Narrative:

After pushback and both engines started; the first officer noticed the ailerons were not hydraulically powered during the flow. We then noticed EICAS messages for all system 1-2 inoperative and rudder system 1-2 inoperative. We pulled back into our gate. The first officer pulled out the QRH while the captain called dispatch to notify and be xferred to maintenance control. Before the first officer had a chance to get to QRH checklist; the problem was idented. The first question asked by maintenance control relating to the problem was the position of the flight control buttons -- on or off? They were off. The CRM of our crew was quite poor to have missed the incorrect position of these switches during flows and checklists. We also neglected to pull out the QRH before assuming maintenance was required.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB135 FLT CREW DISCOVERS AFTER ENGINE START AND PUSHBACK THAT FLIGHT CONTROLS ARE UNPOWERED DUE TO FLIGHT CONTROL SWITCHES BEING TURNED OFF.

Narrative: AFTER PUSHBACK AND BOTH ENGS STARTED; THE FO NOTICED THE AILERONS WERE NOT HYDRAULICALLY POWERED DURING THE FLOW. WE THEN NOTICED EICAS MESSAGES FOR ALL SYS 1-2 INOP AND RUDDER SYS 1-2 INOP. WE PULLED BACK INTO OUR GATE. THE FO PULLED OUT THE QRH WHILE THE CAPT CALLED DISPATCH TO NOTIFY AND BE XFERRED TO MAINT CTL. BEFORE THE FO HAD A CHANCE TO GET TO QRH CHKLIST; THE PROB WAS IDENTED. THE FIRST QUESTION ASKED BY MAINT CTL RELATING TO THE PROB WAS THE POS OF THE FLT CTL BUTTONS -- ON OR OFF? THEY WERE OFF. THE CRM OF OUR CREW WAS QUITE POOR TO HAVE MISSED THE INCORRECT POS OF THESE SWITCHES DURING FLOWS AND CHKLISTS. WE ALSO NEGLECTED TO PULL OUT THE QRH BEFORE ASSUMING MAINT WAS REQUIRED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.