|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : zzz.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Operator||general aviation : instructional|
|Make Model Name||PA-44 Seminole Turbo Seminole|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 91|
|Flight Phase||landing : roll|
|Function||instruction : instructor|
|Qualification||pilot : cfi|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 200|
flight time total : 1180
flight time type : 250
|Anomaly||non adherence : company policies|
non adherence : published procedure
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : unable|
|Consequence||faa : investigated|
|Problem Areas||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
The student pilot and I departed from ZZZ on a simulated cross country flight. I gave the student pilot a diversion to ZZZ1. 10 mi outside of ZZZ1 we did commercial multi-maneuvers and then I asked the student to take me to ZZZ1 for a short-field landing. We began making radio calls 10 mi out. After entering a 2-3 mi left base for runway 4; the student lowered the landing gear and then put in 10 degrees LF flaps; then 25 degrees. The student then announced a left base for runway 4 on the CTAF and also the base turn to final. After turning final; the student did the before landing checklist. On short final; I verified 3 green and 1 in the mirror. I had previously asked the student to land the aircraft abeam the first taxiway. We landed a little beyond commercial standards at around 60-65 KIAS. After verifying that the student had the aircraft under control; I raised the flaps; keeping my eye on the runway as I did. Then I asked the student to continue. I do not recall seeing the student's hand leave the throttles. As we were rolling; the right side of the airplane dropped and we began to go towards the left side of the runway. I asked for the controls; not fully realizing what was going on. There was nothing I could do to keep the airplane on the runway. It wasn't until we hit the raised ground and I saw the propeller stop with its tip bent that I realized we had lost our right gear. We ended up on an embankment to the south side of the runway. Once stopped; the student and I began to secure the airplane. That's when I saw the gear selector switch was in the 'up' position. After discussing with the student the matter of the gear selector switch; the student maintained his hand was on the throttle the entire time; and I do not remember him taking his hand off of the throttle. My 'gut feeling' is that the selector switch was put in the 'up' position as I was lowering the flaps and looking straight ahead at the runway. It's not often that you get a gear 'failure.' if the switch was in the 'down' position after we came to rest; then I would be confident of a mechanical failure. But since it wasn't; I'm very skeptical. If it was a mechanical failure; you can bet next time I will doublechk the j-locks and make sure the gear is locked completely. If this was not a mechanical failure; and is pilot error; I will take full responsibility for not knowing where my student's hand was the entire time. The reason I took the flaps out was so the student's hand would not have to leave the throttle. After my student landed; we had a brief exchange of words. All I said was 'that was a little long' and he by 1 or 2 words and that was it. Perhaps that was enough to distract him. I was very confused about what I should have done afterwards; because I thought I was being safe. However; after time to reflect; I feel the best choice would have been to remain where I was and let my student handle the flaps so I could keep my eye on his every movement. I have been very successful in the past about anticipating mistakes my students would make and have caught the mistakes before they got too far. In this situation; I got caught because I didn't recognize the potential problem of a premature gear retraction and was not ready for the possibility. Regarding the distraction after he landed; I will save any comments until after we are stopped completely or we are in a more safe phase of flight (ie; downwind). Neither one of us was fatigued or distraction by outside 'factors' that I recall. One thing I could do is have every one of my students call out 'gear up' before they actually retract the gear. That could 'head off' any potential problems.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A PA44 INSTRUCTOR REPORTS THAT AFTER A TOUCH AND GO LNDG THE LNDG GEAR WAS RAISED WHILE ON THE RWY CAUSING R MLG TO RETRACT.
Narrative: THE STUDENT PLT AND I DEPARTED FROM ZZZ ON A SIMULATED XCOUNTRY FLT. I GAVE THE STUDENT PLT A DIVERSION TO ZZZ1. 10 MI OUTSIDE OF ZZZ1 WE DID COMMERCIAL MULTI-MANEUVERS AND THEN I ASKED THE STUDENT TO TAKE ME TO ZZZ1 FOR A SHORT-FIELD LNDG. WE BEGAN MAKING RADIO CALLS 10 MI OUT. AFTER ENTERING A 2-3 MI L BASE FOR RWY 4; THE STUDENT LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR AND THEN PUT IN 10 DEGS LF FLAPS; THEN 25 DEGS. THE STUDENT THEN ANNOUNCED A L BASE FOR RWY 4 ON THE CTAF AND ALSO THE BASE TURN TO FINAL. AFTER TURNING FINAL; THE STUDENT DID THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. ON SHORT FINAL; I VERIFIED 3 GREEN AND 1 IN THE MIRROR. I HAD PREVIOUSLY ASKED THE STUDENT TO LAND THE ACFT ABEAM THE FIRST TXWY. WE LANDED A LITTLE BEYOND COMMERCIAL STANDARDS AT AROUND 60-65 KIAS. AFTER VERIFYING THAT THE STUDENT HAD THE ACFT UNDER CTL; I RAISED THE FLAPS; KEEPING MY EYE ON THE RWY AS I DID. THEN I ASKED THE STUDENT TO CONTINUE. I DO NOT RECALL SEEING THE STUDENT'S HAND LEAVE THE THROTTLES. AS WE WERE ROLLING; THE R SIDE OF THE AIRPLANE DROPPED AND WE BEGAN TO GO TOWARDS THE L SIDE OF THE RWY. I ASKED FOR THE CTLS; NOT FULLY REALIZING WHAT WAS GOING ON. THERE WAS NOTHING I COULD DO TO KEEP THE AIRPLANE ON THE RWY. IT WASN'T UNTIL WE HIT THE RAISED GND AND I SAW THE PROP STOP WITH ITS TIP BENT THAT I REALIZED WE HAD LOST OUR R GEAR. WE ENDED UP ON AN EMBANKMENT TO THE S SIDE OF THE RWY. ONCE STOPPED; THE STUDENT AND I BEGAN TO SECURE THE AIRPLANE. THAT'S WHEN I SAW THE GEAR SELECTOR SWITCH WAS IN THE 'UP' POS. AFTER DISCUSSING WITH THE STUDENT THE MATTER OF THE GEAR SELECTOR SWITCH; THE STUDENT MAINTAINED HIS HAND WAS ON THE THROTTLE THE ENTIRE TIME; AND I DO NOT REMEMBER HIM TAKING HIS HAND OFF OF THE THROTTLE. MY 'GUT FEELING' IS THAT THE SELECTOR SWITCH WAS PUT IN THE 'UP' POS AS I WAS LOWERING THE FLAPS AND LOOKING STRAIGHT AHEAD AT THE RWY. IT'S NOT OFTEN THAT YOU GET A GEAR 'FAILURE.' IF THE SWITCH WAS IN THE 'DOWN' POS AFTER WE CAME TO REST; THEN I WOULD BE CONFIDENT OF A MECHANICAL FAILURE. BUT SINCE IT WASN'T; I'M VERY SKEPTICAL. IF IT WAS A MECHANICAL FAILURE; YOU CAN BET NEXT TIME I WILL DOUBLECHK THE J-LOCKS AND MAKE SURE THE GEAR IS LOCKED COMPLETELY. IF THIS WAS NOT A MECHANICAL FAILURE; AND IS PLT ERROR; I WILL TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR NOT KNOWING WHERE MY STUDENT'S HAND WAS THE ENTIRE TIME. THE REASON I TOOK THE FLAPS OUT WAS SO THE STUDENT'S HAND WOULD NOT HAVE TO LEAVE THE THROTTLE. AFTER MY STUDENT LANDED; WE HAD A BRIEF EXCHANGE OF WORDS. ALL I SAID WAS 'THAT WAS A LITTLE LONG' AND HE BY 1 OR 2 WORDS AND THAT WAS IT. PERHAPS THAT WAS ENOUGH TO DISTRACT HIM. I WAS VERY CONFUSED ABOUT WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE AFTERWARDS; BECAUSE I THOUGHT I WAS BEING SAFE. HOWEVER; AFTER TIME TO REFLECT; I FEEL THE BEST CHOICE WOULD HAVE BEEN TO REMAIN WHERE I WAS AND LET MY STUDENT HANDLE THE FLAPS SO I COULD KEEP MY EYE ON HIS EVERY MOVEMENT. I HAVE BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN THE PAST ABOUT ANTICIPATING MISTAKES MY STUDENTS WOULD MAKE AND HAVE CAUGHT THE MISTAKES BEFORE THEY GOT TOO FAR. IN THIS SITUATION; I GOT CAUGHT BECAUSE I DIDN'T RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL PROB OF A PREMATURE GEAR RETRACTION AND WAS NOT READY FOR THE POSSIBILITY. REGARDING THE DISTR AFTER HE LANDED; I WILL SAVE ANY COMMENTS UNTIL AFTER WE ARE STOPPED COMPLETELY OR WE ARE IN A MORE SAFE PHASE OF FLT (IE; DOWNWIND). NEITHER ONE OF US WAS FATIGUED OR DISTR BY OUTSIDE 'FACTORS' THAT I RECALL. ONE THING I COULD DO IS HAVE EVERY ONE OF MY STUDENTS CALL OUT 'GEAR UP' BEFORE THEY ACTUALLY RETRACT THE GEAR. THAT COULD 'HEAD OFF' ANY POTENTIAL PROBS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.