Narrative:

Flight was on descent into las vegas on the kepec 1 arrival. We were cleared to descend via the arrival. First officer was flying while I was monitoring. At FL180 I secured the cabin with an announcement and a ring. The flight attendants began their announcements and began securing the cabin. As we leveled at 13000 ft I called approach control and told them that the tops of the clouds were at 12700 ft and it would be a good thing to try to let the airplanes on the arrival stay as high as possible on the approach. As we made the turn wbound; I noted the winds to be about 230 degrees at 61 KTS; our indicated airspeed was 240 KIAS. I explained to my first officer that we should go ahead and slow down with this much of a tailwind and stay high to hit the fixes as required at a slower speed. First officer began slowing down. I dropped my head to set a frequency when we hit a severe jolt. The airplane first dropped hard; then went back up elevating us against the seatbelts and then pushing us back in the seats with a side load that followed. I looked ahead and saw a break in the clouds to the right and told first officer to turn right and called approach control telling them we were turning to the right around clouds and that we had encountered severe turbulence during the descent. I asked first officer if he could fly and talk to the approach control while I called the back to check on status of everyone. The flight attendants were already talking back and forth on the intercom checking on each other. I was first listening to the status and was getting information that a baby had gone flying up; 2 passenger seatbelts had come loose; and the flight attendant in the back had been knocked down. Although I could not get a defined answer on everyone's condition; I continued to monitor their conversations; picking up bits and pieces of information; while I called operations and told them that we had encountered severe turbulence. It was very important just to leave the service interphone on and continue to listen to the conversations between the flight attendants and then acknowledge that I got the information. They were talking fast enough between the 3 of them that I got most of the information just by listening. I called operations and told them that we had possible injuries to flight attendants and passenger; but did not know to what extent the injuries were. At this time I got calls from maintenance in las vegas; asking me to define the parameters of the event. I later got this as trying to determine at that time whether or not we had hit severe turbulence. This was very distracting at the time I was still trying to get information from the back of the airplane. I told maintenance that we were on approach and we would talk on the ground. I confirmed with the flight attendants that I got the information that we needed to have emt meet the airplane and that we might have possible injuries. I went back to join first officer on approach control and at that time first officer was working on slowing behind traffic on final approach. I advised the tower that if we got too close to the aircraft ahead; that we had possible medical situation and would request the right runway in order to avoid going around. Right then we hit another windshear; I pushed the power levers up to about GA thrust; then pulled them back and gave the airplane back to first officer for the landing. He did a nice job of the touchdown; there were claps from the back; and we were cleared across runway 25R to gate. Upon arrival at the gate we were met by the emt group and maintenance. As the passenger were deplaning; maintenance brought me the severe turbulence condition inspection definition and asked me to review it. My first officer and I reviewed the criteria; which included objects being thrown around and we had 2 seatbelts fail. 1 passenger made comments about being a safety inspector(?). His seatbelt failed. We wrote up the incident in the log. We had no warning. We need relief on the altitudes on the kepec and clarr arrs. This area is directly over the highest mountain point on the arrival and always a potential area of turbulence when there are high winds and clouds. We asked for relief but did not get it. We should have said we could not descend due to WX. Maintenance should not be calling for parameters while we are in approach phase of the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 FLT CREW INBOUND TO LAS ENCOUNTERED SEVERE TURBULENCE.

Narrative: FLT WAS ON DSCNT INTO LAS VEGAS ON THE KEPEC 1 ARR. WE WERE CLRED TO DSND VIA THE ARR. FO WAS FLYING WHILE I WAS MONITORING. AT FL180 I SECURED THE CABIN WITH AN ANNOUNCEMENT AND A RING. THE FLT ATTENDANTS BEGAN THEIR ANNOUNCEMENTS AND BEGAN SECURING THE CABIN. AS WE LEVELED AT 13000 FT I CALLED APCH CTL AND TOLD THEM THAT THE TOPS OF THE CLOUDS WERE AT 12700 FT AND IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING TO TRY TO LET THE AIRPLANES ON THE ARR STAY AS HIGH AS POSSIBLE ON THE APCH. AS WE MADE THE TURN WBOUND; I NOTED THE WINDS TO BE ABOUT 230 DEGS AT 61 KTS; OUR INDICATED AIRSPD WAS 240 KIAS. I EXPLAINED TO MY FO THAT WE SHOULD GO AHEAD AND SLOW DOWN WITH THIS MUCH OF A TAILWIND AND STAY HIGH TO HIT THE FIXES AS REQUIRED AT A SLOWER SPD. FO BEGAN SLOWING DOWN. I DROPPED MY HEAD TO SET A FREQ WHEN WE HIT A SEVERE JOLT. THE AIRPLANE FIRST DROPPED HARD; THEN WENT BACK UP ELEVATING US AGAINST THE SEATBELTS AND THEN PUSHING US BACK IN THE SEATS WITH A SIDE LOAD THAT FOLLOWED. I LOOKED AHEAD AND SAW A BREAK IN THE CLOUDS TO THE R AND TOLD FO TO TURN R AND CALLED APCH CTL TELLING THEM WE WERE TURNING TO THE R AROUND CLOUDS AND THAT WE HAD ENCOUNTERED SEVERE TURB DURING THE DSCNT. I ASKED FO IF HE COULD FLY AND TALK TO THE APCH CTL WHILE I CALLED THE BACK TO CHK ON STATUS OF EVERYONE. THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE ALREADY TALKING BACK AND FORTH ON THE INTERCOM CHKING ON EACH OTHER. I WAS FIRST LISTENING TO THE STATUS AND WAS GETTING INFO THAT A BABY HAD GONE FLYING UP; 2 PAX SEATBELTS HAD COME LOOSE; AND THE FLT ATTENDANT IN THE BACK HAD BEEN KNOCKED DOWN. ALTHOUGH I COULD NOT GET A DEFINED ANSWER ON EVERYONE'S CONDITION; I CONTINUED TO MONITOR THEIR CONVERSATIONS; PICKING UP BITS AND PIECES OF INFO; WHILE I CALLED OPS AND TOLD THEM THAT WE HAD ENCOUNTERED SEVERE TURB. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT JUST TO LEAVE THE SVC INTERPHONE ON AND CONTINUE TO LISTEN TO THE CONVERSATIONS BTWN THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND THEN ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I GOT THE INFO. THEY WERE TALKING FAST ENOUGH BTWN THE 3 OF THEM THAT I GOT MOST OF THE INFO JUST BY LISTENING. I CALLED OPS AND TOLD THEM THAT WE HAD POSSIBLE INJURIES TO FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX; BUT DID NOT KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT THE INJURIES WERE. AT THIS TIME I GOT CALLS FROM MAINT IN LAS VEGAS; ASKING ME TO DEFINE THE PARAMETERS OF THE EVENT. I LATER GOT THIS AS TRYING TO DETERMINE AT THAT TIME WHETHER OR NOT WE HAD HIT SEVERE TURB. THIS WAS VERY DISTRACTING AT THE TIME I WAS STILL TRYING TO GET INFO FROM THE BACK OF THE AIRPLANE. I TOLD MAINT THAT WE WERE ON APCH AND WE WOULD TALK ON THE GND. I CONFIRMED WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS THAT I GOT THE INFO THAT WE NEEDED TO HAVE EMT MEET THE AIRPLANE AND THAT WE MIGHT HAVE POSSIBLE INJURIES. I WENT BACK TO JOIN FO ON APCH CTL AND AT THAT TIME FO WAS WORKING ON SLOWING BEHIND TFC ON FINAL APCH. I ADVISED THE TWR THAT IF WE GOT TOO CLOSE TO THE ACFT AHEAD; THAT WE HAD POSSIBLE MEDICAL SITUATION AND WOULD REQUEST THE R RWY IN ORDER TO AVOID GOING AROUND. RIGHT THEN WE HIT ANOTHER WINDSHEAR; I PUSHED THE PWR LEVERS UP TO ABOUT GA THRUST; THEN PULLED THEM BACK AND GAVE THE AIRPLANE BACK TO FO FOR THE LNDG. HE DID A NICE JOB OF THE TOUCHDOWN; THERE WERE CLAPS FROM THE BACK; AND WE WERE CLRED ACROSS RWY 25R TO GATE. UPON ARR AT THE GATE WE WERE MET BY THE EMT GROUP AND MAINT. AS THE PAX WERE DEPLANING; MAINT BROUGHT ME THE SEVERE TURB CONDITION INSPECTION DEFINITION AND ASKED ME TO REVIEW IT. MY FO AND I REVIEWED THE CRITERIA; WHICH INCLUDED OBJECTS BEING THROWN AROUND AND WE HAD 2 SEATBELTS FAIL. 1 PAX MADE COMMENTS ABOUT BEING A SAFETY INSPECTOR(?). HIS SEATBELT FAILED. WE WROTE UP THE INCIDENT IN THE LOG. WE HAD NO WARNING. WE NEED RELIEF ON THE ALTS ON THE KEPEC AND CLARR ARRS. THIS AREA IS DIRECTLY OVER THE HIGHEST MOUNTAIN POINT ON THE ARR AND ALWAYS A POTENTIAL AREA OF TURB WHEN THERE ARE HIGH WINDS AND CLOUDS. WE ASKED FOR RELIEF BUT DID NOT GET IT. WE SHOULD HAVE SAID WE COULD NOT DSND DUE TO WX. MAINT SHOULD NOT BE CALLING FOR PARAMETERS WHILE WE ARE IN APCH PHASE OF THE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.