Narrative:

The flight was scheduled for 1 hour 14 mins from ZZZZ to ZZZZ1 with ZZZZ the planned alternate. The flight plan fuel was 49525 pounds block fuel; which included 3000 pounds extra fuel; planned takeoff fuel was 48526 pounds and minimum fuel for takeoff was 45526 pounds. The fuel required was more than the normal for our daytime operations; due to having to use ZZZZ as the alternate instead of ZZZZ2 due to low WX in ZZZZ2. Normally; the block fuel would be approximately 36000 pounds. The problem with the fuel load was first noticed at the top of climb fuel check at FL240 by the captain. The fuel at that point was planned to be approximately 18500 kilos/40800 pounds; and instead it was 9800 kilos/21600 pounds. The captain quickly determined that he did not have enough fuel to safely continue to ZZZZ; thus; he contacted radar and requested a return to ZZZZ. The crew determined that the fuel at landing in ZZZZ would be approximately 17000 pounds; which is normal for the operation; and would even provide legal fuel for using ZZZZ3 as an IFR alternate; which is 14576 pounds. The WX in ZZZZ and ZZZZ3 was VFR. Thus; the captain informed ATC that although we did not have enough fuel to go to ZZZZ1 that he was not in a fuel emergency situation. The approach and landing in ZZZZ was uneventful. The fuel at landing was 16500 pounds. The block-in fuel was 16100 pounds. Contributing factors: 1) the crew had a very early report after an approximately 20 hour rest period. The first 2 hours were spent trying to find the location of the company-provided accommodations that were planned for the rest. The rest period for the captain and first officer was hampered by construction noise in their apartment building. The flight engineer informed the captain when he reported that he had not slept properly that night due to itching; which he feared was caused by bugs in the bed. Both situations were reported to the company. So the entire crew was not rested properly; with the flight engineer situation being the worst. 2) the flight was the second leg of 2 flts with a very quick turn in ZZZZ. This was essentially a gas-and-go with only 24 mins between 'in' and 'out.' during the turn; the captain was busy trying to figure out why the company had planned to use ZZZZ as the alternate when the time of day would have allowed the use of ZZZZ2 and prevent having to needlessly offload cargo and carry extra fuel. Thus; when pressed for the final fuel load he told the flight engineer to bring it up to the norm for the lower flight and hold until we get the flight planning sorted out. The captain determined that although the time of day was good for using ZZZZ2; the WX there was below alternate minimums. Then he informed the engineer what the final fuel load would be and that it would be the same as the flight plan. The flight engineer got distraction trying to prepare his takeoff data and forgot to tell the mechanic the final fuel load. He also did not convert his gallons of fuel uploaded to pounds; and add that to the fuel remaining. 3) the airplane's fuel system is in kilograms and the captain had got into a bad habit of not using the totalizer in the front panel due to an intermittent error and that he was used to comparing the fuel required for the flight in pounds; which was converted by the flight engineer. Additionally; in the before start checklist; the callout is 'fuel quantity' -- the flight engineer responds with the fuel on board from the gauges on his panel in pounds; and the captain responds with checks which is when he compared it to the required fuel on the flight plan. In this case; the flight engineer called out 49500 pounds; and that checked with the flight plan. The captain should have doublechked the flight engineer's figures; but instead he only compared it to the total required on the flight plan. 4) in the before takeoff checklist; there should be a check for the minimum fuel required because there is often a big difference between block-out fuel and takeoff fuel due to ATC delays.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A300 FLT CREW DEPARTS WITH INSUFFICIENT FUEL AND ELECTS TO RETURN AFTER DISCOVERING THE ERROR CLIMBING THROUGH FL240.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS SCHEDULED FOR 1 HR 14 MINS FROM ZZZZ TO ZZZZ1 WITH ZZZZ THE PLANNED ALTERNATE. THE FLT PLAN FUEL WAS 49525 LBS BLOCK FUEL; WHICH INCLUDED 3000 LBS EXTRA FUEL; PLANNED TKOF FUEL WAS 48526 LBS AND MINIMUM FUEL FOR TKOF WAS 45526 LBS. THE FUEL REQUIRED WAS MORE THAN THE NORMAL FOR OUR DAYTIME OPS; DUE TO HAVING TO USE ZZZZ AS THE ALTERNATE INSTEAD OF ZZZZ2 DUE TO LOW WX IN ZZZZ2. NORMALLY; THE BLOCK FUEL WOULD BE APPROX 36000 LBS. THE PROB WITH THE FUEL LOAD WAS FIRST NOTICED AT THE TOP OF CLB FUEL CHK AT FL240 BY THE CAPT. THE FUEL AT THAT POINT WAS PLANNED TO BE APPROX 18500 KILOS/40800 LBS; AND INSTEAD IT WAS 9800 KILOS/21600 LBS. THE CAPT QUICKLY DETERMINED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO SAFELY CONTINUE TO ZZZZ; THUS; HE CONTACTED RADAR AND REQUESTED A RETURN TO ZZZZ. THE CREW DETERMINED THAT THE FUEL AT LNDG IN ZZZZ WOULD BE APPROX 17000 LBS; WHICH IS NORMAL FOR THE OP; AND WOULD EVEN PROVIDE LEGAL FUEL FOR USING ZZZZ3 AS AN IFR ALTERNATE; WHICH IS 14576 LBS. THE WX IN ZZZZ AND ZZZZ3 WAS VFR. THUS; THE CAPT INFORMED ATC THAT ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO GO TO ZZZZ1 THAT HE WAS NOT IN A FUEL EMER SITUATION. THE APCH AND LNDG IN ZZZZ WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE FUEL AT LNDG WAS 16500 LBS. THE BLOCK-IN FUEL WAS 16100 LBS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) THE CREW HAD A VERY EARLY RPT AFTER AN APPROX 20 HR REST PERIOD. THE FIRST 2 HRS WERE SPENT TRYING TO FIND THE LOCATION OF THE COMPANY-PROVIDED ACCOMMODATIONS THAT WERE PLANNED FOR THE REST. THE REST PERIOD FOR THE CAPT AND FO WAS HAMPERED BY CONSTRUCTION NOISE IN THEIR APARTMENT BUILDING. THE FE INFORMED THE CAPT WHEN HE RPTED THAT HE HAD NOT SLEPT PROPERLY THAT NIGHT DUE TO ITCHING; WHICH HE FEARED WAS CAUSED BY BUGS IN THE BED. BOTH SITUATIONS WERE RPTED TO THE COMPANY. SO THE ENTIRE CREW WAS NOT RESTED PROPERLY; WITH THE FE SITUATION BEING THE WORST. 2) THE FLT WAS THE SECOND LEG OF 2 FLTS WITH A VERY QUICK TURN IN ZZZZ. THIS WAS ESSENTIALLY A GAS-AND-GO WITH ONLY 24 MINS BTWN 'IN' AND 'OUT.' DURING THE TURN; THE CAPT WAS BUSY TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHY THE COMPANY HAD PLANNED TO USE ZZZZ AS THE ALTERNATE WHEN THE TIME OF DAY WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE USE OF ZZZZ2 AND PREVENT HAVING TO NEEDLESSLY OFFLOAD CARGO AND CARRY EXTRA FUEL. THUS; WHEN PRESSED FOR THE FINAL FUEL LOAD HE TOLD THE FE TO BRING IT UP TO THE NORM FOR THE LOWER FLT AND HOLD UNTIL WE GET THE FLT PLANNING SORTED OUT. THE CAPT DETERMINED THAT ALTHOUGH THE TIME OF DAY WAS GOOD FOR USING ZZZZ2; THE WX THERE WAS BELOW ALTERNATE MINIMUMS. THEN HE INFORMED THE ENGINEER WHAT THE FINAL FUEL LOAD WOULD BE AND THAT IT WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE FLT PLAN. THE FE GOT DISTR TRYING TO PREPARE HIS TKOF DATA AND FORGOT TO TELL THE MECH THE FINAL FUEL LOAD. HE ALSO DID NOT CONVERT HIS GALLONS OF FUEL UPLOADED TO LBS; AND ADD THAT TO THE FUEL REMAINING. 3) THE AIRPLANE'S FUEL SYS IS IN KILOGRAMS AND THE CAPT HAD GOT INTO A BAD HABIT OF NOT USING THE TOTALIZER IN THE FRONT PANEL DUE TO AN INTERMITTENT ERROR AND THAT HE WAS USED TO COMPARING THE FUEL REQUIRED FOR THE FLT IN LBS; WHICH WAS CONVERTED BY THE FE. ADDITIONALLY; IN THE BEFORE START CHKLIST; THE CALLOUT IS 'FUEL QUANTITY' -- THE FE RESPONDS WITH THE FUEL ON BOARD FROM THE GAUGES ON HIS PANEL IN LBS; AND THE CAPT RESPONDS WITH CHKS WHICH IS WHEN HE COMPARED IT TO THE REQUIRED FUEL ON THE FLT PLAN. IN THIS CASE; THE FE CALLED OUT 49500 LBS; AND THAT CHKED WITH THE FLT PLAN. THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE DOUBLECHKED THE FE'S FIGURES; BUT INSTEAD HE ONLY COMPARED IT TO THE TOTAL REQUIRED ON THE FLT PLAN. 4) IN THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST; THERE SHOULD BE A CHK FOR THE MINIMUM FUEL REQUIRED BECAUSE THERE IS OFTEN A BIG DIFFERENCE BTWN BLOCK-OUT FUEL AND TKOF FUEL DUE TO ATC DELAYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.