots must realistically consider that threats easily addressed in-flight might easily re-emerge later as a threat on their livelihood. Due to procedural consequences; pilots do spend time considering these aspects immediately after a hazard is contained. No matter how silly the whole circumstance was; several things were clear. Once we declared an emergency; the following conditions fell immediately into place: 1) all pressure with dispatch and their expectations vaporized. 2) no more distracting study of the regulations; fom; and second-guessing of superseding auths was required. 3) the event had a decisive end; and we were able to complete our flight without any more regard to this threat; and full attention was properly placed back to simply managing the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 CAPTAIN IS RELUCTANT TO EXERCISE HIS EMERGENCY AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE THE FAILURE TO INFLATE OF THE FO'S OXYGEN MASK HARNESS.

Narrative: DURING PREFLT ON THE GND AT ZZZ; THE FO'S OXYGEN MASK WAS CHKED PER THE APPROVED PROCS. THOSE PROCS ONCE REQUIRED US TO REMOVE THE MASK AND PHYSICALLY DON IT; BUT APPROVED PROCS NOW PERMITTED US TO TEST THE FLOW WITHOUT REMOVING THE MASK. THE INTEGRITY OF THE HARNESS CANNOT BE VERIFIED BEFORE FLT. UPON REACHING CRUISE FLT FOR APPROX 30 MINS; THE CAPT EXITED HIS SEAT TO OBTAIN THE CREW MEALS. PER REGS; THE FO REMOVED HIS MASK; AND UPON DONNING IT; THE MASK HARNESS WOULD NOT INFLATE. AN INSPECTION OF THE MASK PROVED THAT LOWER HARNESS LOOP HAD SEPARATED; AND OXYGEN FLOW WOULD NOT INFLATE IT. THE CAPT AND FO DISCUSSED THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINUATION OF THE FLT; AND THE CONDITIONS BY WHICH THEY COULD PRACTICALLY AND LEGALLY FULFILL THEIR DUTIES. THEY BRIEFLY REVIEWED THE MEL AND UNDERSTOOD THAT AN ENTRY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE FROM THE MEL. THEIR FIRST INITIATIVE AND REQUIREMENT WAS TO INVOKE A RESPONSE FROM DISPATCH AND MAINT. ON ACARS WE SENT A MESSAGE TO DISPATCH AND SOLICITED THEIR INPUT. FROM: DISPATCH STAND BY WILL CONT FODO DID THE MASK CHK OUT OK BEFORE YOU DEPARTED IN YOUR PREFLT CHK? THE IMMEDIATE IMPLICATION WE PERCEIVED WAS NATURALLY ONE OF A THREATENING; ACCUSATORY STANCE BY OUR COMPANY. THIS TONE WOULD THUS PERMEATE THE REMAINDER OF OUR INTERACTIONS. THE CAPT RESPONDED VIA ACARS THAT THE NEW PROCS DID NOT REQUIRE US TO CHK THE HARNESS; AND THAT THE PROB WAS ONLY DETECTABLE WHEN THE MASK WAS REMOVED BY THE FO AS REQUIRED WHEN THE CAPT LEFT HIS STATION TO RECEIVE THE CREW MEALS. WHILE WAITING FOR ANOTHER RESPONSE; THE FO EXAMINED THE OXYGEN CONNECTORS AND DETERMINED THAT EITHER 1 OF THE 2 SPARE OXYGEN MASKS IN THE FLT DECK WOULD EASILY AND READILY FIT IN ITS PLACE. WE DISCUSSED THE IMPLICATIONS OF FAA PART 43 WHICH PROHIBITED ANY KIND OF MAINT PERFORMED BY PLTS OPERATING UNDER PART 121. AS A PRACTICAL SAFEGUARD; WHILE WE WAITED FOR A DETERMINATION TO BE OFFERED BY DISPATCH; THE FO REMOVED THE OXYGEN MASK FROM THE JUMPSEAT STATION BEHIND HIM AND RESTED IT BESIDE HIM ON THE CTR PEDESTAL. THE LINE AND OXYGEN CONNECTION WERE LONG ENOUGH TO PERMIT EASY DONNING IN CASE IT WERE REQUIRED IN A RAPID DECOMPRESSION. THE NEXT RESPONSE FROM DISPATCH WAS RECEIVED 9 MINS LATER: FROM DISPATCH/FODO FROM: DISPATCH MGR OPTIONS FOR CAPT'S DECISION MAKING PROCESS: MAINT CTL SAYS MASK AT JUMPSEAT POS IS INTERCHANGEABLE PLUG AND PLAY IF YOU WILL BUT HE CANNOT AUTH A SWAP. YOU HAVE CAPT'S EMER AUTH IF YOU DECIDE TO. MAINT SAYS THE CONNECTORS WILL FIT IN A SWAP. -- ANOTHER MGR SUGGESTION WOULD BE A PORTABLE OXYGEN BOTTLE. PLEASE ADVISE CAPT'S DECISION ON THIS. -- CHIEF DISPATCH: MAINT 'CANNOT AUTH A SWAP;' BUT THE CAPT COULD OVERRIDE SOMETHING MAINT WOULD NOT DO BY EXERCISING HIS EMER AUTH ON A MAINT ITEM? THIS RESPONSE MADE US FEEL PRESSURED TO CONTINUE THE FLT; BUT ALL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ITS CONTINUATION WOULD BE BORNE SOLELY BY THE FLT CREW. THE MESSAGE MADE US FEEL LIKE WE COULD COUNT ON LITTLE COMPANY SUPPORT IF THE FAA DID NOT APPROVE OF THE CREW ACTION. THE CREW THEN DISCUSSED SOME OF THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PERFORMING THIS EXERCISE. SINCE THE ACFT WAS APPROVED USING THE QUICK DON SYS; WOULD A PORTABLE OXYGEN BOTTLE SUFFICE AS AN ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE? COULD THE CREW EXERCISE EMER AUTH WITHOUT DECLARING AN EMER? THE CAPT SENT ANOTHER ACARS TO DISPATCH INQUIRING; 'IF WE DO NOT DECLARE AN EMER; WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS? CAN WE CONTINUE?' THE NEXT RESPONSE WAS: FROM DISPATCH MGR FROM: DISPATCH EXERCISING EMER AUTH IS NOT THE SAME AS 'DOES NOT REQUIRE' DECLARING AN EMER WITH ATC. THIS MESSAGE SEEMED EVASIVE AND DELIBERATELY NON SPECIFIC. THE CONTEXT OF OUR INTERACTION APPEARED TO BECOMING MORE LEGAL IN NATURE THAN DIRECTLY SUPPORTIVE. THE CAPT PULLED OUT HIS FOM; AND WE READ EACH SENTENCE STRUCTURE TO SEE IF IT WAS DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO OUR CIRCUMSTANCE. THE SECTION REFERRED TO BY THE DISPATCHER READ: 'THE CAPT AND DISPATCHER ARE GRANTED EMER AUTH; WHICH AUTHS THEM TO TAKE ACTION NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE SAFETY OF FLT. WHEN SUCH AUTH IS EXERCISED; THE CAPT SHALL; TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE; KEEP DISPATCH AND ATC FULLY INFORMED REGARDING PROGRESS OF FLT. WHEN EMER SITUATIONS ARISE; DISPATCHERS SHALL IMMEDIATELY TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO GIVE THE CAPT ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE. 'IT IS NOT INTENDED THAT AN OCCURRENCE OR A CONDITION MUST BECOME CRITICAL BEFORE EMER AUTH IS EXERCISED. IF IT IS BELIEVED THAT A POTENTIAL EMER EXISTS OR MAY BE CREATED; IT IS PRUDENT AND PERMISSIBLE TO EXERCISE EMER AUTH. 'THE CAPT OR THE DISPATCHER ARE NOT REQUIRED TO 'DECLARE AN EMER' WITH ATC IN ORDER TO UTILIZE EMER AUTH. THE DECISION TO DECLARE AN EMER SHOULD BE BASED ON THE SEVERITY OF THE SITUATION AND THE NEED FOR EXPEDITED HANDLING FROM ATC. DO NOT HESITATE TO DECLARE AN EMER IF THE SITUATION WARRANTS IT.' AFTER REVIEWING THE TEXT; THE CREW DECIDED TO DSND TO FL240. WHILE EXAMINING THE FOM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS; THE QUESTION AROSE OVER WHETHER THE INTENT OF THIS TEXT WAS DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO OUR CONDITION. A MAINT LOGBOOK RECORD WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE REGARDING THE EVENT. IT WOULD HAVE TO STATE THAT THE CAPT USED HIS EMER AUTH TO SWAP OUT AN OXYGEN MASK. THAT WOULD THEN BEG SEVERAL IMPORTANT QUESTIONS: 1) BY WHAT AUTH COULD A CAPT OVERRIDE AN FAR; PARTICULARLY IF THERE THEN EXISTED A WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT WOULD EVIDENCE THE VIOLATION OF AN FAR? 2) WOULD THE FAA ULTIMATELY PERMIT THE USE OF EMER AUTH; WITHOUT A CO-EXISTING RECORD OF THE CAPT BEING IN A PLACE WHERE THAT AUTH WAS NECESSARY? 3) WOULD THE COMPANY SUPPORT THE CREW POS IF THE FAA QUESTIONED THE CREW ABOUT THEIR OP? OR WOULD THEY BE OUT ON THEIR OWN AFTER THEY VALIANTLY MADE AN UNNOTICED EFFORT TO BRING THE FLT HOME WITHOUT INTERRUPTION? THE CAPT ASKED DISPATCH VIA ACARS TO CLARIFY THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF OUR PARADOX. I CALLED AGAIN TO CONFIRM. HE SAYS YES CAPT HAS THE EMER AUTH TO SWAP IT. WE DID NOT FEEL LIKE THIS CLARIFIED THE ORDEAL. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE HAD EMER AUTH TO DO ANYTHING; BUT IF WE PERFORMED THIS ON OUR OWN; AND A LOGBOOK ENTRY MADE; WOULD THE FAA ASK LATER; 'DID YOU DECLARE AN EMER? IF NOT; WHY DID YOU EXERCISE EMER AUTH?' THE CAPT SENT A MESSAGE TO DISPATCH EXPLAINING THAT WE HAD DSNDED TO FL240; AND THE FUEL REMAINING AT ZZZ2 WOULD BE 5.0; NOT ENOUGH REMAINING FOR ALTERNATE FUEL. THE DISPATCH RESPONSE WAS: FROM: DISPATCH 'COPY FL240 AND FUEL 5.0 ZZZ2 WE CAN DELETE ALTERNATE AND USE ANOTHER IF NEEDED AS ALTERNATE.' NONE OF THESE MESSAGES ASSURED US WE WERE NOT GOING DOWN A PRIMROSE PATH. ALTHOUGH A GOOD; SPARE OXYGEN MASK WAS REMOVED AND RESTING BESIDE THE FO; AND THE SITUATION WELL UNDER PRACTICAL CTL; WRITTEN MESSAGES HAD BEEN ALREADY SENT VERIFYING OUR CONDITION FOR FUTURE SCRUTINY. IF CABIN DECOMPRESSION OCCURRED WHILE IN AN UNAPPROVED CONDITION; COULD WE DEFEND OURSELVES LATER AS HAVING DONE EVERYTHING IN HARMONY WITH THE FARS? THE CAPT THEN SENT ANOTHER MESSAGE TO DISPATCH INQUIRING IF WE COULD CONTINUE THE FLT AT FL240. THE NEXT RESPONSE WAS: OUR INPUT FROM: DISPATCH 'GOING TO FL240 DOES NOT SOLVE ISSUE. OXYGEN IS REQUIRED ABOVE 12500 FT AND YOUR MASK IS DEFECTIVE. OUR INPUT IS TO SWAP MASK. HAVE A GOOD MASK AVAILABLE; GO TO PROPER ALT. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE YOUR AUTH.' THIS RESPONSE IMMEDIATELY CORNERED US TO MAKE A TIMELY; DEFINITE DECISION. WE COULD NOT REASONABLY CONTINUE THE FLT TO ZZZ2 AT 12500 FT. WE HAD A CHOICE TO ACCEPT 1 OF 2 CONDITIONS: 1) CONTINUE THE FLT WITH A SWAPPED MASK. MAKE A LOGBOOK ENTRY IN THE MAINT LOGBOOK ABOUT USING EMER AUTH TO MAKE THE SWAP. ACCEPT THE RISK THAT THE FAA MAY NOT APPROVE OF THEIR ACTION; WITHOUT ANY OTHER RECORD MADE AVAILABLE THAT EXPLAINED THE NEED FOR THE ACTION; AND POSSIBLY WITHOUT COMPANY SUPPORT. 2) DECLARE THE EMER; EXPLAIN TO ATC THAT IT WAS PROCEDURAL ONLY IN NATURE; WITHOUT ANY EXISTING HAZARDOUS CONDITION; AND THAT THE DECLARATION WOULD GIVE US AUTH TO SWAP OUT AN OXYGEN MASK IN THE FLT DECK. GIVEN THE OPTIONS AND WEIGHING THE OUTCOMES; WE FIGURED IT WOULD BE BETTER TO BE CRITICIZED FOR DECLARING AN EMER AND SWAPPING OUT THE MASKS;THAN TO LATER DISCOVER THE FAA'S DISPLEASURE THAT WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER AND HAD IMPROPERLY ACTED ON OUR OWN. THE CAPT EXPLAINED THE SITUATION TO ZZZ1 ARTCC AND DECLARED OUR ACFT TO BE AN EMER ACFT. THE FO REPLACED THE FAULTY MASK IN THE RECEPTACLE WITH THE SPARE THAT HAD BEEN LYING ON THE CTR PEDESTAL. THE CAPT SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH TELLING THEM THAT WE HAD DECLARED AN EMER. IN THE MEANTIME; DISPATCH HAD SENT US ANOTHER MESSAGE DETAILING FUEL BURNS AND AMENDING OUR RELEASE TO DROP THE ALTERNATE FOR FL240 FLT. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS; DISPATCH ACKNOWLEDGED OUR EMER: FROM: DISPATCH COPY EMER WITH ZZZ1. AFTER THE DECLARATION OF AN EMER; WITH THE PROB IMMEDIATELY CURED; WE REQUESTED AND WERE GRANTED A CLRNC BACK UP TO FL380. UPON REACHING OUR ALT; THE LNDG FUEL AT ZZZ2 BOOSTED BACK UP TO 7.4. THE CAPT MADE AN ENTRY IN THE LOGBOOK; 'UNDER CAPT EMER AUTH; FO MASK WAS SWAPPED OUT WITH JUMPSEAT MASK.' THE REST OF THE FLT WAS COMPLETED UNEVENTFULLY. UPON LNDG; MAINT GREETED THE AIRPLANE AND EXPLAINED TO US THAT WE LEGALLY NEEDED A MAINT APPROVED ENRTE MEL TO COMPLETE THE FLT. WE TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD THE EMER AUTH TO MAKE THE SWAP; AND THAT AN ENRTE MEL WAS NOT POSSIBLE. WE LEFT THE AIRPLANE WITHOUT A WORRY ABOUT WHAT ANYONE MIGHT SAY; GIVEN THE FACT WE HAD OFFICIALLY DECLARED AN EMER. CONCLUSIONS: THE TIME FROM WHEN DISPATCH FIRST RECOGNIZED OUR SITUATION; UNTIL WE DECLARED AN EMER AND DISPATCH ACKNOWLEDGED IT; WAS 48 MINS. DURING THAT TIME; OUR FOCUS WAS ON AN ITEM THAT COULD HAVE REASONABLY BEEN RESOLVED AND SET ASIDE IN A COUPLE MINS. HOWEVER; WITH AN INTERESTING CHAIN OF REGS AND POLICIES; FLT CREWS MUST TYPICALLY WEIGH REPERCUSSIONS AND EXPECTATIONS THAT CAN LONG OUTLIVE A COMPLETED FLT. PLTS MUST REALISTICALLY CONSIDER THAT THREATS EASILY ADDRESSED INFLT MIGHT EASILY RE-EMERGE LATER AS A THREAT ON THEIR LIVELIHOOD. DUE TO PROCEDURAL CONSEQUENCES; PLTS DO SPEND TIME CONSIDERING THESE ASPECTS IMMEDIATELY AFTER A HAZARD IS CONTAINED. NO MATTER HOW SILLY THE WHOLE CIRCUMSTANCE WAS; SEVERAL THINGS WERE CLR. ONCE WE DECLARED AN EMER; THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS FELL IMMEDIATELY INTO PLACE: 1) ALL PRESSURE WITH DISPATCH AND THEIR EXPECTATIONS VAPORIZED. 2) NO MORE DISTRACTING STUDY OF THE REGS; FOM; AND SECOND-GUESSING OF SUPERSEDING AUTHS WAS REQUIRED. 3) THE EVENT HAD A DECISIVE END; AND WE WERE ABLE TO COMPLETE OUR FLT WITHOUT ANY MORE REGARD TO THIS THREAT; AND FULL ATTN WAS PROPERLY PLACED BACK TO SIMPLY MANAGING THE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.