Narrative:

I was working the R58 radar sector at ZJX. The R15 radar sector which is 2 sectors away was heavily impacted with WX from west of tallahassee to southeast of orlando. The sector from the nnw was still routing aircraft at the known WX and nothing was being done from the tmu to reroute the aircraft away. The supervisor for the gulf area (R15) and the supervisor for the south area (R57) coordination with the R57 controller and the R58 controller (me). We came up with a plan to take all aircraft across the departure sector for orlando (R57) and deliver them to me (R58). We were in the middle of coordinating with both areas; 3 controllers and orlando approach to help keep the aircraft from having to enter known thunderstorm. This was done at the last min and did not serve the users (airlines; pilots; and passenger) very well. If this action would have been done 100 mi before; all planes would have been less impacted and safety would have been higher. All aircraft were routed north of the precipitation and were worked over omn VOR into orlando approach's airspace without incident and with happy pilots. During this time other overflt aircraft transitioned the R58 airspace and were given WX calls before reaching the precipitation; that was outside of R58's airspace. This center (ZJX) continues to send aircraft at known WX phenomenon and leave it to the controller to at the last min turn aircraft away from thunderstorms and traverse other sectors sometimes only as pointouts due to the complexity of the last min coordination and not thinking far enough in advance for WX situations. We also run them at military airspace that is active and hope that the military controller can accept a pointout. If unable; the management expects the pilot to declare an emergency to enter the airspace or reverse course. This is a bad practice that needs to stop. We continue to run aircraft at thunderstorms; leaving it up to the pilot to declare that he will not continue on the route only making the controller call WX and if the controller fails to call WX to one aircraft; not only does he get written up on a remote performance observation; the controller is opened up to liability for the lack of the FAA management team (traffic management unit included) to do a job that would help keep aircraft safe.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZJX CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING LATE DECISIONS AND POOR PLANNING BY TFC MGMNT REF NECESSARY ROUTING CHANGES BECAUSE OF WX FACTORS.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE R58 RADAR SECTOR AT ZJX. THE R15 RADAR SECTOR WHICH IS 2 SECTORS AWAY WAS HEAVILY IMPACTED WITH WX FROM W OF TALLAHASSEE TO SE OF ORLANDO. THE SECTOR FROM THE NNW WAS STILL ROUTING ACFT AT THE KNOWN WX AND NOTHING WAS BEING DONE FROM THE TMU TO REROUTE THE ACFT AWAY. THE SUPVR FOR THE GULF AREA (R15) AND THE SUPVR FOR THE S AREA (R57) COORD WITH THE R57 CTLR AND THE R58 CTLR (ME). WE CAME UP WITH A PLAN TO TAKE ALL ACFT ACROSS THE DEP SECTOR FOR ORLANDO (R57) AND DELIVER THEM TO ME (R58). WE WERE IN THE MIDDLE OF COORDINATING WITH BOTH AREAS; 3 CTLRS AND ORLANDO APCH TO HELP KEEP THE ACFT FROM HAVING TO ENTER KNOWN TSTM. THIS WAS DONE AT THE LAST MIN AND DID NOT SERVE THE USERS (AIRLINES; PLTS; AND PAX) VERY WELL. IF THIS ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN DONE 100 MI BEFORE; ALL PLANES WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS IMPACTED AND SAFETY WOULD HAVE BEEN HIGHER. ALL ACFT WERE ROUTED N OF THE PRECIP AND WERE WORKED OVER OMN VOR INTO ORLANDO APCH'S AIRSPACE WITHOUT INCIDENT AND WITH HAPPY PLTS. DURING THIS TIME OTHER OVERFLT ACFT TRANSITIONED THE R58 AIRSPACE AND WERE GIVEN WX CALLS BEFORE REACHING THE PRECIP; THAT WAS OUTSIDE OF R58'S AIRSPACE. THIS CTR (ZJX) CONTINUES TO SEND ACFT AT KNOWN WX PHENOMENON AND LEAVE IT TO THE CTLR TO AT THE LAST MIN TURN ACFT AWAY FROM TSTMS AND TRAVERSE OTHER SECTORS SOMETIMES ONLY AS POINTOUTS DUE TO THE COMPLEXITY OF THE LAST MIN COORD AND NOT THINKING FAR ENOUGH IN ADVANCE FOR WX SITUATIONS. WE ALSO RUN THEM AT MIL AIRSPACE THAT IS ACTIVE AND HOPE THAT THE MIL CTLR CAN ACCEPT A POINTOUT. IF UNABLE; THE MGMNT EXPECTS THE PLT TO DECLARE AN EMER TO ENTER THE AIRSPACE OR REVERSE COURSE. THIS IS A BAD PRACTICE THAT NEEDS TO STOP. WE CONTINUE TO RUN ACFT AT TSTMS; LEAVING IT UP TO THE PLT TO DECLARE THAT HE WILL NOT CONTINUE ON THE RTE ONLY MAKING THE CTLR CALL WX AND IF THE CTLR FAILS TO CALL WX TO ONE ACFT; NOT ONLY DOES HE GET WRITTEN UP ON A REMOTE PERFORMANCE OBSERVATION; THE CTLR IS OPENED UP TO LIABILITY FOR THE LACK OF THE FAA MGMNT TEAM (TFC MGMNT UNIT INCLUDED) TO DO A JOB THAT WOULD HELP KEEP ACFT SAFE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.