Narrative:

We set up for ILS to runway 8 based on current ATIS. About 20 miles from airport; ATC said that a new ATIS was current with wind 260/14g22 (approximately; don't remember exact). As pm; I got new ATIS and reran performance computer since 260 was a direct tailwind for runway 8. It showed runway 8; 15 as all bracketed while runway 33 had min 2 bracketed with positive margins for 3 and maximum. I didn't have runway 26 selected as a runway in the performance computer. We told ATC that we'd need to circle to runway 33. They said to coordinate with tower and switched us. Tower said that a circle to runway 33 was fine and that he would call our initial turn for the circle due to traffic departing runway 15. We called them in sight and were told to begin our circle. The captain; PF; started to turn but then steadied up again. I stated that we were high and tight and then tower queried our intentions. It was at this point that the captain realized we were cleared to land runway 33 and not runway 26. We asked for a right turn to get lined up for runway 33 and were approved. We completed a turn back to final for runway 33 and were set up on final a little above 500 ft but with a high sink rate. I called sink rate. I then called go-around. The captain must not have heard and by the time I was going to repeat the go-around call; we were back at a stable sink rate for runway 33. The landing and rollout were uneventful. I feel that this visual was a mess since the captain and I were not on the same page with regards to our plans for the approach. In discussion afterward; the captain said that he must have assumed we were going to circle to runway 26 since the winds were so strong from that direction and it didn't register that tower cleared us for runway 33. I feel that I should have spoken up sooner and asked about his plan for the circle. We were behind on planning for the circle due to the late and significant ATIS change in close. Tower calling the start of our circle with regards to the departing traffic also did not help. I should have called the go-around sooner and louder; but by the time I was going to repeat it; we seemed stable and a safe landing could be completed from that position. A late notice circle at an airport with terrain needs to be more thoroughly briefed and in the future I will ask the captain to vocalize his plan so that I know his intentions. Also; if a poor visual puts us in a situation where we are not stable and I call a go-around; I need to speak up much louder than normal cockpit conversation to ensure the other pilot hears since they are most likely task saturated.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this approach was conducted to bur airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLT CREW RECEIVES LATE NOTICE THAT RWY 8 AT BUR HAS STRONG TAILWINDS AND ELECTS TO CIRCLE TO RWY 33. LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN CREW MEMBERS AND BETWEEN TOWER RESULTS IN UNSTABILIZED APPROACH.

Narrative: WE SET UP FOR ILS TO RWY 8 BASED ON CURRENT ATIS. ABOUT 20 MILES FROM AIRPORT; ATC SAID THAT A NEW ATIS WAS CURRENT WITH WIND 260/14G22 (APPROXIMATELY; DON'T REMEMBER EXACT). AS PM; I GOT NEW ATIS AND RERAN PERFORMANCE COMPUTER SINCE 260 WAS A DIRECT TAILWIND FOR RWY 8. IT SHOWED RUNWAY 8; 15 AS ALL BRACKETED WHILE RWY 33 HAD MIN 2 BRACKETED WITH POSITIVE MARGINS FOR 3 AND MAX. I DIDN'T HAVE RWY 26 SELECTED AS A RUNWAY IN THE PERFORMANCE COMPUTER. WE TOLD ATC THAT WE'D NEED TO CIRCLE TO RWY 33. THEY SAID TO COORDINATE WITH TOWER AND SWITCHED US. TOWER SAID THAT A CIRCLE TO RWY 33 WAS FINE AND THAT HE WOULD CALL OUR INITIAL TURN FOR THE CIRCLE DUE TO TRAFFIC DEPARTING RWY 15. WE CALLED THEM IN SIGHT AND WERE TOLD TO BEGIN OUR CIRCLE. THE CAPTAIN; PF; STARTED TO TURN BUT THEN STEADIED UP AGAIN. I STATED THAT WE WERE HIGH AND TIGHT AND THEN TOWER QUERIED OUR INTENTIONS. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT THE CAPTAIN REALIZED WE WERE CLEARED TO LAND RWY 33 AND NOT RWY 26. WE ASKED FOR A RIGHT TURN TO GET LINED UP FOR RWY 33 AND WERE APPROVED. WE COMPLETED A TURN BACK TO FINAL FOR RWY 33 AND WERE SET UP ON FINAL A LITTLE ABOVE 500 FT BUT WITH A HIGH SINK RATE. I CALLED SINK RATE. I THEN CALLED GO-AROUND. THE CAPTAIN MUST NOT HAVE HEARD AND BY THE TIME I WAS GOING TO REPEAT THE GO-AROUND CALL; WE WERE BACK AT A STABLE SINK RATE FOR RWY 33. THE LANDING AND ROLLOUT WERE UNEVENTFUL. I FEEL THAT THIS VISUAL WAS A MESS SINCE THE CAPTAIN AND I WERE NOT ON THE SAME PAGE WITH REGARDS TO OUR PLANS FOR THE APPROACH. IN DISCUSSION AFTERWARD; THE CAPTAIN SAID THAT HE MUST HAVE ASSUMED WE WERE GOING TO CIRCLE TO RWY 26 SINCE THE WINDS WERE SO STRONG FROM THAT DIRECTION AND IT DIDN'T REGISTER THAT TOWER CLEARED US FOR RWY 33. I FEEL THAT I SHOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP SOONER AND ASKED ABOUT HIS PLAN FOR THE CIRCLE. WE WERE BEHIND ON PLANNING FOR THE CIRCLE DUE TO THE LATE AND SIGNIFICANT ATIS CHANGE IN CLOSE. TOWER CALLING THE START OF OUR CIRCLE WITH REGARDS TO THE DEPARTING TRAFFIC ALSO DID NOT HELP. I SHOULD HAVE CALLED THE GO-AROUND SOONER AND LOUDER; BUT BY THE TIME I WAS GOING TO REPEAT IT; WE SEEMED STABLE AND A SAFE LANDING COULD BE COMPLETED FROM THAT POSITION. A LATE NOTICE CIRCLE AT AN AIRPORT WITH TERRAIN NEEDS TO BE MORE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED AND IN THE FUTURE I WILL ASK THE CAPTAIN TO VOCALIZE HIS PLAN SO THAT I KNOW HIS INTENTIONS. ALSO; IF A POOR VISUAL PUTS US IN A SITUATION WHERE WE ARE NOT STABLE AND I CALL A GO-AROUND; I NEED TO SPEAK UP MUCH LOUDER THAN NORMAL COCKPIT CONVERSATION TO ENSURE THE OTHER PILOT HEARS SINCE THEY ARE MOST LIKELY TASK SATURATED.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS APCH WAS CONDUCTED TO BUR ARPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.